PNC Bank Corp. v. WCAB (STAMOS)

• Decision Date: 17 September 2003
• Citation: 831 A.2d 1269
• Parties: PNC BANK CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (STAMOS), Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

831 A.2d 1269

PNC BANK CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (STAMOS), Respondent.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued October 9, 2002.

Decided September 17, 2003.

Joseph A. Fricker, Pittsburgh, for petitioner.

Stephen J. O'Brien, Pittsburgh, for respondent.

BEFORE: COLINS, President Judge, SMITH-RIBNER, Judge, PELLEGRINI, Judge, LEADBETTER, Judge, COHN, Judge, SIMPSON, Judge, and LEAVITT, Judge.

OPINION BY Judge LEADBETTER.

In this appeal we are called upon to address the issue left open by our Supreme Court in Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 552 Pa. 253, 714 A.2d 1016 (1998), to wit: the continued viability of the doctrine of common law marriage. PNC Corporation (PNC), employer of decedent, Janet Stamos, appeals the order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board), affirming the grant of John Kretz's fatal claim petition after concluding that the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) properly concluded that Kretz was the common law spouse of Stamos. PNC argues both that the doctrine of common law marriage ought to be abandoned, and that even if it is not, Kretz failed to meet the heavy burden of proof required to establish such a union. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the time has come to abolish the doctrine, but that this decision should be given purely prospective effect. Because we further conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the findings of fact upon which the WCJ rested her decision, we affirm the order of the Board.

In 1997, Kretz filed a fatal claim petition alleging that he was the common law spouse of Stamos, who died in an airplane crash in 1994 while working for employer. The nature of Kretz's relationship with Stamos was the subject of the hearings that followed before the WCJ. In Pennsylvania, "a common law marriage can only be created by the exchange of words in the present tense [`verba in praesenti `], spoken with the specific purpose that the legal relationship of husband and wife is created by that." Staudenmayer, 552 Pa. at 261-62,714 A.2d at 1020 (footnote omitted).¹ In order to establish the requisite verba de praesenti, Kretz submitted into evidence a document entitled, "Affidavit of Eligible Member of Iron Workers Benefit Plans of Western Pennsylvania Common Law Spouse."² The affidavit stated, in pertinent part:

I, John A. Kretz, in support of my request to include my spouse, Janet Stamos, as a beneficiary under the Iron Workers Welfare Plan of Western Pennsylvania, Iron Workers Pension Plan of Western Pennsylvania, and Iron Workers Local No. 3 Annuity Plan, aver that on or about the 15th day of June, 1988, we, the undersigned, having the capacity to marry, did unite ourselves in marriage through the mutual exchange of words which expressed our present intent to live together as husband and wife; and further, since the aforementioned dated [sic] we have openly lived together as husband and wife, and are so accepted by our family, friends and community.

By signing this affidavit, I understand that my spouse will be legally eligible for any pension and/or annuity benefits upon my death. I also understand that my spouse must now sign and agree to any withdrawals from my pension and/or annuity plans. I also understand that in order to remove my spouse from my coverage, I must obtain a legal divorce.

Hearing of July 23, 1997, Claimant's exhibit 1. Both Kretz and Stamos signed the affidavit on December 22, 1990 and their signatures were notarized.

Kretz also testified to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the affidavit. According to Kretz, the couple signed the affidavit because they were consolidating their benefits and insurances and he wanted to insure that if anything happened to him, his assets would go to Stamos. Kretz testified that prior to signing the affidavit, he and Stamos discussed the date of their marriage in order to pick the date of their anniversary. He admitted, however, that he meant to indicate on the affidavit that their marriage occurred in 1989 rather than 1988 and that the 1988 date was a mistake.³ Kretz also testified that he and Stamos began living together in June of 1989 and that they subsequently exchanged rings as a sign of their marriage. Kretz stated that their marriage was not taken lightly.

With respect to title to their property, Kretz testified that they did not have any jointly owned assets or debts. Although the couple was mutually dependent upon each other financially, they maintained separate bank accounts and the mortgage and deed to the couple's house, which was purchased in 1990, were in Stamos' name only. He also noted that they filed separate tax returns. In addition, Kretz offered into evidence credit card statements, cancelled checks and receipts to demonstrate the various activities and vacations that the couple took together. He also offered into evidence various sympathy cards that referred to Stamos as his wife.⁴ Kretz testified that following Stamos' death, he was the main point of contact between the family and airline.

