Poehlman v. Feferman
| Decision Date | 07 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 71S05-9810-CV-597.,71S05-9810-CV-597. |
| Parties | Helen M. POEHLMAN, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Martin E. FEFERMAN, M.D., Appellee (Defendant below). Helen M. Poehlman, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Martin E. Feferman, M.D., Physicians Insurance Company of Indiana and Marjorie Maginn, Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Indiana, Appellees (Defendants below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
F. Boyd Hovde, Regina M. Poore, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellant.
Jerry Garau, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Indiana Trial Lawyer Association.
Matthew W. Conner, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellee Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Indiana.
Robert J. Palmer, South Bend, Indiana, James F. Bleeke, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees Martin E. Feferman, M.D., and Physicians Insurance Company of Indiana.
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
The plaintiff in this medical malpractice case was awarded $345,263 in damages plus post-judgment interest and court costs. The parties disagree over whether the malpractice act's liability limits apply to damages only or also to the interest and costs and over how to allocate those expenses between the doctor and patient's compensation fund. We hold that the interest and costs are recoverable from the doctor and the fund irrespective of the malpractice act's limits.
On April 4, 1996, Plaintiff Helen M. Poehlman received a judgment from the St. Joseph Superior Court in the amount of $345,263 plus court costs against Defendant, Martin E. Feferman, M.D., for medical malpractice. Dr. Feferman is a health care provider qualified under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, Ind.Code § 27-12-1-1 et seq. ("Act") and was covered by a policy of professional liability insurance with Physicians Insurance Company of Indiana ("PICI"). On August 30, 1996, PICI paid $103,733.09 to the St. Joseph County Clerk to satisfy the portion of the judgment that Feferman owed pursuant to the Act. This sum represented the $100,000 that Feferman owed as a qualified health care provider under the Act's recovery limitation section,1 Ind.Code § 27-12-14-3(b), together with $3,331.84 in post-judgment interest and $401.25 in court costs.
On September 5, 1996, Poehlman filed a petition for payment of damages from the Patient's Compensation Fund ("Fund") and a declaration as to the interest liability of Feferman, PICI, and the Fund. On September 11, 1998, Feferman demanded that Poehlman release the judgment against him on the basis of his payment to the clerk. When Poehlman did not respond to this demand, Feferman filed a petition to release the judgment.
Poehlman filed suit against Feferman, PICI, and the Insurance Commissioner who manages the Fund on October 15, 1996. Poehlman sought a declaratory judgment stating that interest was due pursuant to Indiana's "Post-Judgment Interest Statute," Ind.Code § 24-4.6-1-101. The trial court eventually consolidated Poehlman's declaratory action with Feferman's petition to release the judgment. On December 4, 1996, by a stipulation of the parties, the St. Joseph County Clerk released $100,000 of the money paid by PICI, on behalf of Feferman, to Poehlman. The stipulation did not resolve, however, the amount of post-judgment interest, if any, that Feferman owed on the judgment. On or about January 15, 1997, the Insurance Commissioner paid $245,263 to Poehlman, which represented the unpaid balance of Poehlman's judgment against Feferman, exclusive of any post-judgment interest or court costs.
The parties submitted written briefs to the trial court on the issue of post-judgment interest. On May 21, 1997, the court ruled that: (1) Poehlman was not entitled to post-judgment interest from any of the three defendants; (2) Poehlman was entitled to $401.25 in court costs from Feferman; and the Insurance Commissioner was not required to pay any additional amount. The trial court deferred ruling on Feferman's petition to release the judgment, believing that its ruling on the other matters had resolved the issue.
Poehlman appealed the trial court's declaration as to the various interest obligations. Feferman and PICI cross-appealed the assessment of the $401.25 in court costs and the trial court's failure to rule on Feferman's petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to defer ruling on Feferman's petition, but reversed the trial court on the payment of interests and costs, concluding that the Insurance Commissioner (i.e., the Fund) was responsible for the payment of post-judgment interest on the entire amount of the judgment, as well as the payment of court costs. Poehlman v. Feferman, 693 N.E.2d 1355 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).
The recovery limitation section of the Act sets forth specific "amounts" which medical malpractice recoveries may not exceed. The Court of Appeals held that these "amount" limitations were "solid liability caps" that limited not only damages for malpractice but limited post-judgment interest and court costs as well. We are required to determine the meaning of the phrase "amount recoverable for an injury or death of a patient" as it appears in the Act's recovery limitation section. In regulating medical malpractice judgments, the legislature first capped "the total amount recoverable for an injury or death" at $750,000. Ind.Code § 27-12-14-3(a). Next, the legislature apportioned this liability by assigning the first $100,000 "amount" to the qualified health care provider, id. § 27-12-14-3(b), with the remaining "amount due from a judgment or settlement" to be paid from the Patient's Compensation Fund, id. § 27-12-14-3(c).
The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the "Recovery Limitation Section does not qualify the term `amount' to include only certain types of damages, costs, fees, or interest ... [, t]he plain language of the section sets a solid liability cap without any qualification" on (1) the liability potentially owed by qualified health care provider, and (2) the $750,000 total limit on the Fund's liability. Poehlman, 693 N.E.2d at 1359-60.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jewell Grain Co., 556 N.E.2d 920, 921 (Ind.1990). Clear and unambiguous statutory meaning leaves no room for judicial construction. Community Hosp. of Anderson & Madison County v. McKnight, 493 N.E.2d 775, 777 (Ind. 1986) ().
We disagree with the Court of Appeals's determination that these limits on amounts "recoverable for an injury or death of a patient" also constitute limits on collateral financial obligations associated with litigation generally such as post-judgment interest and court costs. These collateral litigation expenses arise separately by operation of law and are regulated under distinct statutes,2 which guide parties' decisions in nearly every stage of either pursuing or defending medical malpractice claims under the Act. To conclude that the statute establishes "solid liability caps" is to create a separate set of rules for the allocation of these expenses in litigating what remain essentially tort suits notwithstanding the passage of the Act.
We find that the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of the phrase "amount recoverable for an injury or death of a patient" as it appears in the Act's recovery limitation section unambiguously establishes that the legislature intended to only limit the amount of damages, not collateral litigation expenses.3
Even if we were not to conclude that the plain, ordinary and usual meaning of the phrase "amount recoverable for an injury or death of a patient" refers only to damages and not collateral litigation expenses, another canon of statutory construction supports this result as we attempt "to determine, effect and implement the intent of the legislature." Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ind.1998) (collecting cases).
We have long embraced the rule that if a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, this Court may consider the consequences of a particular construction. Superior Constr. Co. v. Carr, 564 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind.1990); Economy Oil Corp. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 162 Ind.App. 658, 664, 321 N.E.2d 215, 218 (1974) (collecting cases). In applying this rule, we recognize a strong presumption that when the legislature enacted a particular piece of legislation, it was aware of existing statutes relating to the same subject. Glick v. Department of Commerce, 180 Ind.App. 12, 18, 387 N.E.2d 74, 78 (1979).
The Medical Malpractice Act is silent as to any direct effect on the post-judgment interest statute and other statutes regulating similar collateral litigation expenses. If the legislature had intended for the Medical Malpractice Act to trump the effect of these various statutes, it could have done so explicitly. For example, it chose to exempt only the Fund, not the health care provider, from the provisions of Indiana's Pre-Judgment Interest Statute. Ind.Code § 34-4-37-4 (1993) () (current version at Ind.Code § 34-51-4-2 (1998)); cf. id. § 24-4.6-1-101 (1993) (); id. § 34-1-32-1 (1993) ().
Having determined that the Act limits only damage amounts, we must next decide who is...
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