Poehlman v. Feferman

• Decision Date: 27 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 71A05-9709-CV-384,71A05-9709-CV-384
• Citation: 693 N.E.2d 1355
• Parties: Helen M. POEHLMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Martin E. FEFERMAN, M.D., Appellee-Defendant. Helen M. POEHLMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Martin E. FEFERMAN, M.D., Physicians Insurance Company of Indiana and Marjorie Maginn Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Indiana, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1355

693 N.E.2d 1355

Helen M. POEHLMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Martin E. FEFERMAN, M.D., Appellee-Defendant.

Helen M. POEHLMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Martin E. FEFERMAN, M.D., Physicians Insurance Company of

Indiana and Marjorie Maginn Commissioner of

Insurance of the State of Indiana,

Appellees-Defendants.

No. 71A05-9709-CV-384.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 27, 1998.

F. Boyd Hovde, Regina M. Poore, Hovde Law Firm, Indianapolis, for Appellant-Plaintiff.

Matthew w. Conner, Tabbert Hahn Earnest Weddle & Starkey, P.C., Indianapolis, for Appellees-Defendants.

OPINION

GARRARD, Judge

Helen Poehlman ("Poehlman") appeals the judgment in her declaratory action against Dr. Martin Feferman ("Feferman"), Physicians Insurance Company of Indiana ("PICI"), and Marjorie Maginn as Commissioner of Insurance ("Commissioner"), claiming that the trial court erred when it ruled that she was not entitled to post-judgment interest on her medical malpractice judgment against Feferman.

We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

FACTS

On April 4, 1996, Poehlman received a judgment in the amount of $345,263 plus costs against Feferman for medical malpractice. At that time, Feferman was insured for medical malpractice by PICI. On August 30, 1996, PICI paid, on behalf of Feferman, $103,733.09 to the St. Joseph County Clerk to satisfy the portion of the judgment that Feferman owed under the Medical Malpractice Act ("Act"). This sum consisted of the $100,000 that Feferman owed under Indiana Code § 27-12-14-3(b) plus $3,331.84 in interest and $401.25 in costs. Subsequently, Feferman filed a petition to appoint a commissioner to release the judgment.

Poehlman filed suit against Feferman, PICI, and the Commissioner on October 15, 1996, seeking a declaratory judgment stating that post-judgment interest was due pursuant to Indiana Code § 24-4.6-1-101. The trial court eventually consolidated Poehlman's declaratory action with Feferman's petition for appointment of a commissioner to release the judgment. On December 4, 1996, by a stipulation of the parties, the St. Joseph County Clerk released $100,000 of the money paid by PICI, on behalf of Feferman, to Poehlman. The stipulation left unresolved, however, the amount of post-judgment interest, if any, that Feferman owed on the judgment. One month later, the Commissioner paid $245,263 to Poehlman. This sum represented the unpaid balance of Poehlman's judgment against Feferman, but did not include post-judgment interest or costs.

After the parties submitted written briefs on the issue of post-judgment interest, the trial court ruled that Poehlman was not entitled to post-judgment interest from any of the three defendants. The trial court, therefore, ruled that Feferman owed the $100,000 already paid plus $401.25 in costs and that the Commissioner was not required to pay any additional amount. Believing its declaratory judgment to have resolved the issue of the release of judgment, the trial court deferred ruling on Feferman's petition to appoint a commissioner to release judgment. Poehlman appeals the trial court's judgment. Feferman cross-appeals the assessment of the $401.25 in costs and the trial court's failure to rule on his petition.

ISSUES

Poehlman raises three issues on appeal which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred by ruling that she was not entitled to post-judgment interest.

Feferman and PICI raise two cross-appeal issues which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred by ordering Feferman to pay $401.25 in costs in addition to the $100,000.

II. Whether the trial court erred by not ordering the appointment of a commissioner to release the judgment held by Poehlman.

DISCUSSION

I. Poehlman's Appeal

Poehlman's declaratory suit asked the trial court to determine whether Indiana Code § 24-4.6-1-101 ("Post-Judgment Interest Statute") applied to a judgment paid pursuant to Indiana Code § 27-12-14-3 ("Recovery Limitation Section"). In its judgment, the trial court determined that the Post-Judgment Interest Statute did not apply because it was the more general of the two statutes. State ex rel. Hatcher v. Lake Superior Court, 500 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind.1986) (specific statute prevails over general statute when the two conflict). The trial court reasoned that the Recovery Limitation Section of the Act was the more specific because it dealt directly with malpractice judgments while the Post-Judgment Interest Statute dealt with all types of judgments.

