Poff v. Scales

• Citation: 36 Idaho 762,213 P. 1019
• Parties: EARL H. POFF, MARY CLAY DAHLQUIST, and BENJAMIN F. TWEEDY, Plaintiffs, v. WALLACE N. SCALES, District Judge, Defendant
• Decision Date: 10 March 1923
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

213 P. 1019

36 Idaho 762

EARL H. POFF, MARY CLAY DAHLQUIST, and BENJAMIN F. TWEEDY, Plaintiffs, v. WALLACE N. SCALES, District Judge, Defendant

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 10, 1923

JUDGE ACTING WITHOUT JURISDICTION-PROHIBITION PROPER REMEDY-ACTION AGAINST JUDGE-DUTY OF JUDGE TO TRANSFER CASE-CONTEMPTS-POWER OF COURTS TO PUNISH-REMEDY OF PARTY AGGRIEVED.

1. The writ of prohibition is the proper remedy when a district judge assumes to act in a case to which he is a party and in which he has a direct interest.

2. When it appears from the complaint that a district judge is a party to an action and that he has a direct interest therein he is without jurisdiction to pass upon any question affecting the merits of such action and should at once order it transferred to another district court.

3. The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, but the mere bringing of an action against a judge, whether of a trial or an appellate court, cannot be made a contempt if it is brought in good faith and the allegations of the complaint are only such as are appropriate to the kind of action brought.

4. The filing of a complaint against a district judge in vacation in one county while the judge is in another county, if admittedly contemptuous, is not a contempt "committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers," and cannot be legally punished in a summary manner.

5. The statutory provisions that "The judgments and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and conclusive," means that such judgments and orders are not appealable. It does not mean that if the court or judge proceeds without jurisdiction the party aggrieved is wholly without remedy.

Original proceeding for Writ of Prohibition. Granted.

Peremptory writ of prohibition granted.

Ben. F Tweedy, for Plaintiffs.

Where a judge is disqualified, if he acts in a pending suit he acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, and a permanent writ of prohibition should be granted against him. (Forest Coal Co. v. Doolittle, 54 W.Va. 210, 46 S.E. 238; North Bloomfield etc. Co. v. Keyser, 58 Cal. 316; State v Seattle Board, 19 Wash. 8, 67 Am. St. 706, 52 P. 317, 40 L. R. A. 317; State v. Judge of Third Judicial District, 38 La. Ann. 247; State v. Judge of Twenty-first Judicial District, 37 La. Ann. 253; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N.Y. 547; People v. Gill, 131 N.Y.S. 902; People v. District Court, 60 Colo. 1, 152 P. 149.)

Where a judge or court has no jurisdiction to proceed in an action, or where no contempt has been committed at all, a permanent writ of prohibition should be granted against contempt proceedings. (State v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 65 Am. St. 90, 72 N.W. 193, 38 L. R. A. 554; People v. Mayer, 24 N.Y.S. 621; Ruggles v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. 125, 37 P. 211; Burke v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.App. 178, 93 P. 1058; Gorden v. Buckles, Judge, 92 Cal. 481, 28 P. 490; People v. Carrington, 5 Utah 531, 17 P. 735; State v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 481, 71 P. 1095; State v. Langhorne, 8 Wash. 447, 36 P. 438.)

The commencement of a proper action against a judge, or the making of allegations in any paper filed that are material to the relief sought, authorized and legalized, is not contempt of a judge or of a court, although the allegations may, to some extent, be a reflection on the judge or court. (Works v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. 304, 62 P. 507; In re Cottingham, 66 Colo. 335, 182 P. 2; Younger v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. 682, 69 P. 485; Harkness v. Hyde, 31 Idaho 784, 176 P. 885.)

Eugene A. Cox, Samuel O. Tannahill, Robt. D. Leeper and Noel B. Martin, for Defendant.

The judgment of the district court in a matter of contempt is final and conclusive. (C. S., sec. 7396; McDougall v. Sheridan, 23 Idaho 191, 128 P. 954.)

The district court as a court of record has inherent power to punish contempts and to expunge from its records and files all scurrilous, scandalous, impertinent and defamatory matter or pleadings. (McDougall v. Sheridan, 23 Idaho 191, 128 P. 954; In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092; Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 225, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405; Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 22 L.Ed. 205; Ex parte Tillinghast, 4 Pet. 708, 7 L.Ed. 798; Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 352, 20 L.Ed. 646; Lambertson v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 458, 91 P. 100, 11 L. R. A., N. S., 619; Hughes v. Moncur, 28 Cal.App. 462, 152 P. 968; Ex parte Ah Men, 77 Cal. 198, 19 P. 380.) This rule is applied without exception by the different states and federal courts as appears by copious note shown in 8 A. L. R. 1543 et seq.; People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75.

