Poindexter v. State

• Decision Date: 12 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. PD-1816-03.,PD-1816-03.
• Citation: 153 S.W.3d 402
• Parties: Robert POINDEXTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

153 S.W.3d 402

Robert POINDEXTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-1816-03.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

January 12, 2005.

Joel Douglas Tinker, Corpus Christi, for appellant.

Douglas K. Norman, Assist. DA, Corpus Christi, Matthew Paul, State's Attorney, Austin, for state.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.

After a bench trial, appellant was convicted of the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that the evidence was legally insufficient, reversed the conviction, and ordered an acquittal.¹ We granted the State's Petition for Discretionary Review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in finding that appellant was not affirmatively linked to the cocaine found in various locations in his home.² Assessing all the evidence — including the unobjected-to hearsay — in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the evidence links appellant to the contraband and is sufficient to support his conviction. We reverse the court of appeals' judgment of acquittal and remand for consideration of appellant's remaining claims.

I.

We quote the court of appeals' summary of the evidence:

On January 18, 2001, members of the Tri-County Narcotics Task Force serving Aransas, Nueces, and San Patricio Counties (the "narcotics officers") secured a search warrant for 1307 Van Loan, located in Corpus Christi. The warrant identified "a black male subject known only as Poindexter, aged approximately mid 60's" and authorized his arrest along with the "other occupants of the suspected place whose names and physical descriptions are unknown." The search warrant was issued expressly on the basis of an affidavit executed by narcotics officer Russell Kirk. That affidavit accused Poindexter of illegal drug possession based only on the following statements regarding a confidential informant ("CI"): "CI informed me that CI was inside Suspected Place within the past 24 hours and that CI personally observed the Suspected Party in possession of a quantity of cocaine, therein."

The affidavit referred to a drug buy that occurred on January 17, 2001. On that day, Officer Kirk drove his CI to 1307 Van Loan, where the CI got out of the car and went into the house. Officer Kirk stayed in his car, which he parked down the street. Before the CI emerged from the house, a gray dually pickup truck arrived and parked in the driveway. Officer Kirk could not see or identify its driver. He did not record its license plate number. Subsequently, the CI emerged from the house and met up with Officer Kirk. The CI had successfully purchased $100 worth of crack cocaine, which Officer Kirk testified the CI did not have before entering the house at 1307 Van Loan.

On January 19, 2001, the narcotics officers executed a warrant on the location. No one was home. The narcotics officers gained access to the home by beating down the front door with a battering ram. The officers conducted a systematic search of the house, which uncovered narcotics and paraphernalia. The contraband was found in two locations: a bedroom towards the front of the house (the "front bedroom") and the master bedroom.

In the front bedroom, the officers found crack residue caked in several vials sitting on a plate found either inside or on top of a dresser. In the master bedroom, the officers discovered cocaine, crack cocaine, razor blades, several small plastic bags, and a scale with cocaine residue on it. These items were discovered in two different closets. The crack cocaine was found in a small tin box of breath mints hidden in the ceiling of the master bedroom's linen closet.³ Some cocaine was also found stuffed in the same spot. Additionally, the officers discovered a few small plastic bags hidden inside a brown paper bag on the top shelf of the linen closet. Finally, they found a scale and razor blades inside a different closet located in the master bedroom. No fingerprints or photographs were taken, but the evidence was collected and sent to the lab for testing. The contraband was confirmed to be cocaine and crack cocaine.⁴

The court of appeals declined to consider the probative value of the C.I.'s unobjected-to out-of-court statements that appellant possessed cocaine, sold cocaine, and hid the cocaine in an open hall closet.⁵ It also concluded that, because there was some evidence indicating that another person was present in the house at the time the C.I. bought crack cocaine, the State failed to prove that appellant had exclusive possession of the house.⁶ Finally, it stated that there were insufficient affirmative links between appellant and the drugs and drug distribution materials found in the house, and therefore no rational trier of fact could find that the evidence was legally sufficient to support his conviction.⁷

II.

When deciding whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must assess all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.⁸ To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that: (1) the accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband.⁹ Whether this evidence is direct or circumstantial, "it must establish, to the requisite level of confidence, that the accused's connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous. This is the whole of the so-called `affirmative links' rule."¹⁰

The "affirmative links rule" is designed to protect the innocent bystander from conviction based solely upon his fortuitous proximity to someone else's drugs.¹¹ This rule simply restates the common-sense notion that a person — such as a father, son, spouse, roommate, or friend — may jointly possess property like a house but not necessarily jointly possess the contraband found in that house.¹² Thus, we have formulated the rule that "[w]hen the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband."¹³

In deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to link the defendant to contraband, the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.¹⁴ Under Texas Rule of Evidence 802, he is entitled to give probative value to "inadmissible hearsay admitted without objection."¹⁵ Thus, once the trier of fact has weighed the probative value of unobjected-to hearsay evidence in its factfinding process, an appellate court cannot deny that evidence probative value or ignore it in its review of the sufficiency of the evidence.¹⁶ An appellate court may determine only if any rational trier of fact could have — based on all of the evidence admitted at trial (including any unobjected-to hearsay) — found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.¹⁷

III.

The court of appeals held, and the parties agree, that appellant was linked to the Van Loan house where the contraband was found, but that he did not have exclusive possession of it.¹⁸ This conclusion was based upon evidence that: 1) both bedrooms in appellant's house appeared to be used; 2) a second person, possibly a woman, opened the door for the C.I. during the January 17th drug buy; and 3) because Officer Kirk was too far away, he was unable himself to positively identify appellant as the driver of the gray dually truck that arrived during the January 17th drug buy. This is a very slender evidentiary reed to support a factual conclusion that someone else lived with appellant or had joint control over the house. Nonetheless, because the State did not contest this conclusion, we will not infer appellant's knowledge of and control over the contraband solely from his possession of the house where drugs were found. Thus, we look for additional facts and circumstances which affirmatively link appellant to the drugs.¹⁹

A. Officer Kirk's testimony that the CI told him that appellant was selling narcotics out of his residence at 1307 Van Loan was probative evidence of appellant's guilt of possession of crack cocaine.

At trial Officer Kirk testified on direct examination, with no objection or request for a limiting instruction,²⁰ as follows:

Q Now, back on January 17th of last year, did you have an occasion to investigate an individual that you knew at that time as Poindexter, a 60-year-old black male, six foot four, 190 pounds, that lived at 1307 Van Loan Avenue?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q And do you recall how that particular address and individual came to your attention?

A Through the use of an informant. He gave me some information about that residence, the subject in that residence, Poindexter, being in possession of and selling narcotics.

The CI's statements also came into evidence through the affidavit and search warrant for 1307 Van Loan, admitted as State's Exhibit Number 3, after the defense stated it had "[n]o objections." The affidavit states, in part: "Within 24 hours of the date of this affidavit, I received information from a confidential informant (hereinafter referred to as "CI").... CI informed me that CI was inside the suspected place within the past 24 hours and that CI personally observed the Suspected Party in possession of a quantity of cocaine, therein."

The court of appeals held that the CI's statements were not objectionable hearsay statements, but rather out-of-court statements explaining how the defendant became the focus of a police investigation. The court stated: "Poindexter had no basis on which to object to Officer Kirk's testimony because it was not offered as hearsay.... The trial court properly allowed...