Pratt & Forrest Co. v. Strand Realty Co.

• Decision Date: 26 June 1919
• Citation: 123 N.E. 771,233 Mass. 314
• Parties: PRATT & FORREST CO. v. STRAND REALTY CO. et al. WILSON et al. v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

233 Mass. 314

123 N.E. 771

PRATT & FORREST CO.

v.STRAND REALTY CO. et al.

WILSON et al.

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

June 26, 1919.

Case Reserved and Report from Superior Court, Middlesex County.

Suits in equity by the Pratt & Forrest Company and by Erwin A. Wilson and others against the Strand Realty Company and others. On reservation and report to the Supreme Judicial Court. Bills dismissed.

Qua, Howard & Rogers, of Lowell (Albert S. Howard and Melvin G. Rogers, both of Lowell), for complainants.

Stoneman, Gould & Stoneman, of Boston (David Stoneman and Charles S. Hill, both of Boston, and Elijah Adlow, of Broxbury), for defendants.

RUGG, C. J.

These are suits in equity to enforce a lien upon the interest of the Strand Realty Company in land in Lowell brought under St. 1915, c. 292, § 4, as amended by St. 1916, c. 306, § 3. These statutes make a radical change in the law of mechanics' and other liens upon real estate. Section 1 of the new statute gives a lien to those who labor. The subsequent sections relate more particularly to contractors and subcontractors who furnish either labor or material or both.

It is provided by St. 1915, c. 292, § 2, as amended by St. 1916, c. 306, § 1, that any person who has entered into a written contract with the owner for the erection, alteration, repair or removal of a building upon land, or for furnishing material therefor, or who has made a subcontract respecting the same and who therefore is entitled to enforce a lien under the act, may file in the registry of deeds for the county or district where the land lies a notice giving the date of the contract between the owner and the contractor, a description of the land, a brief statement of what is to be done under the contract, and the date on or before which ‘said contract is to be completed.’ A further provision is that--

‘A notice of any extension of such contract, stating the date to which it is extended, shall also be filed or recorded in the registry prior to the date stated in the notice of a contract for the completion thereof.’

By section 3, as amended by St. 1916, c. 306, § 2, it is provided that after the required notice has been filed or recorded, any person who subsequently ‘shall * * * furnish labor or material, or perform labor, under a contract with a contractor or’ subcontractor, may enforce a lien therefor on the premises ‘for any labor performed, or labor or material furnished, subsequent to the filing or recording of said notice and prior to the date of the termination of said contract as stated in said notice or notices.’ By section 7 of said chapter 292:

‘The lien provided for by section two and * * * by section three shall be dissolved unless the contractor, or some person claiming by, through or under him shall, within thirty days after the date on which the principal contract is to be performed,’ file a statement of his account.

It is provided by section 8 that the lien also shall be dissolved unless a bill in equity to enforce it is filed within 60 days after the filing of the statement, thus referring also to the date for the completion of the principal contract. On the back of the bond to prevent the attachment of a lien for labor, and standing in place of the lien as security, as set forth in section 9, must appear a certificate signed by the principal on the bond, giving, together with other information, the date on which the work under the principal contract is to be completed.

It is manifest from these provisions of the statute that the date of the completion of the principal contract, at all events, so far as fixed by its terms, must be stated in the notice and is an essential part of it. It is provided in section 8 of said chapter 292 that--

‘The validity of the lien shall not be affected by an inaccuracy in the description of the property to which it attaches, if the description is sufficient to identify the property, or by an inaccuracy in stating the amount due for labor or materials unless it is shown that the person filing the statement has willfully and knowingly claimed more than is due to him.’

There is no such provision respecting inaccuracy in stating the date for the completion of the principal contract.

Sections 2 and 3 of the act relate to written contracts alone. It is matter of common knowledge that such contracts commonly fix the date for their completion.

The irresistible effect of all these provisions is that substantial accuracy in the statement of the date fixed by the principal contract for the completion of the work to be performed under it is essential to a valid notice. This results inevitably from the absolute requirement for the statement of such date in the notice, from the fact that that date is the point of time from which run the several statutory limitations of the act, and from the provision that certain inaccuracies, among which a mistake in this date is not included, shall not affect the validity of the lien.

This conclusion is confirmed by comparison of the pre-existing state of the law as to liens with the changes wrought by said chapter 292. Under the previous lien law there was no provision whereby the record in the registry of deeds disclosed before or at the time of the attachment of a lien the existence of a lien or the fact that one might be claimed. There was no requirement for the record of any facts respecting a building contract, or any information as to its date, or the beginning or ending of work under it before the lien should come into existence. One plain object of the present statute was to require the placing upon record in the registry of deeds of certain information, for the benefit of prospectivepurchasers of land and other interested persons, touching the incumbrances created or likely to be created by liens, including the time limit within which the furnishing of material and labor under written contracts must be performed. Accuracy in this respect may be thought to be essential for the protection of laborers and subcontractors as well as others who may have occasion to depend upon the record. Whatever may have been the reason of the statute, its terms are clear and are not open to misapprehension as to their meaning.

A lien upon real estate for labor or material performed and furnished thereon is wholly the creature of statute. No such lien exists except as provided by statute. The terms of the statute must be followed in order that such lien may be established.

In analogous cases compliance with the statutory requirement for notice has been held to be a condition precedent to the existence of a cause of action. For example, injuries caused by snow or ice (Baird v. Baptist Society, 208 Mass. 29, 94 N. E. 296;O'Neil v. Squire, 230 Mass. 294, 119 N. E. 797); injuries caused by defects in highways (Nash v. South Hadley, 145...