Portside Owners Ass'n v. S. Beach Racquet Club, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | 2008-UP-153 |
| Parties | Portside Owners Association, Inc., Appellant, v. South Beach Racquet Club, Inc., Respondent. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted January 1, 2008.
Appeal From Beaufort County Curtis L. Coltrane, Circuit Court Judge.
Roberts Vaux, of Bluffton; for Appellant.
Drew A. Laughlin, of Hilton Head Island; for Respondent.
Portside Owners Association, Inc. (Portside) filed this action against South Beach Racquet Club, Inc. (South Beach), seeking a determination of the parties' rights to a tract of real property. South Beach prevailed at trial, and Portside appeals. We affirm. [1]
In 1985, Charles Fraser created three corporations known as Beachside-Portside, Inc. (Beachside), Portside, and South Beach. On September 29, 1986, Fraser conveyed six building lots, a common area, and a 50' access easement (the 50' Tract) to Beachside.
On September 30, 1986, Beachside recorded a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for the six lots common area, and 50' Tract comprising Portside Subdivision. The covenants granted to the Portside homeowners the right to transfer interests in the common area. In the covenants, Beachside reserved to itself a right to exercise the powers granted to Portside without the Portside owners' consent. However, this right expired if Beachside no longer owned at least two of the six lots. By December 30 1986, Beachside had conveyed all six of the residential lots to third parties.
In 1987 or 1988, South Beach prepared to build four tennis courts. At the time, Fraser possessed a controlling interest in South Beach. On May 26, 1987, Fraser, as president and on behalf of Beachside, wrote a letter to South Beach acknowledging and consenting to encroachment of the tennis courts into the 50' Tract (the Encroachment Letter). The courts were built by 1988 and encroached into the 50' Tract.
On May 14, 1992, Beachside conveyed a perpetual, non-exclusive Easement and right-of-way for ingress and egress on, over and across the [50' Tract]” to South Beach in an Access Easement” (the Easement). The Easement was recorded on October 30, 1992. In addition to the rights of ingress and egress, the Easement stated South Beach shall have the right to maintain such portions thereof as Grantee is presently maintaining for use as parking and landscaped areas including the right, at the sole cost and expense of Grantee, to install such paving, curbing, drainage and irrigation facilities, and other similar or related improvements as Grantee shall require.”
Beachside conveyed the 50' Tract to Portside in a quit-claim deed, dated May 1, 1992, and recorded on November 6, 1992. The deed states on its face that it is subject to an easement for ingress and egress and parking reserved to South Beach Racquet Club, Inc. in that certain document entitled Access Easement, dated May 14, 1992, by and between Grantor and South Beach Racquet Club, Inc.”
Approximately twelve years later, Portside filed this action on February 20, 2004, alleging the Easement and Encroachment Letter are invalid, thus South Beach's use of the Tract constitutes trespass. Portside also sought declaratory relief. The trial court found if Portside's action against South Beach's use of the Tract is based on a breach of covenants, it is barred by the three year statute of limitations. The trial court further found if the action is characterized as one for the recovery of real property, it is barred by the ten year statute of limitations for the recovery of real property. The trial court also found, with respect to the tennis court encroachments, South Beach proved its claim for adverse possession. Portside appeals.
A suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable, but is determined by the nature of the underlying issue. An issue, essentially one at law, will not be transformed into one in equity simply because declaratory relief is sought.” Felts v. Richland County, 303 S.C. 354, 356, 400 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1991). The character of an action as legal or equitable is determined by the main purpose of the complaint, the nature of the issues as raised by the pleadings or the pleadings and proof, and the character of the relief sought under them. Ins. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. S.C. Ins. Co., 271 S.C. 289, 293, 247 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1978).
