Popoff v. Illinois Dept. of Labor

• Decision Date: 26 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 2-85-0741,2-85-0741
• Citation: 98 Ill.Dec. 939,494 N.E.2d 1266,144 Ill.App.3d 575
• Parties: , 98 Ill.Dec. 939 Norman POPOFF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, an administrative agency in the State of Illinois Director of the Illinois Department of Labor; Board of Review, an administrative agency in the State of Illinois, Navy Exchange, employer, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1266

494 N.E.2d 1266

144 Ill.App.3d 575, 98 Ill.Dec. 939

Norman POPOFF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, an administrative agency in the State of Illinois Director of the Illinois Department of Labor; Board of Review, an administrative agency in the State of Illinois, Navy Exchange, employer, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 2-85-0741.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

June 26, 1986.

Norman Popoff, pro se.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Roma Jones-Stewart, Patricia Rosen, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

Justice SCHNAKE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Norman Popoff, appeals pro se from an order of the circuit court of Lake County affirming the administrative decision of the defendant, the Board of Review, which affirmed the referee's conclusion that the plaintiff was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits under the provisions of section 601 A of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 48, par. 431 A) because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his employer. On appeal, plaintiff raises only one assignment of error: that the trial court's decision that he left work without good cause attributable to his employer was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

It is axiomatic that an administrative agency's findings concerning factual questions are prima facie true and correct and should not be disturbed on review unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 3-110; Garland v. Department of Labor (1984), 104 Ill.2d 383, 392, 84 Ill.Dec. 474, 472 N.E.2d 434; Gregory v. Bernardi (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 376, 381, 80 Ill.Dec. 706, 465 N.E.2d 1052; Crocker v. Department of Labor (1984), 121 Ill.App.3d 185, 189, 76 Ill.Dec. 695, 459 N.E.2d 332.) Thus, the court's function in an unemployment insurance case is limited to determining whether the Board of Review's findings at the administrative hearing are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (125 Ill.App.3d 376, 381, 80 Ill.Dec. 706, 465 N.E.2d 1052; Griffitts Construction Co., Inc. v. Department of Labor (1979), 76 Ill.2d 99, 104, 28 Ill.Dec. 166, 390 N.E.2d 333.) The court will not reweigh the evidence adduced at the hearing or substitute its judgment for that of the agency unless the board's findings are without substantial support in the record. (125 Ill.App.3d 376, 381, 80 Ill.Dec. 706, 465 N.E.2d 1052; Thompson v. Board of Review, Illinois Department of Labor (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 1, 4, 75 Ill.Dec. 518, 457 N.E.2d 512; see James v. Department of Labor (1983), 119 Ill.App.3d 524, 527, 75 Ill.Dec. 58, 456 N.E.2d 879.) Where such an administrative order is against the manifest weight of the evidence or where an agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously and, therefore, abused its discretion, a court should not hesitate to intervene. Southern Illinois Asphalt Co., Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 204, 207, 326 N.E.2d 406.

