Pratt v. Tofany
| Decision Date | 10 February 1971 |
| Citation | 320 N.Y.S.2d 555,66 Misc.2d 172 |
| Parties | Application of George W. PRATT, III, an infant, by George C. Pratt, his parent, Petitioner, v. Vincent L. TOFANY, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
George W. Pratt, III, pro se.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., New York City, for respondent; Charles A. LaTorella, Jr., New York City, of counsel.
In this Article 78 proceeding the petitioner, a 16-year old youth to whom a junior operator's license has been duly issued, seeks the removal from said license of the restriction which prohibits him from operating a motor vehicle within Nassau County except 'for the purpose of driving to and from a state approved co-operative work-study educational program.'
In every other county of the State except those within the City of New York the statute permits the holder of a junior operator's license to operate a motor vehicle, unaccompanied, during the daytime hours, and during the hours of 8 P.M. and 5 A.M. if accompanied by a parent, guardian or one in the position of loco parentis. Further, there is no restriction at all on the hours of driving for the purpose of traveling to or from school. (While the statute specifies the nighttime hours as being between 8 P.M. and 5 A.M., the license itself refers to them as 'the hours of darkness'.) The statute also prohibits the holder of a junior operator's license from driving within the City of New York, and makes no excptions there as to work-study programs.
At the outset it must be noted that an Article 78 proceeding against the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to remove the license restriction is not the appropriate remedy. The restriction has been imposed by the statute (Section 501(1)(b), Vehicle and Traffic Law), which is self-operative, and not by the Commissioner's regulations, which are merely repetitive of the statute. Furthermore, the enforcement of the statute is not vested in the Commissioner, since a violation is expressly delineated in the statute as a penal infraction (Sec 501(10), Vehicle and Traffic Law). It is therefore the constitutionality of the statute itself which is at issue. This issue is most appropriately determined by a declaratory judgment action (see Fenster v. Leary, 53 Misc.2d 774, 279 N.Y.S.2d 743, rev'd 20 N.Y.2d 309, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 229 N.E.2d 426; Bunis v. Conway, 17 A.D.2d 207, 211, 234 N.Y.S.2d 435, 440, app. dsmd. 12 N.Y.2d 882, 237 N.Y.S.2d 993, 188 N.E.2d 260; 13 N.Y.2d 1143, 247 N.Y.S.2d 134, 196 N.E.2d 564; Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 49 Misc.2d 351, 267 N.Y.S.2d 410).
Since the Court is empowered to treat this Article 78 proceeding as an action for declaratory judgment for this purpose (Matter of Lakeland Water District v. Onondaga, etc., Althority, 24 N.Y.2d 400, 408, 409, 301 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6, 7, 248 N.E.2d 855, 858, 859), and the Attorney General has appeared in support of its constitutionality (cf. Executive Law section 71), the Court will deem this proceeding such an action. When the Court has obtained jurisdiction over the parties, a judicial proceeding shall not be dismissed solely because it is not brought in the proper form (CPLR 103). 'The true question is whether a cause for complaint has been stated; for form of the action or proceeding can be molded by the court.' (Bloom v. Mayor of City of New York, 35 A.D.2d 92, 312 N.Y.S.2d 912).
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on grounds which will be discussed hereinafter, and has submitted matters on the motion which relate to the merits of the controversy. Under these circumstances the Court is not required to afford the respondent an opportunity to file an answer pursuant to CPLR 7804(f) in the event a dismissal is not warranted, and the matter may be considered and determined on the merits at this stage of the proceeding (cf. Application of Spanierman, 58 N.Y.S.2d 322 (n.o.r.), aff'd 269 App.Div. 1023, 59 N.Y.S.2d 400; Matter of Kiernan v. Mirante, 53 Misc.2d 173, 278 N.Y.S.2d 278).
The petitioner pursues his attack against the restrictive provisions in the statute as they relate to Nassau County on two separate grounds. The first of these is that the statute violates the provisions of the 'home rule' section of the New York State Constitution (Art. IX, Sec. 2(b)(2)) in that it is a special law adopted by the Legislature without a request of the Board of Supervisors of Nassau County or a certificate of necessity from the Governor. This contention is without merits in this Court's opinion, and the petitioner's reliance thereon is misplaced.
