Polanco v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin.

• Decision Date: 15 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-2905,No. 502,D,502,96-2905
• Citation: 158 F.3d 647
• Parties: Andre Lopez POLANCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee. ocket
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 647

158 F.3d 647

Andre Lopez POLANCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 502, Docket No. 96-2905.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 30, 1997.

Decided Oct. 15, 1998.

(Andre Lopez Polanco, Fort Dix, NJ, pro se.)

(Thomas J. Maroney, United States Attorney, Northern District of New York; William C. Pericak, Assistant United States Attorney, Albany, NY, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CARDAMONE, WALKER, and JACOBS, Circuit Judges.

JACOBS, Circuit Judge:

The pro se complaint alleges that on April 4, 1990, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") seized $6,920 in United States currency from plaintiff-appellant Andre Lopez Polanco, and that the government violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by failing to notify Polanco that it intended to forfeit the property. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.) construed the complaint as a claim for the return of forfeited property under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); applied the three-year statute of limitations for a Bivens action; concluded that Polanco's action (filed on August 27, 1996) was time-barred; and dismissed the action sua sponte, as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

For several reasons, we vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings. This action is not properly construed as a Bivens claim for damages arising from the intentional deprivation of property without due process of law; Polanco's cause of action more closely resembles the judicially-created cause of action to remedy a procedurally deficient forfeiture, as in Boero v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 111 F.3d 301 (2d Cir.1997) and Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir.1998), which (for reasons stated infra ) is not a Bivens action. The statute of limitations for such an action is six years, by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Polanco's claim accrued when he discovered or had reason to discover that his property had been forfeited without sufficient notice, and it is impossible to ascertain that date on the present record. Even if the action is time-barred, the district court may consider whether it is saved by the doctrine of equitable tolling, on the theory that Polanco initially filed his action in the wrong court. Finally, it may be that Polanco's claim is barred by res judicata in light of an order in the District of Maine that dismissed a motion filed by Polanco in 1996; we cannot ascertain the nature of that order on the current record.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from Polanco's papers, the public record, and the district court's Decision and Order.

Polanco alleges that on April 4, 1990, he and others were in a car that was stopped by New York State troopers near Syracuse, New York. The police questioned the passengers, searched the car without a warrant or consent, found $6,920 in cash in the car, seized the money, and turned it over to DEA agents who had been called to the scene. Polanco identified himself to the DEA agents as the owner of the currency, and they gave him a receipt for it. According to Polanco, the DEA agents told him that he was free to go, and that he would be notified regarding the status of the seized currency, but he was never so notified, or served with notice of forfeiture.

Polanco was subsequently convicted on possibly unrelated narcotics charges in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, and has been in federal prison since October 17, 1990. At some point after the close of his trial, Polanco filed a document in the District of Maine designated a "petition for return of personal property in the amount of $6,920.00 in U.S. currency." On June 10, 1996, Polanco filed what he styled a "motion to dismiss petition for return of currency for lack of jurisdiction and venue," and on July 10 he filed a motion to Polanco filed this action on August 27, 1996 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the district court considered whether the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted before allowing the plaintiff to proceed. The district court construed the complaint as a claim brought pursuant to Bivens. Assuming that Polanco's cause of action had accrued when the money was seized on April 4, 1990 (more than six years before his complaint was filed), the court concluded that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Bivens actions, and it dismissed the claim sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). The government was never served with Polanco's papers.

                withdraw his petition for the return of property.  Polanco alleges that this motion was granted and that the District of Maine "dismissed" his claim so that he could "subsequently refile[ ] in New York which is the Court of proper Venue and Jurisdiction."   Polanco's "petition for return of personal property" is unavailable to this Court, and its filing date is unknown.  (The District of Maine has provided a partial docket sheet indicating that Polanco filed a motion on April 1, 1996 seeking the return of property pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e), but it is unclear whether that motion, which sought the return of $11,420 in cash and which was denied on May 31, 1996, has any bearing on this case.  The clerk of the district of Maine has advised this Court's Staff Attorneys' Office that the May 1996 action was "archived" and that (a seeming non sequitur ) it is therefore unavailable.)
                

Polanco filed this appeal and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted by a panel of this Court. That panel advised the parties to brief two issues: (i) the timeliness of Polanco's claim under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346; and (ii) the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine.

DISCUSSION

Prior to the enactment of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA"), Title VIII of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), the dismissal of a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 was discretionary, and was reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1734, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). The PLRA's amendment to § 1915 expands the grounds for dismissal (including the failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the ground for dismissal in this case) and makes such dismissal mandatory. See 28 U.S.C.1915(e)(2). The PLRA amendments raise a question as to whether the standard of review should now be de novo. See Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 436-37 (2d Cir.1998). However, as we did in Livingston, we decline to address this question because we find that the district court's dismissal was improper regardless of the applicable standard of review.

A. The Nature of the Claim

The district court construed Polanco's complaint as a Bivens action. However, Bivens provides a remedy only for intentional deprivations of property without due process of law. See Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392, 1399 (2d Cir.1992). It is unclear whether Polanco complains of an intentional or a negligent deprivation of his property, and he appears to seek equitable relief rather than money damages. Moreover, the only defendant is the DEA, and a Bivens action is brought against individual federal agents rather than against the federal agency. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1005-06, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). For these reasons, and because a pro se complaint is liberally construed, see Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam ); Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1983) (per curiam ), the district court erred by conclusorily construing Polanco's complaint as one brought pursuant to Bivens.

Polanco's allegation is that the government failed to "apprise [him] of the Government's intentions to forfeit the said currency....

                ....  Thus, [he] was never given a fair opportunity or adequate remedy at law to challenge the seizure of his property."   Subject matter jurisdiction over this claim is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question statute, because the complaint alleges a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.  See Willis v. United States, 787 F.2d 1089, 1093 (7th Cir.1986).  In Boero v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 111 F.3d 301 (2d Cir.1997), we discussed the judicially-created cause of action to remedy a forfeiture that is procedurally deficient under the Due Process Clause and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-513, tit.  II, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276, as amended by Pub.L. No. 95-633, tit.  III, § 301(a)(1), 92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (1978). 1  A district court has jurisdiction to consider a claim that one's property has been taken "accidentally, fraudulently, or improperly" by an agency of the United States.  Onwubiko, 969 F.2d at 1398 (citing The Rio Grande, 90 U.S.  (23 Wall.) 458, 465, 23 L.Ed. 158 (1874)).  A claim that property was seized without proper notice, and therefore improperly, falls within this category.  Boero, 111 F.3d at 305;  see also Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40, 93 S.Ct. 30, 31, 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972) (per curiam ) (due process requires government to afford notice that is "reasonably calculated" to be efficacious);  Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir.1998) (same)
                

We have held that such a claim is a "civil 'claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an...