Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Dileo

• Citation: 10 N.E.2d 251,298 Mass. 401
• Parties: EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, Limited, v. DILEO.
• Decision Date: 27 September 1937
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

298 Mass. 401

10 N.E.2d 251

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, Limited,

v.DILEO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 27, 1937.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Diego Dileo, employee, opposed by the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, insurer. From an interlocutory decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill of review brought by the insurer to review a final decree in favor of the employee, and from a final decree dismissing the bill, the insurer appeals.

Decrees reversed.Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Williams, Judge.

W. G. Reed, of Boston, for appellant.

Fusaro & Fusaro, of Worcester, for appellee.

QUA, Justice.

This case is here on appeals from an interlocutory decree sustaining a demurrer to a bill of review filed by leave of court and from a final decree dismissing the bill.

The bill is brought by the insurer in a workmen's compensation case to secure review of a final decree in favor of the employee. A bill of review is a proper means to that end. All proceedings in relation to decrees in compensation cases are the same as though the decree had been rendered in a suit in equity duly heard and determined by the court. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 152, § 11, as amended by St.1932, c. 129 and St.1935, c. 484. A bill of review is a proceeding in relation to a decree recognized in general equity practice, Boston & Maine Railroad v. Greenfield, 253 Mass. 391, 397, 149 N.E. 322, and has been employed in compensation cases. Sterling's Case, 233 Mass. 485, 490, 124 N.E. 286.

These appeals are properly before us. A previous attempt to appeal from the decree in the original compensation proceeding failed because the decree was based upon a ‘memorandum of agreement,’ and under said section 11 decrees so based are not appealable. DiLeo's Case (Mass.) 4 N.E.(2d) 299. Compare Kareske's Case, 250 Mass. 220, 145 N.E. 301. But the statutory prohibition of an appeal to this court in such cases does not prevent resort to a bill of review in the Superior Court to correct errors which are open to correction on review, such as lack of jurisdiction apparent on the face of the record, and a decree denying review is not a decree based upon the ‘memorandum of agreement.’ These propositions seem to be established as matter of authority by Sterling's Case, 233 Mass. 485, 490, 124 N.E. 286.

The bill of review alleges that the contract of employment between the employer and the employee had been entered into and the injury had been received at the Veterans' Hospital in Rutland on a tract of land which the Commonwealth had ceded to the United States by St.1922, c. 409, and over which the Industrial Accident Board had no jurisdiction; that these facts had been brought to the attention of the insurer after the agreement for compensation had been entered into; that at hearings on the question of continuing disability both the single member and the reviewing board denied the right of the insurer to raise the question of jurisdiction at that time; that the Superior Court ruled ‘that the Board had no jurisdiction over the case where both the hiring and injury took place without the Commonwealth,’ but that later the court recommitted the case to the board for the sole purpose of determining whether the hospital where the work was performed and where the contract of hire was made ‘is the same property referred to’ in the statute of 1922; that the board found that it was the same property; that thereafter the court ordered payment of compensation to be continued in accordance with the act, thereby impliedly ruling that the board had jurisdiction. Inasmuch as lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any stage in a proceeding, Cheney v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 227 Mass. 336, 116 N.E. 411, the allegations of the bill of review were sufficient to show error of law on the face of the record, if the final ruling allowing compensation was error. Sterling's Case, 233 Mass. 485, 490, 124 N.E. 286. It follows that we must now deal with the question of jurisdiction which was left open in DiLeo's Case (Mass.) 4 N.E.(2d) 299.

By St.1922, c. 409, the Commonwealth consented to the purchase by the United States of the land in question and ‘granted and ceded’ to the United States jurisdiction over the same upon the sole condition that the Commonwealth should retain concurrent jurisdiction with the United States with respect to the service of process thereon. Under article 1, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution of the United States the Congress has power ‘to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever’ over the District of Columbia ‘and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts * * * and other needful Buildings.’ It results that, for the purposes of this case, the land on which the Veterans' Hospital was located was not a part of this Commonwealth, and neither our administrative officers and boards nor our courts had any jurisdiction over it. Fort Leavenworth Railroad v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264;Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 29 S.Ct. 613, 53 L.Ed. 994;Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 49 S.Ct. 227, 73 L.Ed. 447;Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72;Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick. 298; Opinion of the Justices, 1 Metc. 580;Newcomb v. Rockport, 183 Mass. 74, 66 N.E. 587;People v. Hillman, 246 N.Y. 467, 159 N.E. 400. The exclusive power of legislation granted by the Constitution carries with it exclusive jurisdiction. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091.

It is true that after a cession of jurisdiction over territory from one sovereign to another the existing municipal laws, including statutes, relating to the title to property or intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until changed by the new sovereign. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 5 S.Ct. 1005, 29 L.Ed. 270;Vilas v. Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 31 S.Ct. 416, 55 L.Ed. 491. Upon this principle it has been held that an action for negligence at common law could be maintained in a State court for a cause arising in ceded territory. Kaufman v. Hopper, 220 N.Y. 184, 115 N.E. 470. And the same ruling has been made as to an action for death under a statute which had been enacted before the cession. McCarthy v. R. G. Packard Co., 105 App.Div. 436, 94 N.Y.S. 203.Danielson v. Donmopray (D.C.) 57 F.(2d) 565. See Act of Congress of February 1, 1928, c. 15, 45 U.S. Sts. at Large, 54 (16 U.S.C.A. § 457). But we are of opinion that this principle does not extend so far as to keep alive a workmen's compensation act such as ours (G.L. [Ter.Ed.] c. 152, as amended) in teritory complete jurisdiction over which has been ceded in accordance with the constitutional provision hereinbefore quoted. Under our act an injury does not give rise to a cause of action in the ordinary sense which, like other transitory causes of actions, can at once be taken into any court of general jurisdiction wherever service can be had and there reduced to final judgment. The act ‘creates rights and remedies and procedure all its...