Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., Inc.

Decision Date01 September 1986
Docket NumberNo. 147,147
Citation524 A.2d 61,309 Md. 347
PartiesTheodore E. POTTER v. BETHESDA FIRE DEPARTMENT, INCORPORATED et al
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Joseph F. McBride (Joseph F. McBride, P.A. and John C. Hanrahan, on the brief), Silver Spring, for appellant.

Anthony M. Ventre, Asst. Co. Atty. (Paul A. McGuckian, Co. Atty., Joann Robertson, Sr. Asst. Co. Atty., on the brief for appellee Bethesda Fire Dept., Inc. and Montgomery County, Md.

Richard W. Galiher, Jr., Galiher, Clarke & Galiher, on the brief, for appellee Bethesda Fire Dept., Inc., and Ins. Co. of North America, Rockille.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ. and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (retired), Specially Assigned.

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge, Specially Assigned.

I

This case has been struggling through the Workmen's Compensation Commission and various courts of this State since Theodore E. Potter was injured in January 1978. Its history to 5 February 1985 was recounted in Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., Inc., 302 Md. 281, 487 A.2d 288 (1985).

Appellant, Theodore E. Potter, was a salaried firefighter employed by Bethesda Fire Department, Inc. He filed a claim with the Workmen's Compensation Commission as a result of injuries sustained by him. Appellee, Insurance Company of North America, was the insurer of the employer for that injury. Potter reinjured his back. Montgomery County as a self-insurer was the employer's insurer for that injury. Potter retired under the Montgomery County disability retirement program. Appellees, Bethesda Fire Department, Inc., Montgomery County, and Insurance Company of North America, contended they were entitled to a set-off pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.) Art. 101, § 33(c) and (d). Their contention was based on the fact that Potter was receiving disability retirement benefits from Montgomery County in excess of any benefits that he was eligible to receive as workmen's compensation. The Commission denied the right of set-off. Bethesda Fire Department, Inc., and Montgomery County appealed the Commission's decision to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Named defendants in the appeal were Insurance Company of North America and Potter.

The fire company and Montgomery County filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the claimed statutory set-off. Insurance Company of North America subsequently joined in this motion, and asked that the ruling also apply with respect to the claim in which it was previously ordered to pay benefits for 20% industrial loss of use.

The matter came on for hearing in the circuit court. It ordered that the motion for partial summary judgment be granted "on the question of the applicability of the set-off provisions of Article 101, Section 33 ... to the benefits awarded by the Workmen's Compensation Commission under its order dated October 6, 1982, and Amended Order of April 20, 1983." It further ordered, stating "that there appears to be no just cause for delay in entering judgment in this action," that "the Clerk of the Court [was] ... directed to enter judgment in favor of the employer, Bethesda Fire Department, Inc., and the insurer, Montgomery County, Maryland, on their entitlement to a set-off pursuant to Article 101, Section 33 of the Annotated Code of Maryland." Insofar as the record before us reflects, the matter otherwise remains open on the docket in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

Potter appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That court affirmed in Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., Inc., 59 Md.App. 228, 474 A.2d 1365 (1984). We granted Potter's petition for a writ of certiorari in order that we might address the important public question of whether Bethesda Fire Department, Inc., is a quasi-public corporation within the meaning of Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.) Art. 101, § 21(a)(2). Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, Inc., 301 Md. 43, 481 A.2d 803 (1984). 302 Md. at 483-484.

We did not reach the important public question. We found that the Court of Special Appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The partial summary judgment from which the appeal was taken was not a judgment certifiable for appeal by then Rule 605(a). We were obliged to remand the case to the Court of Special Appeals with direction to dismiss the appeal. Id. 302 Md. at 284-287, 487 A.2d 288.

The open questions were resolved in special verdicts by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The jury found that 47% of industrial loss was due to the first injury, that 23% was due to the second injury and that no industrial loss was due to pre-existing conditions. Judgment to that effect was entered.

Potter and the Insurance Company of North America noted an appeal. Subsequently the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal of INA at the insurance company's request. INA explained that the subject of its appeal was the off-set for pension benefits and, as it understood this issue was the subject of Potter's appeal, its appeal was superfluous.

Potter and Montgomery County jointly filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted the petition before resolution of the appeal by the Court of Special Appeals, and the writ was issued on our order. We now address "the important public question" which prompted our grant of the first petition for a writ of certiorari, namely, "whether Bethesda Fire Department, Inc., is a quasi-public corporation within the meaning of Code (1957, [1985] Repl.Vol.) Art. 101, § 21(a)(2)." Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., Inc., 302 Md. at 284, 487 A.2d 288.

