PORTER v. SPADER

• Decision Date: 21 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 09-0678.,1 CA-CV 09-0678.
• Citation: 239 P.3d 743,225 Ariz. 424
• Parties: Holly PORTER, a married woman, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Arona M. SPADER, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

225 Ariz. 424

239 P.3d 743

Holly PORTER, a married woman, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Arona M. SPADER, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 09-0678.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,Division 1, Department E.

Sept. 21, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Riggs Ellsworth & Porter, P.L.C. by Matthew L. Riggs, Mesa, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.

The Ledbetter Law Firm, P.L.C. by James E. Ledbetter, Brett R. Rigg, Cottonwood, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.

OPINION

WINTHROP, Judge.

¶ 1 Holly Porter (“Plaintiff”) appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing her complaint because it was untimely filed under the applicable statute of limitations. We hold that Rule 60(c)(1), Ariz. R. Civ. P., does not allow relief from a judgment entered based on a statute of limitations.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Plaintiff suffered personal injuries in an automobile collision on September 25, 2006. She secured the services of counsel, who prepared a civil complaint seeking compensation for those injuries. The complaint was mailed to the Navajo County Superior Court on September 19, 2008, six days before the statutory two-year limitations period for such actions, see Ariz.Rev.Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 12-542 (2003), was to expire. The envelope was returned for insufficient postage and received by the law office on September 24, one day before the limitations period would expire. Upon seeing the insufficient postage designation on the returned envelope, law office staff, without consulting the attorney or other staff responsible for handling the matter, and without reviewing the contents, simply placed the contents in another envelope with additional postage and re-mailed it to the court. Upon receipt, the clerk of the court filed the complaint on September 26; unfortunately for Plaintiff, this was one day after the limitations period had expired.

¶ 3 Defendant moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. In response, Plaintiff conceded her complaint was filed after limitations had run, but she argued that under Rule 60(c)(1), even if summary judgment were granted, the judgment should immediately be set aside based on the excusable neglect of the law office staff. Following briefing and without argument, the trial court granted the defense motion for summary judgment and concomitantly denied Plaintiff's Rule 60(c)(1) motion on the basis that she had not met her burden of showing excusable neglect. ¹

¶ 4 This timely appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) (2003). See also A.R.S. § 12-2101(C); Schwab v. Ames Constr., 207 Ariz. 56, 58-59, ¶¶ 9-12, 83 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2004) (recognizing that technical procedural defects generally do not deprive this court of jurisdiction).

ANALYSIS

¶ 5 We review de novo the trial court's interpretation of A.R.S. § 12-542 and the reach of Rule 60(c)(1). See Owens v. City of Phoenix, 180 Ariz. 402, 405, 884 P.2d 1100, 1103 (App.1994); Libra Group, Inc. v. State, 167 Ariz. 176, 179, 805 P.2d 409, 412 (App.1991). To the extent that we review whether there is a sufficient factual basis on which to apply Rule 60(c)(1) to set aside a judgment, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Staffco, Inc. v. Maricopa Trading Co., 122 Ariz. 353, 356, 595 P.2d 31, 34 (1979).

I. The Applicable Statute of Limitations Was Not Extended or Tolled.

¶ 6 In interpreting and applying statutes, Arizona courts have previously recognizedthat the most compelling evidence of the legislature's intent is the language it has chosen to use in the statute. See, e.g., Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996); In re Estate of Jung, 210 Ariz. 202, 204, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 97, 99 (App.2005). Here, A.R.S. § 12-542 provides in pertinent part as follows:

Except as provided in § 12-551 [the statute of limitations regarding product liability] there shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, the following actions:

1. For injuries done to the person of another....

¶ 7 The plain purpose of statutes of limitations is to identify the outer limits of the period of time within which an action may be brought to seek redress or to otherwise enforce legal rights created by the legislature or at common law. See In re Estate of Travers, 192 Ariz. 333, 336, ¶ 21, 965 P.2d 67, 70 (App.1998) (“A statute of limitations is a legislative enactment which sets maximum time periods during which certain actions can be brought.” (citing Black's Law Dictionary 927 (6th ed.1990))). ² As a matter of public policy, our legislature has determined that claims must be brought within an identifiable period of time, and claims brought thereafter are, absent certain circumstances, too stale to be enforceable.

