Watson v. Suggs

• Decision Date: 09 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 2079,2079
• Citation: 313 S.C. 291,437 S.E.2d 172
• Parties: Mike C. WATSON, Respondent, v. Forrest D. SUGGS, Jr., and Jane Gray W. Suggs, as Trustees, Appellants. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 172

437 S.E.2d 172

313 S.C. 291

Mike C. WATSON, Respondent, v. Forrest D. SUGGS, Jr., and Jane Gray W. Suggs, as Trustees Appellants.

No. 2079.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 9, 1993.

Decided Oct. 4, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1993.

Patrick J. Frawley and Jeff M. Anderson, of Bouknight, Nicholson, Davis, Frawley & Anderson, Lexington, for appellants.

E. Pickens Rish, Lexington, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This case involves the disputed ownership of a tract of land. Respondent, Watson, sought to prove that he owned the disputed tract of land and the Suggses, through their agent, trespassed and removed timber from this land. The Suggses claimed they owned the land. After the evidence was presented, the Suggses moved for a directed verdict which was denied. The jury found in favor of Watson, and the Suggses moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or in the alternative for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. We reverse and remand.

The Suggses argue that this case is an action of trespass to try title and therefore, the burden was upon Watson to prove paramount title to the land. They assert that Watson failed to prove paramount title by any of the four methods available to a plaintiff in an action of trespass to try title, and, thus, they were entitled to a JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial. We agree.

At Trial, the court charged the law of trespass to try title, and noted the boundary line question was "incident to" the action to try title. Watson now claims the case presented no question of competing title, but instead, the sole issue was the location of the boundary between the two properties. However, there was no objection to the charge and the case was presented to the jury on the theory of trespass to try title. Furthermore, a review of Watson's complaint unequivocally establishes that the purpose in bringing this suit was to determine title to the disputed nineteen acre tract of land. One of the primary purposes of a written complaint is to appraise the opposite party of the nature and extent of the action against him, and only such matters as are clearly alleged in the complaint can be considered upon the trial of the case. McCullough v. The American Workman, 200 S.C. 84, 20 S.E.2d 640 (1942). We find that this action is in the nature of a trespass action to try title.

An action brought for the primary purpose of determining title to a disputed land is in the nature of a trespass action to try title, which is an action at law. Cummings v. Varn, 307 S.C. 37, 413 S.E.2d 829 (1992); Corley v. Looper, 287 S.C. 618, 340 S.E.2d 556 (Ct.App.1986).

In a law case, a jury's verdict may be reversed on appeal when the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is contrary to the factual findings implicit in the jury's verdict. Bell v. Harrington Mfg. Co., 265 S.C. 468, 219 S.E.2d 906 (1975).

In an action of trespass to try title, the defendant in actual possession of the disputed property is regarded as the rightful owner of the property until the plaintiff proves perfect title, and a mere prima facie showing of paper title by the plaintiff is not enough. Cummings, 413 S.E.2d at 832. In Cummings, the Supreme Court restated the methods of establishing paramount title:

There are four ways in which a plaintiff in an action of trespass to try title may acquire title to land sufficient to oust a defendant claiming the same land. First, the plaintiff may show a grant from the state to someone, and then by successive deeds to him. This chain of conveyances is called perfect legal paper title. Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S.C. 61, 69, 115 S.E. 727, 729 (1923). Second, the plaintiff may trace his title to a common source from whom both he and the defendant claim through separate chains of title. Id. If the plaintiff can show an earlier deed deriving from a common source, he may dispossess a defendant in possession. Brown v. Moore, 26 S.C. 160, 2 S.E. 9 (1887). Third, a plaintiff may show that he[,] and those under whom he claims[,] have been in actual, hostile, exclusive, and continuous possession of the land adversely to the defendant for twenty years. Once that fact is established, the law presumes whatever is necessary to give the plaintiff good title. Haithcock, 123 S.C. at 69, 115 S.E. at 729. Fourth, the plaintiff can show he alone or with those from whom he has inherited have been in actual, hostile, exclusive, and continuous possession of the land adversely to the defendant for...