The primary purpose of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 48, par. 300 et seq.) is to provide compensation benefits to unemployed individuals to alleviate their economic distress that was caused by involuntary unemployment. (Wadlington v. Mindes (1970), 45 Ill.2d 447, 452, 259 N.E.2d 257, appeal dismissed (1970), 400 U.S. 935, 91 S.Ct. 252, 27 L.Ed.2d 242; Burke v. Board of Review, Illinois Department of Labor (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 1094, 1099, 87 Ill.Dec. 823, 477 N.E.2d 1351; Clark v. Board of Review of Illinois Department of Labor (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 559, 561, 81 Ill.Dec. 828, 467 N.E.2d 950; Lipman v. Board of Review of Department of Labor (1984), 123 Ill.App.3d 176, 179, 78 Ill.Dec. 679, 462 N.E.2d 798.) The Act was not intended to benefit those who are unemployed on account of their own misdeeds. (Granite City Steel v. Board of Review (1979), 68 Ill.App.3d 264, 269, 24 Ill.Dec. 790, 385 N.E.2d 931.) Thus, the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits in this State is a conditional right, and a claimant bears the burden of establishing eligibility before the agency. (126 Ill.App.3d 559, 561, 81 Ill.Dec. 828, 467 N.E.2d 950; 123 Ill.App.3d 176, 181, 78 Ill.Dec. 679, 462 N.E.2d 798; Crocker v. Department of Labor (1984), 121 Ill.App.3d 185, 188, 76 Ill.Dec. 695, 459 N.E.2d 332; Thompson v. Board of Review, Illinois Department of Labor (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 1, 7, 75 Ill.Dec. 518, 457 N.E.2d 512, (Nash J., dissenting); James v. Department of Labor (1983), 119 Ill.App.3d 524, 527, 75 Ill.Dec. 58, 456 N.E.2d 879.) In order to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must satisfy the terms and conditions the Act prescribes. (126 Ill.App.3d 559, 561, 81 Ill.Dec. 828, 467 N.E.2d 950.) The Act must be construed liberally for the benefit of unemployed workers. Davis v. Board of Review of Department of Labor (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 67, 72, 80 Ill.Dec. 464, 465 N.E.2d 576; Jackson v. Board of Review of Illinois Department of Labor (1984), 121 Ill.App.3d 963, 967, 77 Ill.Dec. 373, 460 N.E.2d 429, rev'd on other grounds (1985), 105 Ill.2d 501, 86 Ill.Dec. 500, 475 N.E.2d 879; Garland v. Department of Labor Bureau of Unemployment Security (1984), 121 Ill.App.3d 562, 564, 77 Ill.Dec. 29, 459 N.E.2d 1125, aff'd (1984), 104 Ill.2d 383, 84 Ill.Dec. 474, 472 N.E.2d 434.

Section 601 A of the Act provides, in relevant part, that a claimant, "shall be ineligible for benefits for the week in which he [or she] has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 48, par. 431 A.) The statute, however, does not define "good cause." This court has determined that Pennsylvania's unemployment statute is similar to the Illinois enactment and has relied upon Pennsylvania jurisprudence in adjudicating "voluntarily leaving" under section 601 A. (See, e.g., Jones v. Board of Review of Department of Labor (1985), 136 Ill.App.3d 64, 66, 90 Ill.Dec. 848, 482 N.E.2d 1131; Burke v. Board of Review, Illinois Department of Labor (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 1094, 1100-01, 87 Ill.Dec. 823, 477 N.E.2d 1351; Minfield v. Bernardi (1984), 122 Ill.App.3d 97, 102, 77 Ill.Dec. 462, 460 N.E.2d 766.) Although a unilateral change in employment may render the employment unsuitable so that good cause for voluntary termination is established (136 Ill.App.3d 64, 66, 90 Ill.Dec. 848, 482 N.E.2d 1131 (and cases cited therein); Davis v. Board of Review of Department of Labor (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 67, 72, 80 Ill.Dec. 464, 465 N.E.2d 576), generally, the dissatisfaction with the number of working hours does not constitute good cause to leave employment. 122 Ill.App.3d 97, 102-03, 77 Ill.Dec. 462, 460 N.E.2d 766; see Hamilton v. Board of Review of Department of Labor (1985), 136 Ill.App.3d 50, 55-56, 90 Ill.Dec. 843, 482 N.E.2d 1126.

The record in the present case reveals that plaintiff began working for defendant, Navy Exchange, as a part-time janitor on September 30, 1982. All part-time workers were expected to work various hours on various days of the week, totalling 20 to 34 hours per week. Initially, plaintiff worked five days per week from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. His second assignment was to work from 5 a.m. to 11 a.m. five days per week. As the early morning hours precluded him from helping his wife take care of his elderly and sickly father, plaintiff took a leave of absence without pay.

On July 30, 1983, the Navy Exchange rehired plaintiff to work part-time, specifically, five days per week from 1:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. The next day, he was reassigned to work six days per week, including Sundays. Plaintiff immediately quit.

Plaintiff contends that the prior reviewers of his case applied an improper legal standard in determining that he voluntarily left his work without good cause. Specifically, he claims that section 601 B of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 48, par. 431 B) is applicable because he left work upon the advice of his father's...