Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Stanczyk

Citation489 P.3d 743
Decision Date21 June 2021
Docket NumberSupreme Court Case No. 20SC269
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
Parties POUDRE SCHOOL DISTRICT R-1 and Poudre School District R-1 Board of Education, Petitioners v. Patricia STANCZYK and Poudre Education Association, Respondents.

Attorneys for Petitioners: Semple, Farrington, Everall & Case, P.C., M. Brent Case, Jonathan P. Fero, Mary B. Gray, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondents: Colorado Education Association, Charles F. Kaiser, Brooke Copass, Rory Herington, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Attorney General: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jenna Zerylnick, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado State Board of Education: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Julie C. Tolleson, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Section 22-63-203.5, C.R.S. (2020), of the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act ("TECDA") provides that, beginning with the 2014-15 school year, a nonprobationary teacher in Colorado "who is employed by a school district and is subsequently hired by a different school district ... shall be granted nonprobationary status in the hiring school district" if the teacher "can show two consecutive performance evaluations with effectiveness ratings in good standing." In 2016, Patricia Stanczyk, who obtained nonprobationary status in the Thompson School District in 1999, applied for several teaching positions with the Poudre School District ("PSD") through its online application portal. The application required her to attest that she voluntarily waived her right to transfer, or "port," nonprobationary status under section 22-63-203.5 and stated that the job was conditioned on this waiver. Stanczyk's teaching contract for the 2016-17 school year contained language similar to the online application and further provided that the contract was voidable at PSD's option if Stanczyk asserted portability of her nonprobationary status.

¶2 We granted certiorari to determine whether, under section 22-63-203.5, a school district is prohibited from asking or requiring a teacher who earned nonprobationary status in another district to waive portability of that status.1 TECDA plainly places the decision-making authority with respect to asserting or waiving portability with the teacher, and we therefore hold that school districts may not require teachers to waive portability of nonprobationary status as a condition of employment. Because waiver was required as a condition of employment in this case, Stanczyk's waiver of her right to assert portability was involuntary and, as a result, invalid. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on other grounds, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 Stanczyk was a teacher in the Thompson School District from 1995 through 2016; she attained nonprobationary status in 1999. In the spring of 2016, Stanczyk applied to several teaching positions within PSD through its online application portal. All teaching positions posted by PSD for the 2016-17 school year were advertised as "probationary," and all individuals applying for these teaching positions were required to certify their "understanding and agreement" in their online applications that:

(a) the positions for which I am applying are for licensed probationary teachers and/ or special services providers; (b) by applying for these positions I have voluntarily decided to waive my right to assert the portability of nonprobationary status I have acquired in another school district, if any; and (c) any offers of employment extended by Poudre School District to me for these positions are conditioned on my signing a probationary teacher employment contract and not asserting the portability of nonprobationary status I have acquired in another school district, if any.

Applicants were required to click "I agree" to these statements in order to submit the application – there was no way for applicants to skip this step or indicate lack of agreement in the application portal. Stanczyk checked this box and submitted her application.

¶4 PSD offered, and Stanczyk accepted, a teaching position for the 2016-17 school year. Stanczyk subsequently signed a "Probationary Teacher Employment Contract," which stated that she "is employed as a probationary teacher under C.R.S. § 22-63-203, and has voluntarily waived the right under C.R.S. § 22-63-203.5 to assert the portability of nonprobationary status acquired in another school district, if any." The contract stated further that it was "voidable at the option of the Board of Education ... if the TEACHER asserts the portability of nonprobationary status acquired in another school district, if any."

¶5 Before Stanczyk signed her employment contract, she went to PSD's human resources office to ask about portability of her nonprobationary status from the Thompson School District. In response to Stanczyk's inquiry, an unidentified PSD employee told her that "we don't do that here." PSD's Human Resources Director later testified that she did not know how her office would handle a situation where an applicant did not want to waive their right to port nonprobationary status or whether PSD would have even hired such an applicant. Unlike many other school districts in the state, PSD did not have a policy in place regarding portability of nonprobationary status. Thus, Stanczyk signed the employment contract in August 2016 without getting an answer to her question regarding portability.

