Poiroux v. Rich

• Decision Date: 14 March 2014
• Docket Number: 1120734.
• Citation: 150 So.3d 1027
• Parties: Clement David POIROUX et al. v. Ashley RICH et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

150 So.3d 1027

Clement David POIROUX et al.

v.Ashley RICH et al.

1120734.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 14, 2014.

Diandra S. Debrosse of Gentle Turner Sexton Debrosse & Harbison, Hoover; T. Jefferson Deen III, Mobile; and Edward C. Blount, Jr., Mobile, for appellants.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Andrew Brasher, deputy atty. gen., and James W. Davis and Misty S. Fairbanks Messick, asst. attys. gen., for the appellees District Attorneys, the Circuit Clerks, and the State Officials; Richard H. Cater and Mose Stuart, asst. attys. gen., Alabama Department of Finance, for appellee Dr. Marquita F. Davis, finance director; Marc S. Bass, gen. counsel, Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, for appellee Michael Sparks, director of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences; J. Matt Bledsoe, asst. atty. gen., for appellee John E. Hixon, executive dir. of the Alabama Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund; and Trisha L. Mellberg, asst. atty. gen., Alabama District Attorneys Association, for the appellees dist. attys.

Thomas T. Gallion III and Constance C. Walker of Haskell Slaughter Young & Gallion, LLC, Montgomery, for appellee Montgomery County Sheriff D.T. Marshall.

Kendrick E. Webb and Fred L. Clements of Webb & Eley, P.C., for appellees Sheriff Andy Hughes, Sheriff Thomas Tate, and Sheriff Huey “Hoss” Mack.

Opinion

BRYAN, Justice.

Clement David Poiroux, Lamar Sanders Osborne, Travis Kyle Blair, Christopher Raybon, Sara Hawkins, Brian Williams, Levorish Hudson, Joseph Gardner Johnson, Jr., Nicholas Cain McNeil, and Willie James Walker II (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the criminal defendants”), and McNeil & Stokley Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Metro Bonding Co., Bay Area Bail Bonds, LLC, A–Plus Bonding, Inc., Alternative Justice Bail Bonding, Inc., A–Advantage Bonding, LLC, Affordable Bail Bond, Inc., and Allstar Bail Bonds, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the bail-bond companies”), appeal the dismissal of their claims against various district attorneys,¹ circuit court clerks,² and other state officials³ (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the defendants”). We affirm the judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

On July 6, 2012, several of the criminal defendants and of the bail-bond companies ⁴ sued the defendants and fictitiously named parties in the Montgomery Circuit Court, alleging claims related to Act No. 2012–535, Ala. Acts 2012, codified as § 12–14–31 and § 12–19–311, Ala.Code 1975.⁵ The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies argued, among other things, that the fee assessed pursuant to § 12–19–311(a)(1) a., Ala.Code 1975 (“the filing fee”), and the fee assessed pursuant to § 12–19–311(a)(1) b., Ala.Code 1975 (“the back-end fee”), are unconstitutional. According to the original and amended complaints, each of the criminal defendants had been assessed either a filing fee or a back-end fee, and each of the bail-bond companies had paid filing fees on behalf of various clients.

With the exception of minor traffic cases, the filing fee and the back-end fee are “imposed on every bail bond in all courts of [Alabama].” § 12–19–311(a)(1). The filing fee, if collected by the official executing the bond, is collected “at the execution of the bond or at the time of release,” or, if the circuit clerk collects the bond, the filing fee can also be collected “within two business days of release.” § 12–19–311(b). The back-end fee is “assessed to the defendant and ... imposed by the court when the defendant appears in court for adjudication or sentencing.” § 12–19–311(e)(1).

The filing fee is assessed “in the amount of thirty-five dollars ($35) on each bond executed.” § 12–19–311(a)(1) a. The back-end fee is set forth in § 12–19–311(a)(1) b., which provides, in pertinent part:

“For a misdemeanor offense, a bail bond fee in the amount of 3.5 percent of the total face value of the bail bond or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater, but not to exceed four hundred fifty dollars ($450). For a felony offense, a bail bond fee of 3.5 percent of the total face value of the bail bond or one hundred fifty dollars ($150), whichever is greater, but not to exceed seven hundred fifty dollars ($750).... For purposes of this section, face value of bond shall mean the bond amount set by court or other authority at release, not the amount posted at release on bail.”

