Porter v. State, 90101.
Decision Date | 15 October 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 90101.,90101. |
Citation | 723 So.2d 191 |
Parties | Raleigh PORTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Martin J. McClain, Litigation Director CCRC, and Todd G. Scher, Chief Assistant CCRC, Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel for the Southern Region, Miami, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Raleigh Porter appeals an order entered by the circuit court below pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 which found that Judge Richard M. Stanley Jr. was impartial at the time he sentenced appellant to death in 1978 and again in 1981. The circuit court's order stems from an evidentiary hearing required by a decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir.1995). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. State v. Fourth District Court of Appeal, 697 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla.1997). We reverse the circuit court's order because we determine that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in finding that Judge Stanley was impartial when he sentenced appellant to death.
Appellant's case has a long judicial history, as detailed in Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir.1995) ( ); Porter v. Singletary, No. 95-109-CIV-FTM-17D (M.D.Fla.1995) ( ); Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554 (11th Cir. 1994) (affirming judgment), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1009, 115 S.Ct. 532, 130 L.Ed.2d 435 (1994); Porter v. Dugger, 805 F.Supp. 941 (M.D.Fla.1992) (vacating order); Porter v. Dugger, 777 F.Supp. 934 (M.D.Fla.1991) (denying habeas petition); Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 3195, 96 L.Ed.2d 682, and cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919, 107 S.Ct. 3196, 96 L.Ed.2d 683 (1987); Porter v. State, 700 So.2d 647 (Fla.1997) ( ); Porter v. State, 688 So.2d 318 (Fla.1997) ( ); Porter v. State, 653 So.2d 374 (Fla.) (, )cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1092, 115 S.Ct. 1816, 131 L.Ed.2d 739 (1995); Porter v. Dugger, 559 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1990) ( ); Porter v. State, 478 So.2d 33 (Fla.1985) ( ); Porter v. State, 429 So.2d 293 (Fla.) (, )cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 202, 78 L.Ed.2d 176 (1983); and Porter v. State, 400 So.2d 5 (Fla.1981) ( ). The facts of the case are set forth in detail in these various opinions.
The judicial proceedings began with a trial in November 1978 before a jury in Glades County with Judge Stanley presiding. The jury recommended sentences of life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years for the two first-degree murders of which the jury had found appellant guilty. Judge Stanley overrode the recommendations of life sentences and entered sentences of death. In its first review in 1981, this Court reversed the death sentences because of a procedural error. Porter, 400 So.2d at 6. The resentencing was solely a reconsideration by Judge Stanley free from the procedural error that had required the reversal. On remand, Judge Stanley again overrode the jury's recommendation of life in prison and sentenced appellant to death. On appeal, the sentences of death were affirmed. Porter, 429 So.2d at 294.
Following the signing of a second death warrant for appellant's execution on March 1, 1995, we had before us appellant's appeal from the denial of his second motion for postconviction relief. Germane to the present appeal is the following from our opinion issued March 28, 1995, affirming the trial court's denial of the motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850:
We begin by addressing an issue raised in this appeal which was not presented to the judge in this motion. Porter claims that the original trial judge's statement in a newspaper interview, the contents of which were published on March 23, 1995, indicating that the trial judge had already decided to sentence Porter to death before receiving the jury's advisory sentence, establishes that Porter's life recommendation was overruled by a judge who was biased in favor of the death penalty. However, even accepting the assertion about the judge's statement in the interview as true, any claim based upon that statement is procedurally barred. Information upon which Porter claims bias of the trial judge has long been available to Porter. In fact, Porter has raised the issue of judicial bias on several prior occasions. The record clearly demonstrates that on November 30, 1978, the trial judge entered a judgment and sentence stating that Porter was to be executed for both Count I and Count II although the jury did not recommend a sentence for each count until December 1, 1978. The newspaper article says nothing more than what was already in the original 1978 sentencing order. The 1978 sentence has since been reversed. Porter's present attack is based upon the 1981 sentencing order, but we find nothing demonstrating that the newspaper article pertains to the 1981 sentencing.
Porter, 653 So.2d at 377-78 (footnote omitted).
Appellant thereafter filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, which was denied. Porter v. Singletary, No. 95-109-CIV-FTM-17D (M.D.Fla. Mar.30, 1995). In its review of the denial of the writ, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in respect to appellant's claim concerning Judge Stanley's lack of impartiality:
Porter argues that the proffered evidence, if proved, would establish that his sentencing judge had made up his mind to sentence Porter to death before the penalty proceedings began. Porter argues that such predisposition violated his constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal.
In the Florida sentencing scheme, the sentencing judge serves as the ultimate factfinder. If the judge was not impartial, there would be a violation of due process.
Porter, 49 F.3d at 1487 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The federal appeals court then remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to inquire into whether appellant had established cause in his successive federal petition to surmount the abuse of writ doctrine as well as the state procedural bar. Id. at 1489-90. The Eleventh Circuit held that if on remand appellant satisfied the cause standard, then he would be entitled to an opportunity to prove that his sentencing judge lacked impartiality and violated his constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal. Id. at 1490. The court included the following footnotes:
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