Polin v. Kaplan

• Decision Date: 29 September 1931
• Citation: 177 N.E. 833,257 N.Y. 277
• Parties: POLIN v. KAPLAN. SCHNEIDER v. SAME.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

257 N.Y. 277

177 N.E. 833

POLIN

v.KAPLAN.

SCHNEIDER

v.SAME.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Sept. 29, 1931.

Actions by Alexander Polin and by Charles Schneider against Sam Kaplan, as president of the Moving Picture Machine Operators' Union of Greater New York, Local No. 306, of Internation Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators of United States and Canada. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (231 App. Div. 849, 850, 246 N. Y. S. 522, 524), affirming judgment of Special Term dismissing the complaint, plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed, and judgment directed in favor of plaintiff in each action.

POUND and O'BRIEN, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Charles H. Tuttle, Copal Mintz, and Samuel M. Birnbaum, all of New York City, for appellants.

Jeremiah T. Mahoney, of New York City, and Gardiner Conroy, of Brooklyn, for respondent.

KELLOGG, J.

The plaintiffs were members of an unincorporated association known as the ‘Moving Picture Machine Operators' Union of Greater New York, Local No. 306.’ The recording secretary of the union presented charges against the plaintiffs to the association at one of its regular meetings. The charges were three in number. Briefly stated, they were as follows: Charge No. 1. The plaintiffs had violated section 6, article 10, of the constitution, in that they had brought an action in the Supreme Court of the state, in which they had charged the officers of the union with having violated the constitution and by-laws, and had sought redress therefor. Charge No. 2. The plaintiffs had circulated printed articles of a libelous nature, containing statements charging the officers of the union with violations of the constitution and by-laws, and other illegal practices, and such statements were false and malicious. Charge No. 3. The plaintiffs had violated their oaths of obligation to the union ‘by committing the acts charged in specifications 1 and 2, and refusing on numerous occasions to obey the mandates of the union, and also the will of the majority of said union. Also, in failing to keep confidential the work of the body of the union.’ The union, at a regular meeting, made the charges cognizable, and referred them to the executive board to try the same and make their report. This was the procedure prescribed by article 10, section 1, of the constitution. The board heard the proof offered in respect to the charges, and made a report sustaining them. Thereupon the union, at a regular meeting, confirmed the report, and imposed these penalties: For the violation specified in charge No. 1, $500; for that specified in charge No. 2, $500; for that specified in charge No. 3, expulsion from the union. Thereafter the plaintiffs instituted these actions to have the proceedings adjudged to be null and void, to procure the plaintiffs' reinstatement, and to recover damages.

The constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated association express the terms of a contract which define the privileges secured and the duties assumed by those who have become members. As the contract may prescribe the precise terms upon which a membership may be gained, so may it conclusively define the conditions which will entail its loss. Thus, if the contract reasonably provides that the performance of certain acts will constitute a sufficient cause for the expulsion of a member, and that charges of their performance, with notice to the member, shall be tried before a tribunal set up by the association, the provision is exclusive, and the judgment of the tribunal, rendered after a fair trial, that the member has committed the offenses charged and must be expelled, will not be reviewed by the regularly constituted courts. Belton v. Hatch, 109 N. Y. 593, 17 N. E. 225,4 Am. St. Rep. 495;Matter of Haebler v. New York Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 414, 44 N. E. 87. A court ‘cannot review the proceedings or re-examine the merit of the expulsion.’ Per MILLER, J., in Wilcox v. Supreme Council Royal Arcanum, 210 N. Y. 370, 376,104 N. E. 624, 626,52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 806. This is not to say, however, that a court will decline to interfere, if an expulsion has been decreed for acts not constituting violations of the constitution and by-laws, and not made expellable offenses thereby, either by terms expressed or implied. In such an instance, the expulsion is not within the poser conferred by the contract. Accordingly, the proceedings will be set aside and the associate restored to membership. People ex rel. Bartlett v. Medical Society of Erie County, 32 N. Y. 187; Amalgamated Society of Carpenters v. Braithwaite [1922] 2 App. Cas. 440, 470. In the latter case a trade unionist was threatened with expulsion on the ground that, in violation of a rule of his union, he had become a participant in a profit-sharing scheme instituted by his employer. The House of Lords held that his act was not, within its strict meaning, a violation of the rule, and that an injunction lay to prevent the expulsion. The contention, as stated by counsel, was, ‘that no member of a trade union can restrain by injunction his expulsion from the union.’ Lord Wrenbury said: ‘My Lords, I think it well to say plainly that in my opinion this contention is absolutely untenable.’

We think, also, that in every contract of association there inheres a term binding members to loyal support of the society in the attainment of its proper purposes, and that for a gross breach of this obligation the power of expulsion is impliedly conferred upon the association. It has been said by the Supreme Court of California that an association may expel a member upon one of two grounds, viz.: ‘First, a violation of such of the established rules of the association as have been subscribed or assented to by the members, and as provide expulsion for such violation; second, for such conduct as clearly violates the fundamental objects of the association, and if persisted in and allowed would thwart those objects or bring the association into disrepute.’ Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union, 75 Cal. 308, 314, 17 P. 217, 219,7 Am. St. Rep. 156. The supreme Court of Pennsylvania has said that, if the charter of an association contains no express provision for expulsion, it may nevertheless be had if the member ‘has been guilty of some infamous offense, or has done some act tending to the destruction of the society.’ Weiss v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 189 Pa. 446, 451, 42 A. 118, 120,69 Am. St. Rep. 820. We subscribe to these views.

Charge no. 1. This charge, as we have stated, is that the plaintiffs, in bringing an action against the officers of the corporation, violated section 6 of article 10 of the constitution. That section is entitled ‘Order of Appeal’ and provides in part: ‘The order of appeal shall be: 1. To the Local Union from its own or its officers' decision.’ It then provides that subsequent appeals shall be from the decision of the local union to the international president of the...