Kretz also presented the deposition testimony of Boe Gillespie, the Administrative Manager of the Iron Workers Plans of Western Pennsylvania. According to Gillespie, once the common law spouse affidavit is executed, the participant cannot remove the spouse from coverage unless a divorce is obtained. In addition, a plan representative counsels participants regarding the import of executing the affidavit. Finally, employer offered into evidence Stamos' death certificate, which indicated that she was divorced and had no surviving spouse at the time of her death.

The WCJ found that:

The evidence establishes verba de praesenti between John Kretz and Janet Stamos. Submitted into evidence was the [Affidavit] completed December 22, 1990 by claimant and [Stamos] and notarized before a Notary Public. The affidavit provides that John A. Kretz requests to include his spouse, Janet Stamos as a beneficiary under the [Pension Plan]. The document sets forth that "we, the undersigned, having the capacity to marry, did unite ourselves in marriage through the mutual exchange of words which expressed our present intent to live together as husband and wife; and further, since the aforementioned date we have openly lived together as husband and wife, and are so accepted by our family, friends and community." While it may be suggested that the designation is only to provide health benefits not otherwise available to a non-spouse, the completion of the form entitles the "spouse to a marital interest in Pension and Annuity Plans. Once completed, the husband and wife status remains and requires spousal approval, via signature, for any withdrawals from the pension and/or annuity plans.

....

The testimony of Mr. Kretz, and the common law spouse affidavit clearly establish that the parties had completed the verba de praesenti, the present intention to marry, required to establish a common law marriage. The parties set forth on December 22, 1990 the written words of their present intention to be married, had their written intention notarized at a magistrate's office. They discussed the date they desired to be their marriage date for their upcoming two year anniversary. Although the date listed on the form incorrectly listed June 15, 1988 instead of June 15, 1989, the parties executed the document setting forth their present intention to be married on December 22, 1990. There did not exist any impediment to the parties' marriage as of 1989 and therefore, clear and convincing evidence exists that the parties had repeated their verba de praesenti on December 22, 1990.

Kretz v. PNC Bank Corp., Bureau Claim No. 983729, slip op. at 2-4 (WCJ's decision and order, April 28, 2000) (Findings of fact nos. 8 and 12). Based upon her finding that Kretz was married via common law marriage to Stamos at the time of her death, the WCJ concluded that Kretz was entitled to surviving spouse's benefits. On appeal, the Board affirmed.⁵

Relying on our Supreme Court's clearly articulated skepticism in Staudenmayer regarding the continued viability of the common law marriage doctrine in Pennsylvania, employer asks this court to abolish the doctrine as antiquated and lacking any valid purpose in today's society. Employer is correct that the Supreme Court has clearly stated its disapproval of the doctrine.

As the Supreme Court noted in Staudenmayer, marriage is a "civil contract by which a man and woman take each other for husband and wife." 552 Pa. at 260, 714 A.2d at 1019. Two forms of marriage are recognized in Pennsylvania, namely, ceremonial, which involves a marriage performed by a religious or civil authority with the usual ceremony or formalities, and common law. Id. at 260-61, 714 A.2d at 1019. Notwithstanding the provision in Section 1301 of the 1990 Marriage Law (Law)⁶ that "[n]o person shall be joined in marriage in this Commonwealth until a marriage license has been obtained," the Law explicitly left unchanged the judicially-created doctrine of common law marriage. 23 Pa.C.S. § 1103. Pennsylvania, however, is one of the minority of states that continue to recognize common law marriages. See Staudenmayer, 552 Pa. at 261 n. 3,

714 A.2d at 1020 n. 3 (listing the 11 other states that recognize common law marriages).

The doctrine of common law marriage was recognized by the United States Supreme Court as early as 1877, see Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 24 L.Ed. 826 (1877),

and by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as early as 1873, see Richard v. Brehm, 73 Pa. 140 (1873). Despite the well-established history of the doctrine, different views exist regarding its origins. In A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 Or. L.Rev. 709 (1996), Cynthia Grant Bowman provides an extensive historical review of common law marriages. According to Bowman's research, common law marriage in the United States stems from the informal marriages common in Europe prior to the...