¶6 In April 2017, a supervisor notified Stanczyk that her teaching contract would not be renewed for the following school year. A few days later, Stanczyk emailed PSD's Human Resources Director to request portability of her nonprobationary status and submitted her 2014-15 and 2015-16 teacher evaluations from the Thompson School District in support of her request. At that time, Stanczyk was the only employee in PSD to have requested portability of her nonprobationary status. PSD denied Stanczyk's request, pointing to the language contained in Stanczyk's online application and employment contract.

¶7 Stanczyk and the Poudre Education Association ("PEA") then filed this lawsuit seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that (1) section 22-63-203.5 requires a school district to grant a teacher nonprobationary status if the teacher provides the requisite documentation, and (2) PSD violated Stanczyk's rights under the statute. PSD moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, finding that the right to request nonprobationary portability under section 22-63-203.5 is waivable and that Stanczyk validly waived her right to port her nonprobationary status. The district court also found that, because the statute did not explicitly prohibit such blanket waivers, school boards could lawfully require teachers to waive their right to port nonprobationary status as a condition of employment.

¶8 Stanczyk appealed, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Stanczyk v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 2020 COA 27M, ¶ 5, ––– P.3d ––––. The court of appeals concluded that PSD placed unreasonable restrictions on prospective teachers' right to port their nonprobationary status in violation of section 22-63-203.5 and held that if a teacher complies with the statute's requirements, the hiring school district must grant the teacher nonprobationary status. Id. at 11 59-60, 65-69.

¶9 PSD petitioned this court for certiorari, and we granted the petition to determine the proper construction of section 22-63-203.5.

II. Analysis

¶10 We begin by addressing the applicable standard of review. We then examine TECDA, and specifically analyze section 22-63-203.5 to determine whether school districts may require applicants to waive their right to port nonprobationary status as a condition of employment. We conclude that they may not.

¶11 Section 22-63-203.5 provides that hiring school districts shall grant nonprobationary status to teachers who request it and submit the documents required by the statute. While school districts are free to negotiate with potential hires over portability, they may not avoid this statutory mandate by simply requiring applicants to consent to blanket waivers during the hiring process. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, though on different grounds.

A. Standard of Review

¶12 We review de novo a district court's decision to grant summary judgment. People ex rel. Rein v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶1 19, 465 P.3d 554, 559. Because we apply the same standard as the district court in our review, we must "determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed and whether the district court correctly applied the law." City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass'n, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 9, 369 P.3d 586, 590. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only when it is clear that the applicable standards have been met. Meagher , ¶ 21, 465 P.3d at 559.

¶13 We also review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Blooming Terrace No. 1, LLC v. KH Blake St., LLC, 2019 CO 58, ¶ 11, 444 P.3d 749, 752. Our primary goal when interpreting a statute is "to effectuate the legislature's intent." Id. To accomplish this, "we look to the entire statutory scheme in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts, and we apply words and phrases in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings." Id. (quoting UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark Towers Ass'n, 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 836, 840 ). "If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written – venturing no further." Id. ; accord Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 2020 CO 73, ¶ 14, 474 P.3d 46, 49.

B. Applicable Law

¶14 In 1990, the General Assembly enacted TECDA, supplanting its predecessor, the Teacher Employment, Dismissal, and Tenure Act of 1967 ("TEDTA"), ch. 435, sec. 1, §§...

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4 cases
  • Brannberg v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • October 28, 2021
    ...interpreting statutory text is to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Stanczyk , 2021 CO 57, ¶ 13, 489 P.3d 743, 747. To accomplish this, we must "respect the legislature's choice of language." Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colorado Springs , 2018 CO 10, ¶......
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    ...interpreting statutory text is to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Stanczyk, 2021 CO 57, ¶ 13, 489 P.3d 743, 747. To accomplish this, we must "respect the legislature's choice of language." 12 Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colorado Springs, 2018 CO 10, ......
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