The legitimate purposes of statutes of limitations are threefold: (1) to protect defendants from stale claims, see Brooks v. Southern Pacific Co., 105 Ariz. 442, 444, 466 P.2d 736, 738 (1970) (pursuit of a claim after an unreasonable amount of time may be thwarted when evidence may have been lost or witnesses' memories have faded); (2) to protect defendants from insecurity-economic, psychological, or both, Comment, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV.L.REV. 1177, 1185 (1950) (“there comes a time when he ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations”); and (3) to protect courts from the burden of stale claims. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945).

Ritchie v. Grand Canyon Scenic Rides, 165 Ariz. 460, 464, 799 P.2d 801, 805 (1990); accord Jackson, 23 Ariz.App. at 203, 531 P.2d at 936 (“The underlying purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution.” (quoting Wood at 8-9)).

¶ 8 To determine whether a claim is time-barred, we examine four factors: “(1) when did the plaintiff's cause of action accrue; (2) what is the applicable statute of limitations period; (3) when did the plaintiff file his [or her] claim; and (4) was the running of the limitations period suspended or tolled for any reason?” Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 Ariz. 39, 41, 893 P.2d 39, 41 (App.1994) (citing Roldan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 149 A.D.2d 20, 544 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (1989)), vacated in part on other grounds, 185 Ariz. 174, 913 P.2d 1092 (1996).

¶ 9 There is no issue here concerning accrual or discovery of the cause of action, and Plaintiff acknowledges that she filed her complaint one day late; thus, we address whether the limitations period was suspended or tolled.

¶ 10 Our legislature has provided for the suspension or tolling of a limitations period only in very limited and specified situations. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 12-501 (2003) (providing that the absence of a defendant from the state at the time the cause of action accrues or during the limitations period extends the limitations period); 12-502 (2003) (providing that minors and persons of “unsound mind” are considered “disabled” as a matter of law,and the limitations period is tolled until the disability is removed); 12-508 (2003) (providing that a cause of action may be tolled by a written agreement signed by the party to be charged); 14-3802 (2005) (providing for limited suspension of statutes of limitations for certain claims in probate cases); 43-722 (2006) (providing for suspension of the running of the statute of limitations on the making of assessments by the department of revenue in cases involving bankruptcy or receivership). We have found no statutory exception that applies to suspend or legally toll the limitations period in this matter.

¶ 11 Further, the doctrine of equitable tolling, a concept rooted in the common law, see Hosogai v. Kadota, 145 Ariz. 227, 231, 700 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1985), ³ is not applicable here. In instances involving equitable tolling, courts have recognized that, as a matter of equity, a defendant whose affirmative acts of fraud or concealment have misled a person from either recognizing a legal wrong or seeking timely legal redress may not be entitled to assert the protection of a statute of limitations. ⁴ See, e.g., Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 319, ¶¶ 34-37, 44 P.3d 990, 999 (2002); Certainteed Corp. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 158 Ariz. 273, 277, 762 P.2d 560, 564 (App.1988) (stating that a defendant insurer will be estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations if by its conduct the insurer induces its insured (the plaintiff) to forego litigation by leading the insured to believe a settlement will be effected without the necessity of commencing litigation).

¶ 12 In this case, there is no contention that the actions of Defendant, or her agents or representatives, served to conceal the cause of action, misled Plaintiff in any fashion, or caused Plaintiff to delay filing her complaint in a timely manner. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges no facts presenting the “extraordinary circumstances” contemplated by this court in McCloud. See 217 Ariz. at 87-89, ¶¶ 11-20, 170 P.3d at 696-98. Accordingly, we conclude that the limitations period established by § 12-542 was not equitably suspended or tolled. Plaintiff's complaint was untimely filed as a matter of law.

II. Rule 60(c)(1) Relief Is Not Available When A Complaint Is Untimely Filed.

¶ 13 Rule 60(c)(1) provides that a party or a party's legal representative may be relieved from a final judgment upon a showing of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” In the proceedings below, Plaintiff contended that the actions of the law office staff constituted “excusable neglect,” and she maintains the trial court should consequently have granted her motion to set aside the judgment. It appears the trial court assumed that Rule 60(c)(1) relief was theoretically available, but denied relief because it found that the actions of...