Hutchison v. State

• Decision Date: 05 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 06–13–00035–CR.,06–13–00035–CR.
• Citation: 424 S.W.3d 164
• Parties: Timothy HUTCHISON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

424 S.W.3d 164

Timothy HUTCHISON, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 06–13–00035–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted Jan. 2, 2014.

Decided Feb. 5, 2014.

Lew Dunn, Longview, for Appellant.

Zan Colson Brown, Asst. Dist. Atty., Longview, for Appellee.

Before MORRISS, C.J., CARTER and MOSELEY, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice MORRISS.

Police had two warrants—one to arrest Timothy Hutchison and the other to search a house at 213 South Houston Street in Longview—when they stopped the vehicle Hutchison was driving and advised him of the warrants. During Hutchison's ensuing interactions with officers and before he was warned of his Miranda¹ rights, he made two notable statements and handed officers the keys to the house and the room within which contraband was located. The State used the two statements and the delivery of the keys as part of the evidence in Hutchison's jury trial on two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. From his conviction and sentence of fifty years' imprisonment, Hutchison appeals, claiming legally insufficient evidence that he possessed the contraband, error that the trial court instructed the jury on joint possession, and error that the trial court admitted into evidence the two statements and the delivery of the keys.

In the first statement in question, made apparently without specific inquiry by police but after officers stated that the search warrant authorized a search of the house, Hutchison stated, “I've just been doing what I've been doing for a little extra money.” ² The second statement was uttered after Hutchison and officers had arrived at the house and after the officers had told Hutchison that, if “[y]ou tell us where [the] stuff is at, you know, we'll see what we can do, you know, help you out if you'll help us out.” In the resulting second statement, Hutchison told the officers “that everything he had was in his bedroom in a safe or in his closet.” Hutchison also provided the officers with his keys. One of the keys unlocked the front door to the house, but, most importantly, another key unlocked a padlock on the bedroom door. In that bedroom's closet, the police discovered an open safe containing 11.58 grams of methamphetamine, 32.51 grams of gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and some Xanax pills—the discovery resulting in Hutchison's conviction. It is uncontested that Hutchison was never given Miranda warnings.

We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, because—although (1) the evidence is legally sufficient, and (2) the jury instruction was not erroneous—(3) the record does not demonstrate the lack of harmful error in the admission of evidence.

(1) The Evidence Is Legally Sufficient

Hutchison claims the evidence is legally insufficient to link him to the contraband. According to Hutchison, the State proved only that drugs were found at 213 South Houston Street, a house owned by Hutchison's mother as rental property. Hutchison claims no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had actual care, custody, control, or management of the drugs.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781).

The State had the burden to prove Hutchison “knowingly ... possess[ed] with intent to deliver a controlled substance in Penalty Group I.” ³SeeTex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112 (West 2010). Possession is statutorily defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp.2013). The crime is established by showing that Hutchison exercised control, custody, management, or care over the drugs and that he knew the matter possessed was contraband. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see alsoTex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39).

When the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband.

Deshong v. State, 625 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981).

Mere presence at the location where drugs are found is insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or control of those drugs. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. Presence or proximity to drugs, however, when combined with other direct or circumstantial evidence, may be sufficient to establish control, management, custody, or care provided the proof amounts to more than a strong suspicion. Id. Requiring that evidence link a defendant with the contraband protects “the innocent bystander from conviction based solely on his fortuitous proximity to someone else's drugs.” Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). Texas courts have recognized the following links as factors that tend to establish a person's possession of contraband:

(1) the accused's presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the accused's proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the accused was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the accused possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the accused made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the accused attempted to flee; (8) whether the accused made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the accused owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the accused was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt.

Wright v. State, 401 S.W.3d 813, 818–19 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref'd); see Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n. 12.

Hutchison argues he was present at the location only because the officers escorted him to the location. Hutchison further points out that the contraband was not in plain view and that there is no evidence that he was under the influence of the contraband, attempted to flee, made furtive gestures, or lived at the location. Although drug paraphernalia was found at the house, this paraphernalia was never directly linked to Hutchison. Hutchison did not have any contraband or drug paraphernalia on his person or in his car when he was detained. According to Hutchison, the State failed to establish that he had a right to possess the place where the drugs were found. The property in question was owned by Hutchison's mother, not Hutchison. The State did not present any direct evidence that Hutchison lived at the premises; in fact, several defense witnesses testified that Hutchison lived at another of his mother's properties. The address of the other property is the one used on Hutchison's driver's license. In his sufficiency argument, Hutchison handles the statements in two ways: he claims that they are inadmissible because they resulted from a custodial interrogation and that they are ambiguous, that is, they “can just as likely be read as innocuous and non-incriminating statements.”

The admissibility of the incriminating statements is not relevant to the issue of the evidence's sufficiency. In conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, that the jury was permitted to consider. Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Thus, Hutchison's first and second statements, and the key delivery, must be considered in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to establish knowing possession, regardless of whether those pieces of evidence were admissible. Also, Texas does not recognize the as-consistent-with-innocent-activity test, and the State is not obligated to disprove every reasonable alternative hypothesis. See Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (rejecting as-consistent-with-innocent-activity test); Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (State need not disprove every reasonable alternative hypothesis).

Although both Hutchison and the State focus on whether there is sufficient evidence that Hutchison lived at the house, the State was not required to prove his residence in the house where the drugs were found or even that he had exclusive possession of the house. The State had to prove merely that Hutchison knowingly had control, management, custody, or care of contraband. Before the search, the police observed Hutchison leave the house, return, enter without knocking, and then leave again. Hutchison provided the police with a set of keys that unlocked not only the entry doors, but also the lock on the bedroom containing the drugs. A letter addressed to Hutchison at 213 South Houston Street was located in the bedroom. Hutchison also signed a Booking Report which listed “213 Houston St.” as his address.⁴ The State established that Hutchison had access to the...