Prado v. Lonestar Resources, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 04-19-00543-CV |
| Citation | 647 S.W.3d 731 |
| Parties | Elsa PRADO, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Rolando Prado, Jr., Deceased, and as Next Friend of A.P., Minor; Elizabeth Prado; Rolando Prado; and Maria Prado; Appellants v. LONESTAR RESOURCES, INC., Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Samuel V. Houston, III, Nissa M. Dunn, Houston Dunn, PLLC, 4040 Broadway Street, Suite 515, San Antonio, TX 78209, Noah Wexler, Jason A. Itkin, Christopher Jake Balser, John Benjamin Bireley, Arnold & Itkin LLP, 6009 Memorial Dr., Houston, TX 77007-7035.
APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Kelly Rogers, Stephan B. Rogers, Rogers & Moore, PLLC, 309 Water Street, Ste. 201, Boerne, TX 78006, Kent Rutter, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., 1221 McKinney Street, Suite 4000, Houston, TX 77010-2007, Jessica Z. Barger, Lisa M. Wright, E. Marie Jamison, Wright & Close, LLP, One Riverway, Suite 2200, Houston, TX 77056, Norton ‘Trey’ A. Colvin III, Colvin, Saenz, Rodriguez & Kennamer, 1201 East Van Buren St., Brownsville, TX 78520-7057, Lewin Plunkett, Tim T. Griesenbeck, Jr., Nik A. Mimari, Plunkett & Griesenbeck & Mimari, Inc., Catholic Life Bldg., 1635 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 900, San Antonio, TX 78209, Bill D. Blanton, Law Office of Bill D. Blanton, PLLC, P.O. Box 2129, Boerne, TX 78006.
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice, Beth Watkins, Justice
Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
The Prados (including Elsa Prado, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Rolando Prado, Jr., Deceased, and as Next Friend of A.P., Minor, as well as Elizabeth Prado, Rolando Prado, and Maria Prado) filed a wrongful death and survival action against appellees Lonestar Resources, Inc., Ezra Alderman Ranches, Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company. The trial court rendered a final summary judgment in appellees’ favor. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Rolando Prado, Jr. worked for an oilfield subcontractor at a wellsite operated by Lonestar Resources. Driving home after his first day of work, Rolando Jr. approached a railroad crossing on a private road owned by Ezra Alderman Ranches (the Ezra Alderman crossing). Before the Ezra Alderman crossing was a stop sign and a crossbuck warning of the railroad crossing. Rolando Jr. approached the Ezra Alderman crossing in his truck just before sunset. A Union Pacific train also approached the crossing. Rolando Jr.’s truck collided with the train. The Prados sued Union Pacific, Lonestar, and Ezra Alderman Ranches. Each defendant filed separate summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the trial court rendered a final summary judgment, ordering that the Prados take nothing on their claims. The Prados timely appealed.
We review summary judgments de novo. Carrera v. Yañez , 491 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.). "To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the [movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A no-evidence motion for summary judgment must be granted if, after an adequate time for discovery, the moving party asserts that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial and the nonmovant fails to produce more than a scintilla of summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on those elements." Id. at 93–94 (internal quotation marks omitted). "In reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the non-movant's favor." Id. at 94. "If a trial court grants a motion for summary judgment that includes both traditional and no evidence grounds, we evaluate the no evidence grounds first." Id. "If the nonmovant fails to meet its no evidence burden on any given claim, we need not analyze whether the movant satisfied its burden under the traditional motion." Id.
The Prados argue the trial court erred by rendering summary judgment in Union Pacific's favor because the summary judgment evidence shows Union Pacific negligently failed to: (1) issue a slow order2 for the Ezra Alderman crossing; and (2) use extraordinary means to warn drivers of the extra-hazardous crossing.
In the trial court, Union Pacific argued the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) preempts the Prados’ negligence claim for failure to issue a slow order. "The United States Supreme Court limits the preemption doctrine by presuming that Congress did not intend to displace state law." Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Estate of Wells , 52 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. 2001). "Historically, states have exercised primary authority in matters involving their citizens’ public health and safety." Id. "Thus, this presumption is nowhere stronger than under circumstances in which the states are exercising that authority." Id. Claims "based upon negligence ... involve the state's power to regulate health and safety matters." Id. "Accordingly, the party urging preemption has the difficult burden of overcoming the presumption against preemption." Id.
But when that burden is satisfied, "[a] state law that conflicts with federal law is preempted and has no effect." BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter , 346 S.W.3d 533, 537 (Tex. 2011). A Texas law may be preempted "expressly, by a federal law specifically preempting state law." Id. The FRSA expressly preempts certain state laws relating to railroads. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2)(A). Under the FRSA's preemption provision:
A State may adopt or continue in force a law ... related to railroad safety or security until ... a [federal] regulation or ... order cover[s] the subject matter of the State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, or order ... is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard.
Id. The Prados do not dispute that federal regulations (, federal speed limits for trains) cover the subject matter of train speed on railroads, and generally preempt state law requiring trains to travel more slowly. See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9. However, the Prados argue the FRSA does not preempt "claims for breach of the duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, individual hazard."
Congressional intent is the touchstone of any federal preemption analysis. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc. , 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). We therefore must construe the FRSA to effectuate this intent.
See id. "We apply federal rules of statutory construction to federal statutes based on considerations of comity and consistency." Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc. v. Titan Textile Co., Inc. , 130 S.W.3d 301, 305 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). When construing a federal statute, "we must first determine whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous." Carcieri v. Salazar , 555 U.S. 379, 387, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 172 L.Ed.2d 791 (2009). "If it is, we must apply the statute according to its terms." Id. We are obligated to follow decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of federal law, but the decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on this court. See Pitts v. Dall. Cty. Bail Bond Bd. , 23 S.W.3d 407, 418 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, pet. denied).
The FRSA does not further define "essentially local safety or security hazard." Furthermore, the Supreme Court "has not defined what constitutes a specific, individual hazard." Stouffer v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 530 S.W.3d 782, 792 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, pet. denied). However, under the FRSA, "[e]vidence of pre-emptive purpose is sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood , 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). The FRSA's express pre-emptive purpose is to ensure "railroad security [is] nationally uniform to the extent practicable." 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a). The exception for essentially local safety or security hazards is intended "to enable the states to respond to local situations which are not statewide in character and not capable of being adequately encompassed within uniform national standards." Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. Coleman , 542 F.2d 11, 14–15 (3rd Cir. 1976). "Courts have generally interpreted th[is] exception narrowly." Stouffer , 530 S.W.3d at 792.
The FRSA generally preempts tort claims based on a failure to slow a train, travelling at or under federal speed limits, based on the general dangers associated with trains and railroad crossings. See Easterwood , 507 U.S. at 673–74, 113 S.Ct. 1732. "Federal regulations issued by the Secretary pursuant to FRSA and codified at 49 CFR § 213.9(a) (1992) set maximum allowable operating speeds for all freight and passenger trains for each class of track on which they travel." Id. at 673, 113 S.Ct. 1732. These speed "limits were adopted only after the hazards posed by track conditions were taken into account." Id. at 674, 113 S.Ct. 1732. Consequently, the FRSA preempts negligence claims alleging a duty to slow a train based on the potential for general hazards at railroad crossings. See id. at 673–74, 113 S.Ct. 1732. However, the FRSA does not necessarily preempt negligence claims based on a "duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, individual hazard." Id. at 674 n.15, 113 S.Ct. 1732.3 The type of hazard involved "turns on the facts of each case." Id. at 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732.
"A specific, individual hazard is a unique occurrence that could cause an accident to be imminent, rather than a...
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