II

Md.Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.) Art. 101, § 33 provides, in relevant part:

(c) Whenever by statute, charter, ordinances, resolution, regulation or policy adopted thereunder, whether as part of a pension system or otherwise, any benefit or benefits are furnished employees of employers covered under § 21(a)(2) of this article, ... the benefit or benefits when furnished by the employer shall satisfy and discharge pro tanto or in full as the case may be, the liability or obligation of the employer and the Subsequent Injury Fund for any benefit under this article.

Code, Art. 101, § 21 provides:

(a) Coverage of employers.--The following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this act:

(1) Every person that has in the State one or more employees subject to this act.

(2) The State, any agency thereof, and each county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school district, sewer district, drainage district, public or quasi-public corporation, or any other political subdivision of the State that has one or more employees subject to this act. 1

See Art. 101, § 67(2) for the definition of "employer." It is in accord with § 21(a).

"The cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is to effectuate the real and actual intention of the Legislature." State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 1680, 48 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976).

Of course, a statute should be construed according to the ordinary and natural import of its language, since it is the language of the statute which constitutes the primary source for determining the legislative intent. Id. (citations omitted).

Therefore,

[w]here there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intention of the Legislature. Thus, where statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity and expresses a definite and sensible meaning, courts are not at liberty to disregard the natural import of words with a view towards making the statute express an intention which is different from its plain meaning. Id. at 421-422, 348 A.2d 275 (citations omitted).

But,

"[a]dherence to the meaning of words does not require or permit isolation of words from their context 'xxx [since] the meaning of the plainest words in a statute may be controlled by the context....' " In construing statutes, therefore, results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language, with the real legislative intention prevailing over the intention indicated by the literal meaning. Id. at 422, 348 A.2d 275 (citations omitted).

It is also a well settled precept that

statutes are to be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose to be accomplished, and in light of the evils or mischief sought to be remedied; in other words, every statutory enactment must be "considered in its entirety, and in the context of the purpose underlying [its] enactment." Id. at 421, 348 A.2d 275 (citations omitted).

Applying these precepts, we need not look beyond the language of the statute. Section 21(a)(1) concerns private employers. Section 21(a)(2) concerns public employers. In the latter section "quasi-public corporation" appears amidst certain other designations. Common to all of those other designations is that they are governmental in nature. See 1 E. McQuillen & J. Dray, The Law of Municipal Corporations §§ 1.19-1.20, 2.03-2.03a, 213 (3rd ed. 1971); H. Brune,Maryland Corporation Law and Practice § 2 (rev. ed. 1953); 1 A. Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, § 29 (1908). It is self evident that the State, any agency of the State, a county, a city, a town, a township, an incorporated village, and a public corporation are each within the category of public and governmental. A school district, sewer district and drainage district and other "special function districts," are considered to be public and governmental bodies. See O. Reynolds, Handbook of Local Government Law §§ 11-12 (1982); 3 A. Antieau, Local Government Law § 30 D. 00 (1987); McQuillen & Dray §§ 2.28-2.29. A political subdivision of the State is likewise public and governmental. See, e.g., Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.) Art. 24, § 2-101(a)(4) (" 'Political subdivision'...

To continue reading

Request your trial
55 cases
  • Wills v. Baltimore County
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1997
    ...244 Md. 609, 617, 224 A.2d 677 (1966)); Fikar v. Montgomery County, 333 Md. 430, 434-35, 635 A.2d 977 (1994); Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61 (1987); Jung v. Southland Corp., 114 Md.App. 541, 548, 691 A.2d 263 (1997). The Legislature deleted the very word in for......
  • Warfield v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 1 Septiembre 1988
    ...prevailing over the intention indicated by the literal meaning.' " Kaczorowski at 516, 525 A.2d 628, quoting Potter v. Bethesda Fire Department, 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61 (1987), quoting State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421-422, 348 A.2d 275 (1975); cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 16......
  • Abington Center Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Baltimore County, 1202
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1996
    ...grammatical construction or literal intent...." Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 516 n. 4, 525 A.2d 628. See also Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't., 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61 (1987). Here, the legislative history does not reflect that the Legislature intended to omit taxpayers in these three counti......
  • Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 12 Mayo 2005
    ...is the key. And that purpose becomes the context within which we apply the plain-meaning rule. (Quoting Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61, 64 (1987).) In addition, context may include related statutes, pertinent legislative history and "other material that fairly ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT