Poythress v. Moses, 39283
| Decision Date | 04 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 39283,39283 |
| Citation | 250 Ga. 452,298 S.E.2d 480 |
| Parties | David B. POYTHRESS v. Michael J. MOSES. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Alan P. Layne, Lyons, for Michael J. Moses.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Thomas D. Watry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for David B. Poythress.
A person elected to serve as district attorney must have been a member of the State Bar of Georgia for three years immediately preceding his election. Georgia Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. XIII, Para. I. This appeal raises the issue of the exact day on which the election occurs so as to determine whether a candidate may qualify to serve as district attorney. We are also faced with the question of whether the fact that the candidate lost the election renders the case moot.
We have determined that mootness does not prevent our consideration of this case and that election as used in the constitutional provision under consideration means the day on which the votes are cast.
Moses filed notice of candidacy for the office of district attorney of the Middle Judicial Circuit but was notified by the Secretary of State that he did not satisfy the requirements of the Georgia Constitution. The date of the 1982 general election was November 2, 1982. The third anniversary of Moses' admission to the State Bar of Georgia was November 8, 1982.
The trial court held that the election is not complete until the votes are tabulated and certified by the Secretary of State and that, therefore, the election would not be completed until a date subsequent to November 2. The court enjoined the Secretary of State from deleting Moses' name from the ballot. We reverse.
1. At the outset, it is necessary to decide whether this case has been removed from our review because of mootness. When Poythress appealed the trial court's order he moved for a supersedeas, which we denied. Moses now contends that since he lost the election the appeal is moot. The time period between the determination of qualifications of a candidate and the day of election is brief and because of this the opportunity for review is diminished. We hold that this is one of those questions which is capable of repetition yet evading review. In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), the United States Supreme Court found that the application of the "capable of repetition yet evading review" rule is appropriate in dealing with a mootness challenge in a case where the attack upon an election statute is either facial or as applied. The court held that "[t]he construction of the statute, an understanding of its operation, and possible constitutional limits on its application, will have the effect of simplifying future challenges, thus increasing the...
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Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections
...DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed. 1979). The operative part of that definition was adopted by the Georgia Supreme Court in Poythress v. Moses, 250 Ga. 452, 453, 298 S.E.2d 480 (1983). Interestingly, within the same definition, Black's distinguishes between "election" and With respect to the choice of......
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I.B., In Interest of
...Other cases taking this anomalous two-step approach are: Caldwell v. Bateman, 252 Ga. 144, 145-146(1), 312 S.E.2d 320 (1984); Poythress, supra at 453(1), 298 S.E.2d 480 5; Wood v. Cole, 249 Ga. 389, 290 S.E.2d 927 (1982); Citizens for Ethical Govt. v. Gwinnett Place Assoc., 260 Ga. 245(1), ......
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Scoggins v. Collins
...Bray, 284 Ga. 641, 641, 670 S.E.2d 98 (2008) and Randolph County, supra, 282 Ga. at 161(2), 646 S.E.2d 261 with Poythress v. Moses, 250 Ga. 452, 453(1), 298 S.E.2d 480 (1983). Appellants' remaining claims involve proper post-election challenges timely raised pursuant to OCGA §§ 21-2-521 and......
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Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System of Georgia v. Kenworthy
...of simplifying future challenges," so that the need for judicial economy allows the court to reach the merits. Poythress v. Moses, 250 Ga. 452, 453, 298 S.E.2d 480 (1983). This court can walk places where a superior court cannot tread when, in addition to the factor of greater judicial econ......