Admittedly the statute which imposes this restriction was adopted without a request of the Board of Supervisors of Nassau County or a certificate of necessity from the Governor. However, the 'home rule' provisions relate only to 'the property, affairs or government of any local government.' (Whalen v. Wagner, 2 Misc.2d 89, 91, 152 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388, affd. 3 A.D.2d 936, 163 N.Y.S.2d 225, affd. 4 N.Y.2d 575, 176 N.Y.S.2d 616, 152 N.E.2d 54.) Judge Crane, speaking for the Court of Appeals in Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 473, 167 N.E. 705, 707, pointed out that those words have a 'special, limited meaning.' In a concurring opinion in the same case, Judge Pound pointed out that in matters which are of concern to the State, such as 'the life, health and safety' of inhabitants of localities in the State, the Legislature is not limited by the home rule provisions of the Constitution.
Since the provisions of Section 1604 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law expressly exclude local authorities from any jurisdiction over the licensing of an operator of a motor vehicle (with exceptions not pertinent here), it is clear that such matters are the exclusive concern of the State. The statute, notwithstanding its limited territorial application, cannot be construed as a special law for Nassau County which requires a request from the County's Board of Supervisors or the Governor's certificate of necessity.
The attack is further pressed on the second claim that the statute is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection provisions of the New York State Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 11) and the United States Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment). The gist of this attack is that the conditions in Nassau County relating to traffic safety are not substantially different from the conditions which exist in other counties of the state where 16-year old residents with junior licenses are permitted to drive motor vehicles, and that the denial of this privilege to the petitioner, who holds a junior license and is a resident of Nassau County, constitutes a denial of the constitutionally guaranteed 'equal protection of the law.' The essence of equal protection is that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike (Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923).
Since the places to which a junior operator is most likely to transport himself, such as school, stores, places of work and recreation, and the like, during daylight hours, are most likely to be in the vicinity of his home, it is claimed that this legislation frustrates the purpose of a junior license primarily with respect to Nassau-based operators. Therefore the petitioner's argument is not materially affected by the observation that junior operators who reside outside this county also may not drive within Nassau County.
In seeking the dismissal of the petition herein, and in support of the statute's constitutionality, the respondent contends that the petitioner has not demonstrated that Nassau County is similar to other areas in the state which are not similarly restricted. Additionally, it is argued that the prevailing judicial doctrine as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and by our own courts, permits the Legislature to establish a classification which is limited as to its territorial effect without violating the equal protection guarantees, providing there is a reasonable basis for the distinction.
The 'reasonable basis' underlying this statute is presumably established by the exhibits which respondent has submitted, to wit, (1) a letter dated March 3, 1960, from New York State Senator Edward Speno, the Nassau County legislator who sponsored the statute, and (2) a memorandum from the Department of Motor Vehicles. The considerations and the facts which constitute the reasonable basis relied upon by the respondent are set forth in the Senator's letter as follows:
'There are in existence in Nassau County approximately 15% Of all of the junior operator licenses issued in the State of New York, as shown by the statistics set forth in the attached schedule. In Nassau County these young people represent approximately 2% Of the driving public and our present figures indicate that they are involved in approximately 6% Of the accidents. This disproportionate ratio would seem to justify the restriction of the licenses.
The congestion on the highways of Nassau County by reason of the large population of over 1,250,000, the proximity of the county to New York City where no junior operator licenses are issued support the justification for expanding the restriction to include Nassau County.'
The pertinent part of the Department of Motor Vehicles' memorandum contains the following:
'The numbers of motorists on Nassau County roads today is staggering. The county in the past ten years has experienced a phenomenal growth to the extent that the population has increased from about half a million in 1948 to about a million and a quarter in 1958. The purpose and reason behind the original enactment was to permit those who had reached 16 years of age, to operate a motor vehicle on the farms in rural areas and to drive to and from school where great distances were involved and no other means of transportation was available. Such a situation does not now prevail in Nassau County. The area is no longer rural,...
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