Pongdara v. Employment Appeal Board, No. 8-802/08-0789 (Iowa App. 10/29/2008)
| Decision Date | 29 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 8-802/08-0789,8-802/08-0789 |
| Parties | PHANOMKEO PONGDARA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD and IOWA GAMING COMPANY/BELLE OF SIOUX CITY, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Iowa |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Duane E. Hoffmeyer, Judge.
Petitioner seeks judicial review of the district court's decision affirming the Employment Appeal Board's final decision denying her unemployment benefits.
AFFIRMED.
Jennifer H. Cerutti of Iowa Legal Aid, Sioux City, for appellant.
Richard Autry, Des Moines, for appellee Employment Appeal Board.
Lorraine May, Des Moines, for appellee Iowa Gaming Company.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Potterfield, JJ.
Petitioner, Phanomkeo Pongdara, appeals the district court's decision affirming the Employment Appeal Board's final ruling denying her unemployment benefits.
Pongdara was hired by the Belle of Sioux City Riverboat Casino on May 11, 2005 and worked as a card dealer. While working she met and became friends with Chuck Topp, a patron. In December 2006, Pongdara asked Topp for two loans to purchase Christmas gifts. Topp loaned Pongdara $800 and Pongdara agreed to make monthly payments of $200 and pay off the remaining balance with her tax return expected in the spring of 2007. Pongdara paid $100 in February 2007 and made no further payments. Frustrated by Pongdara's failure to repay the loan, Topp contacted the casino's operations manager on March 20, 2007, and notified them of the loan and Pongdara's default.
On March 21, 2007, the casino placed Pongdara on administrative leave pending an internal investigation. The casino determined Pongdara violated its conflicts of interest policy by obtaining a loan from a patron and terminated her employment on March 27, 2007. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits which was denied on April 12, 2007. The decision noted benefits would not be awarded because she was discharged for conduct not in the best interest of her employer. Pongdara appealed and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge on May 9, 2007. The judge determined that though the casino's policy did not specifically forbid employees from obtaining loans from patrons, a reasonable employee would understand that it would be inappropriate to do so. The judge concluded Pongdara was therefore not entitled to unemployment benefits because she was terminated for misconduct.1
Pongdara appealed this decision to the Employment Appeal Board. Two members of the board affirmed and adopted the administrative law judge's decision, and one member dissented. Pongdara's rehearing request was denied and she sought judicial review at the district court. On review, the district court noted the case was difficult but found substantial evidence supported the board's decision. The court pointed out that Pongdara acknowledged she knew of the policy and did not disclose the loan to the casino. It found Pongdara's failure to disclose the loan to the casino for several months after the loan agreement was made was an ongoing act of misconduct. Pongdara appeals again, urging there is not substantial evidence to prove she engaged in misconduct that would disqualify her from unemployment benefits.
Iowa Code Chapter 17A (2007), the Administrative Procedure Act, governs our review of claims concerning unemployment benefits. Titan Tire Corp. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 641 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Iowa 2002); Dico, Inc. v. Iowa Employment Appeal Bd., 576 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1998). Under the act we review to correct any errors of law that may have occurred at the agency level. Harrison v. Employment Appeal Bd., 659 N.W.2d 581, 586 (Iowa 2003). We can grant relief if Pongdara's substantial rights have been prejudiced due to any reason listed under Iowa Code section 17A.19(10).
Pongdara asserts she is entitled to relief because the agency's decision is an incorrect application of law to undisputed facts. In other words, she contends the board's decision is "[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact that has clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m). We will therefore analyze whether the district court correctly applied the law by applying section 17A.19(10)(m) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as the district court's. Weishaar v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 506 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 1993); Langley v. Employment Appeal Bd., 490 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). We do grant a limited degree of discretion to the agency's application of law to fact but will reverse if it was irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. Grant v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 722 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 2006); Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218-19 (Iowa 2006). We are also instructed to give appropriate deference to the agency's view when particular matters have been vested by law in the agency's discretion. Iowa Code § 17A.19(11)(c). The determination of whether an employee has been discharged for misconduct has been vested in the agency. See Iowa Code § 96.5(2) () (emphasis supplied).
Pongdara identifies four ways the agency misapplied this law to the facts to reach the conclusion she was ineligible for benefits. She contends (1) she did not violate the policy and therefore she did not engage in misconduct, (2) even if she violated the policy, her actions do not satisfy the definition of misconduct in the administrative code, (3) her actions did not constitute off-duty misconduct warranting denial of benefits, and (4) any misconduct she did engage in was months prior to the termination, and was not a current act of misconduct as is required to deny benefits on the basis of disqualifying misconduct.
Pongdara's initial argument that she did not violate the policy is essentially a challenge to a factual determination rather than to the application of law. We are bound by the agency's fact findings if supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218. If a reasonable person could accept the evidence as adequate to reach the same conclusions as the agency, then the evidence is substantial. Asmus v. Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist., 722 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Iowa 2006); see also Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1) (). In analyzing a factual determination, we look to whether the evidence supports the findings the agency actually made, not considering whether we would have made the same findings. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218.
The casino had a policy stating that employees had "an obligation to conduct business within guidelines that prohibit actual or potential conflicts of interest." The policy did not specifically forbid loans with patrons, but encouraged employees to seek clarification with the casino's compliance officer for questions concerning specific conflicts of interest. The policy provided, in relevant part, that
[a]n actual or potential conflict of interest occurs when an employee is in a position to influence a decision that may result in a personal gain for that employee or for a relative as a result of the Company's business dealings or in a situation making it difficult for the employee to perform their duties.
A reasonable person could find, from the circumstances presented in the record, that Pongdara violated her employer's policy by making a loan agreement with Topp without first consulting with her employer to determine whether it would be an actual or potential conflict of interest prohibited under the policy. There is substantial evidence supporting the agency's finding of a policy violation.
However, even if the policy violation was sufficient to warrant Pongdara's discharge, this may not be a sufficient reason for denial of unemployment benefits. These are two different inquiries and "[m]isconduct serious enough to warrant the discharge of an employee is not necessarily serious enough to warrant a denial of benefits." Gaborit v. Employment Appeal Bd., 743 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007); Sellers v. Employment Appeal Bd., 531 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Application of the administrative code definition of misconduct to the facts determines whether Pongdara is ineligible for benefits due to her violation of the casino's policy.
An employee who is terminated for misconduct is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Iowa Code § 96.5(2)(a); Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.32(1)(b). Misconduct for this purpose is defined as:
a deliberate act or omission by a worker which constitutes a material breach of the duties and obligations arising out of such worker's contract of employment. Misconduct as the term is used in the disqualification provision as being limited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree of recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the...
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