In our review we are not bound by the trial court's interpretation of these two statutes. Olejniczak v. Town of Kouts, 651 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. Rather, we must independently determine the meaning of the statutes and their application to the facts before us. Id. "For a specific statute to prevail over or modify a general statute, there must be a conflict in the two statute's [sic] application to the same subject matter. " Wayne Township v. Lutheran Hospital, 160 Ind.App. 427, 312 N.E.2d 120, 124 (1974) (emphasis added). We do not agree with the trial court's determination that the two statutes covered the same subject matter. The subject matter at issue in the declaratory action was post-judgment interest. The Post-Judgment Interest Statute deals with interest owed on a money judgment. In contrast, the Recovery Limitation Section details the amount that can be recovered for medical malpractice for injury or death of a patient and discusses how much of this amount the health care provider and the patient's compensation fund ("Fund") must pay. Post-judgment interest is not expressly provided for or prohibited by the Recovery Limitation Section. The two statutes, therefore, do not apply to the same subject matter. Because there was not a conflict between the two statutes' application to the same subject matter, the trial court erred in ruling that the Recovery Limitation Section, as the more specific statute, prevailed.

"When construing a statute, we must give words and phrases their plain, ordinary and usual meaning, unless a contrary purpose is clearly shown by the statute itself." Olejniczak, 651 N.E.2d at 1199. Under its plain meaning, the Recovery Limitation Section does not prohibit a successful plaintiff from recovering post-judgment interest on a medical malpractice judgment. As discussed above, the section does not mention interest at all. Because the Recovery Limitation Section does not discuss post-judgment interest, we must look to the Post-Judgment Interest Statute to determine whether Poehlman is entitled to the claimed interest.

Poehlman claims that the clear and unambiguous language of the Post-Judgment Interest Statute provides for interest unless another statute explicitly provides for a different rate of interest or precludes interest. See, e.g., Glick v. Dept. of Commerce, 180 Ind.App. 12, 387 N.E.2d 74 (1979) where Tort Claims Act interest provision takes precedence. "When a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to apply any rules of construction other than that requiring words and phrases to be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense." Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133, 136 (Ind.1994). Because we find that the Post-Judgment Interest Statute is clear and unambiguous, we may not impose judicial construction upon the clear meaning of the words. Id.

Feferman, PICI, and the Commissioner all argue that the trial court correctly declined to apply the Post-Judgment Interest Statute. To support this argument, the parties contend that had the legislature intended interest to be included in a medical malpractice judgment, the legislature would have expressly provided for interest as it did in the Tort Claims Act. In addition, the parties claim that the Act's policy is to limit the liability of health care providers and that applying the Post-Judgment Interest Statute would contravene this policy. In sum, the parties argue that the Act precludes the imposition of post-judgment interest on medical malpractice judgments. We do not agree.

Indiana Code § 24-4.6-1-101 provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, interest on judgments for money whenever rendered shall be from the date of return of the verdict or finding of the court until satisfaction at:...." This section also sets the maximum rate of interest at 8% when a contract for interest exists, and sets the rate at 8% when no contract exists. The Recovery Limitation Section does not discuss post-judgment interest. Instead, the section provides in relevant part:

(a) The total amount recoverable for an injury or death of a patient may not exceed five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) except that, as to an act of malpractice that occurs on or after January 1, 1990, the total amount recovered for an injury or death may not exceed seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000).

(b) A health care provider qualified under this article is not liable for an amount in excess of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) for an occurrence of malpractice.

(c) Any amount due from a judgment or settlement that is in excess of the total liability of all liable health care providers, subject to subsections (a), (b), and (d), shall be paid from the patient's compensation fund under IC 27-12-15.

IND.CODE § 27-12-14-3(a-c). Under the plain language of the Post-Judgment Interest Statute, Poehlman is entitled to post-judgment interest unless the Recovery Limitation Section provides otherwise. IND.CODE § 24-4.6-1-101. The Recovery Limitation Section is simply silent on the topic of post-judgment interest. Thus, looking only to the plain, ordinary, and usual sense of the words and phrases in the statutes, the Post-Judgment Interest Statute applies. Benham, 637 N.E.2d at 136.

The trial court, therefore, erred in ruling that Poehlman was not entitled to post-judgment interest.

We must next decide whether the liability limits specified in the Recovery Limitation Se...