Section 12–19–313, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

“If the charge against a defendant in a case is disposed of by a finding of not guilty, no bill, dismissal or nolle prosequi without conditions, the fees imposed in the case pursuant to [§ 12–19–311(a)(1) b.] shall not be assessed. In all other cases wherein the charge against a defendant is disposed of by conviction, a finding of guilty, or dismissal or nolle prosequi upon conditions to pay costs and fees, the fees pursuant to [§ 12–19–311(a)(1) b.] shall be assessed. If the defendant is admitted to a pretrial diversion program or to a specialty court program, the fee shall be assessed as with other court costs and fees.”

No such provision appears to apply to the filing fees.

The filing and back-end fees are distributed as follows:

“(f) The court clerks shall distribute on a monthly basis as other fees are distributed, the [filing] fees ... as follows: Ten percent from each fee shall be distributed either to the county general fund to be earmarked and distributed to the Sheriff's Fund, administered by the sheriff, in the county where the bond was executed or, where the bond is executed by the municipality, to the municipality; 45 percent of the fee to the court clerk's fund where the bond was executed or where the bond is executed by the municipal court, to the municipality; 45 percent of the fee to the Solicitor's Fund in the county where the bond was executed. The bail bond fee records shall be audited by the Department of Examiners of Public Accounts.

“(g) The court clerks shall distribute on a monthly basis as other fees are distributed, the [back-end] fees ... as follows: Twenty-one dollars and fifty cents ($21.50) from each fee shall be distributed to the county general fund which shall be earmarked and distributed to the Sheriff's Fund, administered by the sheriff, in the county where the bond was executed or, where the bond was executed by a municipality, to the municipality; 40 percent of the remainder of the fee to the court clerk's fund where the bond was executed or where the bond is executed by the municipal court, to the municipality; 45 percent of the remainder of the fee to the Solicitor's Fund in the county where the bond was executed; five percent to the State General Fund and ten percent to the Alabama Forensic Services Trust Fund. The bail bond fee records shall be audited by the Department of Examiners of Public Accounts.”

§ 12–19–311.

The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies asked the circuit court to certify a class under Rule 23, Ala. R. Civ. P., and for a judgment declaring that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the matter and that § 12–19–311 violated the Alabama Constitution and the United States Constitution. They also asked for a declaration that the defendants' acts and practices were “unlawful” and sought “injunctive and equitable relief in accord with the declarations of this Court.” The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies asked the circuit court to “award [them] damages and the cost of this matter” and “a reasonable attorney fee.”

On July 26, 2012, the defendants, with the exception of the sheriffs named in the action (“the defendant sheriffs”), moved the circuit court to dismiss the criminal defendants and bail-bond companies' claims against them or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment or, in the alternative, to deny the criminal defendants and bail-bond companies' request for injunctive relief. On August 7, 2012, Sheriff D.T. Marshall moved the circuit court to dismiss the claims against him, and, on August 10, 2012, Sheriff Thomas Tate and Sheriff Huey “Hoss” Mack moved for dismissal of the claims against them. In a separate motion, Sheriff Sam Cochran also asked the circuit court to dismiss the claims against him. Each sheriff's motion alleged that he was entitled to sovereign immunity, pursuant to Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. of 1901.

In August 2012, after a hearing, the circuit court denied the criminal defendants and bail-bond companies' request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. In October 2012, the circuit court stayed discovery pending a ruling on the motions to dismiss. In November 2012, the criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies amended their complaint, adding several plaintiffs and an additional claim for relief under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies also filed objections to the circuit court's order staying discovery and a response to the motions to dismiss. The defendants filed various motions to dismiss the amended complaint, to which the criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies responded.

On February 15, 2013, the circuit court dismissed the criminal defendants and bail bond companies' claims, determining that, pursuant to this Court's decision in Citizenship Trust v. Keddie–Hill, 68 So.3d 99 (Ala.2011), it did not have jurisdiction over the claims in this action and that the criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies lacked standing. The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies appeal that judgment.

Standard of Review

“A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed without a presumption of correctness. This Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss we will not consider whether the pleader will ultimately prevail but whether the pleader may possibly prevail.”

Newman v. Savas, 878 So.2d 1147, 1148–49 (Ala.2003) (citations omitted).

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