Pond Machine Tool Co. v. Robinson

Decision Date15 March 1888
Citation38 Minn. 272
PartiesPOND MACHINE TOOL COMPANY <I>vs.</I> JABEZ M. ROBINSON.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

as assignee in insolvency of the Pray Manufacturing Company, and other defendants, to establish and enforce a lien upon the machine-shop of that company and its appurtenances for the price of an iron planer. The assignee defended on the ground (1) that the machine was sold and delivered, not in this state, but in Massachusetts, and was not ordered or furnished for, or used in, "altering" the company's machine-shop; and (2) that any right to a lien which plaintiff might have had under Gen. St. 1878, c. 90, was taken away by the repeal of that chapter by the general repealing clause in Laws 1887, c. 170. The action was tried by Hicks, J., who found the facts stated in the opinion, and ordered judgment for plaintiff. A new trial was refused, and the defendant Robinson appealed.

M. B. Koon and A. B. Jackson, for appellant.

Selden Bacon, for respondent.

VANDERBURGH, J.

1. The mechanic's lien law of March 20, 1858, (Laws 1858, c. 53,) applied to "every person who shall have a claim for materials furnished or services rendered in the construction, erection, or repair of any dwelling-house," etc. The act of August 12, 1858, (Laws 1858, c. 54,) provided that any person who shall have performed, or may hereafter perform, labor, etc., by virtue of a contract with the owner, etc., shall have a lien as thereby provided. By section 17: "In all cases where liens have been filed under pre-existing laws, the same may be prosecuted to final judgment under such law; and in all cases where the right to liens has accrued as provided in this act, the same may be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions of this act." By section 19 all acts and parts of acts inconsistent therewith were repealed. This act, therefore, was made applicable both to existing and future claims, but limited the lien to cases where the work was performed or materials furnished by virtue of a contract with the owner, except that all liens, of whatever class, which had been filed, were saved and were to be prosecuted under the pre-existing statute. It is clear that the court in Toledo Novelty Works v. Bernheimer, 8 Minn. 92, (118,) were right in holding that, except as to liens expressly saved, the act of March 20th was repealed by the act of August 12, 1858. The purpose of the legislature was made very clear to provide a lien for a certain class of claims, past or future, and no others. The existing law was, by clear implication, not continued in force in respect to claims not included in the class specified. The plaintiff's claim in that case did not belong to that class, nor to the class for which provision was made by the new statute. He was therefore rightly denied relief.

This statement is made because that case is cited as an authority here for the proposition that Gen. St. 1878, c. 90, was repealed by Laws 1887, c. 170, and that the plaintiff is not, therefore, entitled to a lien in this case, and in order to show the distinction between the two cases. The act of 1887 provides (section 1) "that on and after the passage of this act, all labor performed * * * shall be a first lien," and (section 2) "all material furnished * * * shall be a second lien." Sec. 4. Liens must be filed within 90 days after labor performed or materials furnished. And section 12 repeals inconsistent legislation. Of the two classes of claims, existing and future, this act purports to provide only for the latter. No mention or provision is made for the former. The existing statute on the subject is not expressly repealed. It is clearly inconsistent with the provisions made for future liens by the act of 1887. It is not so clear that, as to claims existing at the time of the passage of the last act, the former is necessarily repealed. The new act is expressly made prospective. Full effect may be given to it, and the old statute remain operative. The legislation is remedial in its character, and since no attempt is made in the new act to make provision for past cases, it will not be presumed that it was the intention of the legislature to supersede the old statute as to them. So far at least the statutes are not inconsistent. Conner v. Lewis, 16 Me. 268, 273. The repeal of inconsistent legislation extends no further than the subject-matter of the act, which relates only to future claims. The distinction between Toledo Novelty Works v. Bernheimer and the case at bar is the same as that recognized by the Maine supreme court between Bangor v. Goding, 35 Me. 73, (56 Am. Dec. 688;) and Conner v. Lewis, supra. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff may prosecute his lien under the General Statutes if otherwise entitled to it.

2. The findings of fact as to the delivery of the machine in question and that it was manufactured and furnished for the machine-shop of the Pray Manufacturing Company in the city of Minneapolis, are, we think, sustained by the evidence; and as bearing upon these questions the evidence of the correspondence and negotiations of the parties was properly admitted. The reception of that portion of the testimony of the witness Pond which might be deemed objectionable as tending to vary the written contract, was error without prejudice, in view of the fact that there is no dispute in respect to the contract.

The evidence shows that the Pray Company were in need of such a machine for use in the business of their shop. The officers of the plaintiff corporation were informed of the nature of the shop of the Pray Company, and the machinery in it, which had been described to them; and it is clear, from the circumstances under which the machine was ordered and the negotiations between the parties, that it was built for the works of the latter company, and consigned and shipped directly to them at Minneapolis, as intended by the parties. It was accordingly set up in the machine-shop in a place prepared for it, and properly adjusted so as to run and be operated in connection with the other machinery in the shop. It was an enormous planer, of many tons' weight, and needs no supports other than the foundation prepared for it. It is found that in order to set up the machine it was necessary to cut pits in the floor for the gearing. It is not bolted down, but is held in its place by its own weight, — 76,000 pounds. The building in which it was placed was specially constructed for a machine-shop, 200 feet long and 50 feet wide, and had a large amount of machinery in it specially for that business. From the main shafting in the building a belt was run to the counter-shafting, which belongs to and is...

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1 cases
  • Pond Mach. Tool Co. v. Robinson
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • March 15, 1888
    ... ... before the receipt of the notes was not necessarily a waiver of the conditions of the sale or of the right of the consignor subsequently to reclaim the actual possession of the property upon default of the consignee to deliver the notes as agreed.The findings of the trial court that the machine in controversy here was a fixture in the machine-shop referred to in the record, and was furnished for use therein in pursuance of a contract with the owners thereof, and that the absolute and final delivery of such machine was made in this state, held supported by the evidence.Appeal from district ... ...

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