The fact that the pleading purported to be filed against the judge does not relieve the plaintiffs herein from liability for contemptuous matter contained therein, and does not relieve this defendant from the duty of punishing such contempt and does not disqualify him from taking action in regard to such contempt. (Const. Ida., art. 5, sec. 13; Morrison v. Snow, 26 Utah 247, 72 P. 924; In re Snow, 27 Utah 265, 75 P. 741; Ropes v. Stewart, 54 Fla. 185, 45 So. 31; Kelley v. Boettcher, 85 F. 55, 29 C. C. A. 14; Kruegel v. Bolanz, 100 Tex. 572, 102 S.W. 110; McDougall v. Sheridan, supra.)

Public policy demands, and for time immemorial the law has been, that a judge of a court of record be immune from suit because of any matter arising out of the exercise of his judicial function. (Hill v. Morgan, 9 Idaho 777, 76 P. 765; Bradley v. Fisher, supra; Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 283, 19 L.Ed. 285; Casserleigh v. Malone, 50 Colo. 597, 115 P. 520; Comstock v. Eagleton, 110 Okla. 487, 69 P. 955; Kroegel v. Murphy (Tex. Civ.), 126 S.W. 343; Kruegel v. Cobb (Tex. Civ.), 124 S.W. 723; Kruegel v. Bolanz, supra; Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 34 S.Ct. 27, 58 L.Ed. 142; Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654, 43 Am. Rep. 412; Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860; Harrison v. Redden, 53 Kan. 265, 36 P. 325; Pickett v. Wallace, 57 Cal. 555.)

DUNN, J. McCarthy and William A. Lee, JJ., concur.

OPINION

DUNN, J.

On application of plaintiffs to this court for a writ of prohibition against the defendant as judge of the tenth judicial district an alternative writ was granted requiring said defendant to show cause why he should not be restrained from further proceedings in certain actions brought in the district court of Nez Perce county in which Mary Clay Dahlquist and Earl H. Poff, respectively, were plaintiffs and said defendant herein and other parties were defendants, and why said defendant herein should not be restrained from proceeding to punish the plaintiffs in this action as for contempt of court in bringing the said actions.

The application for the writ sets forth verbatim a copy of the amended complaint of Mary Clay Dahlquist against the said judge and other defendants, from which it appears that the plaintiff in said action was seeking damages in the sum of $ 100,000 against the said judge and other defendants because of an alleged conspiracy charged to have been entered into by the defendants in said action to unlawfully take from said plaintiff in a condemnation action a certain portion of her farm for a right of way for a state highway and to compel her to accept as a part of her damages certain fences in lieu of money. The said complaint further sets out the imprisonment for contempt of court of plaintiff in said condemnation action by order of the said judge, "without any right, power or jurisdiction," to aid and assist the consummation of said conspiracy.

The application also sets out verbatim a certain order entered by the judge of said district court striking from the files of said court the said amended complaint. Said order contains the following:

"The language charging Wallace N. Scales, the Judge of this court and the other defendants with said alleged conspiracy was abusive, disrespectful, insulting and contemptuous. The allegations made are of a most serious character and would be attended with the gravest results if established.

"The complaint in this case is signed by Benjamin F. Tweedy, attorney for plaintiff Mary Clay Dahlquist, and verified by Mary Clay Dahlquist.

"The procedure in this case, if practiced, would be to suffer the judicial respect, integrity, honor and reputation of courts and judges to be attacked and overthrown, and the honor of judicial officers would be exposed to malice or rage of disappointed attorneys and parties whose evil inclinations, anger, or passion would thus seek gratification.

"The allegations of this complaint are so palpably false that the conclusion is irresistible that the said Mary Clay Dahlquist is guilty of the crime of perjury, and that her attorney, Benjamin F. Tweedy, is also guilty of the crime of perjury.

"It also appears that by making and filing said complaint Mary Clay Dahlquist and her attorney, Benjamin F. Tweedy, are each guilty of contempt of court.

"It is unquestionable and has been from the earliest days of the common law that a judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for his determination and acts in his judicial capacity, however erroneous or by whatever motives prompted; and it appears that the conduct of Benjamin F. Tweedy, an attorney of this court, is in the highest degree unprofessional and improper, and that he has violated his duties as an attorney at law.

"Therefore it is ordered by the Court that the complaint herein be stricken from the files, and that all the record, and files in this case be retained in the custody of the clerk of this court, not to be removed therefrom except upon the order of the judge of this court or of the supreme court of the state of Idaho, and that the plaintiff have until the 26th day of December, 1922, at...