The issue of title is legal in nature. Getsinger v. Midlands Orthopaedic Profit Sharing Plan, 327 S.C. 424, 428, 489 S.E.2d 223, 224 (Ct. App. 1997). An action brought for the primary purpose of determining title to a disputed land is in the nature of a trespass action to try title, which is an action at law.” Watson v. Suggs, 313 S.C. 291, 293, 437 S.E.2d 172, 173 (Ct. App. 1993). An adverse possession claim is an action at law. Clark v. Hargrave, 323 S.C. 84, 87, 473 S.E.2d 474, 476 (Ct. App. 1996).
In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried without a jury, we may not disturb the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are unsupported by the evidence or controlled by error of law. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Langford, 330 S.C. 578, 581, 500 S.E.2d 496, 498 (Ct. App. 1998).
Portside initially argues its claims are not barred by the applicable statutes of limitations because it consented to South Beach's use of the 50' Tract until October 24, 2003 so that the applicable limitation periods for the actions for breach of the covenants and the recovery of real property did not commence until that date. Thus, Portside argues, the action was initiated within the applicable statutory period of three years for breach of covenants and ten years for the action to recover real property. See S.C. Code Ann §§ 15-3-340 & 15-3-530 (2005).
We find Portside's action is essentially an action for the recovery of real property and is barred by the ten year statute of limitations. In determining whether a proceeding is an action for the recovery of real property within the meaning of the statute of limitations, the pleadings as a whole must be considered. Winn v. Grantham, 263 S.C. 368, 371, 210 S.E.2d 602, 603 (1974). The character of an action is not to be determined by the terminology which the pleaders may chance to give to it.” Walsh v. Evans, 112 S.C. 131, 136, 99 S.E. 546, 548 (1919). [W]hen a defendant's right to property is attacked and in his answer he raises the ‘flag of dominion' the issue of recovery has been established.” Winn, 263 S.C. at 372, 210 S.E.2d at 604.
The gravamen of Portside's complaint is to remove any cloud on its title in the 50' Tract and affirm its exclusive right to possession of the property. Portside attacked South Beach's use of the property as a violation of Portside's exclusive rights. As an action for the recovery of real property, the action is governed by section 15-3-340, which states that an action for the recovery of real property may not be maintained unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-340 (2005). Portside commenced this action to recover its exclusive rights in the property by filing its summons and complaint on February 20, 2004. Therefore, under section 15-3-340, Portside's action may only be maintained if it was possessed of those exclusive rights to the 50' Tract within ten years of February 20, 2004, i.e., at any time after February 20, 1994.
South Beach encroached on the property by building tennis courts in 1988 and received the Easement for ingress and egress in 1992, both more than ten years prior to the filing of this action. To avoid the application of the statute, Portside argues it consented to South Beach's encroachment and use until 2003.
Portside argues it consented to South Beach's use of the property until October 24, 2003, the date it alleges it revoked its consent and thus, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until that date. We disagree.
We find evidence in the record to support the finding that Portside did not consent to South Beach's use of the 50' Tract. The circuit court's order does not specifically state that Portside did not consent. However, the court stated that Portside suffered South Beach to use and maintain the encroachments, and to occupy the [50' Tract] in a manner consistent with the written easement for a period of more than ten years prior to bringing this action.” The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure require that [i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon.” Rule 52(a), SCRCP. The rule is directorial in nature so where a trial court substantially complies with Rule 52(a) and adequately states the basis for the result it reaches, the appellate court should not vacate the trial court's judgment for lack of an explicit or specific factual finding.” Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 57, 403 S.E.2d 122, 123-24 (1991).
We find substantial compliance by the circuit court in making its findings, and evidence to support the finding that Portside did not consent to the encroachments. See Kirkland v Gross, 286 S.C. 193, 198, 332 S.E.2d 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1985), receded from on other grounds by Boyd v. Hyatt, 294 S.C. 360, 364 S.E.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1988) ( the question of acquiescence in an action for adverse possession is generally a question of fact). See also Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of...
To continue reading
Request your trial