Adler v. Deegan

• Decision Date: 08 August 1929
• Citation: 251 N.Y. 467,167 N.E. 705
• Parties: ADLER v. DEEGAN, Tenement House Com'r, et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

251 N.Y. 467

167 N.E. 705

ADLER

v.DEEGAN, Tenement House Com'r, et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Aug. 8, 1929.

Suit by Ernest N. Adler against William F. Deegan, as Tenement House Commissioner, and another. From a judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County, enjoining defendant named from enforcing certain provisions of the Multiple Dwelling Law (Laws 1929, c. 713 [Consol. Laws, 61-a]), on ground that said act was passed in violation of the home rule provisions (article 12) of the Constitution, defendants appeal direct to the Court of Appeals, under Civ. Prac. Act, § 588, subd. 3.

Reversed, and complaint dismissed.

Lehman and O'Brien, JJ., dissenting.

(Per Cardozo, C. J., and Kellogg and Hubbs, JJ.)

Appeal from Supreme Court, New York County.

Arthur J. W. Hilly, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (William E. C. Mayer and Francis E. V. Dunn, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellant Deegan.

Hamilton Ward, Atty. Gen. (Harold Riegelman, Robert P. Beyer, John W. Davis, and H. H. Nordlinger, all of New York City, of counsel), for the State.

John W. Davis, of New York City, for Apartment Hotel Owners' Ass'n, Inc., et al., amicus curiae.

Jacob Broches Aronoff, of New York City, for respondent.

Clarence M. Platt, Corp. Counsel, of Rochester, for city of Rochester, amicus curiae.

Gregory U. Harmon, Corp. Counsel, of Buffalo (Andrew P. Ronan, of Buffalo, of counsel), for city of Buffalo, amicus curiae.

Joseph Sterling, of New York City, for New York State Society of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, amicus curiae.

CRANE, J.

The Multiple Dwelling Law, entitled ‘An act in relation to multiple dwellings, constituting chapter sixty-one-a of the Consolidated Laws' (Laws 1929, c. 713 [Consol. Laws, c. 61-a]), supersedes the Tenement House Law (Laws 1901, c. 334, as amended [Consol. Laws, c. 61]), as applicable to the city of New York, and changes its provisions. It was passed in the adopted; that is, by a majority vote, and not as an emergency measure, jority vote, and not as an emergency measure, by the concurrent vote of two-thirds of the members of each house of the Legislature.

The act has been challenged as unconstitutional, in that it violates the home rule provision of the state Constitution, article 12, § 2. The Special Term has decided that this Multiple Dwelling Law relates to the ‘property, affairs, or government’ of New York City, and therefore should have been adopted by the action of two-thirds of both houses of the Legislature, upon an emergency message from the Governor. The law has, therefore, been declared unconstitutional.

The determining factor on this appeal is the meaning of the words, ‘property, affairs or government of cities,’ as used in section 2 of article 12 of the Constitution of this state. By section 4 of that same article it is provided that the power of the Legislature shall not be deemed to be restricted in relation to matters other than ‘the property, affairs or government of cities.’ Whatever be the meaning of section 3 of this same article, enumerating the powers which may be given to cities, it is certain that, by the express provisions of this article of the Constitution, the Legislature by a majority vote has full power over all matters pertaining to the city of New York, except such matters as are included within the meaning of the words, ‘property, affairs or government of cities.’

What do these words mean? Their colloquial significance would indicate that anything touching or pertaining to the affairs of a city or of the people thereof was within the breadth and scope of their intent. If we are satisfied with first impressions, if we do not look beneath the surface of the matter, if we ignore the past use of these words, then we may very well say that the statute under review, known as the Multiple Dwelling Law, is unconstitutional. If, however, we pause to consider whether these words had a special, legal significance when used in the constitutional amendment, we find that there is another side to the question, and it is that which I desire to present as the basis for my conclusion.

[1] Words, like men, grow an individuality; their character changes with years and with use. It is common knowledge that many words have a meaning at law different from that of common speech-carelessness, negligence, fraud, theft, and the like-have a limitation not always given to them by the dictionary. Thus we may expect that, if the words ‘property, affairs or government of cities' have been previously used in statutes and in decisions with a limited meaning, this limited meaning was carried into article 12 of the Constitution.

What subject more vitally touches the affairs of the city than rapid transit? The recent litigation in the federal courts, and the decision of the United States Supreme Court, show how necessary rapid transit is to urban life. Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159, 49 S. Ct. 282, 73 L. Ed.652. Stop the railroads, surface, subways, or elevated, in the city of New York, and the calamity, almost immediate, would be too direful for contemplation. An affair of the city! Any man in the street, or in the ordinary walks of life, conversant with New York City, would say that the railroads, already half municipally owned, were a very important and vital affair of the city of New York. Yet this court, in Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 110, 99 N. E. 241, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1054, distinctly stated in its opinion that the Rapid Transit Act (Laws 1891, c. 4, as amended) dealing as it did directly with the railroads in New York City, was not a law which related to municipal property and affairs. It is said the law was adopted, not only for the benefit of cities to be affected, but for the public at large. The words ‘property, affairs or government of cities' appeared in the Constitution of 1894 (article 12. § 2) as follows: ‘Laws relating to the property, affairs or government of cities, and the several departments thereof, are divided into general and special city laws; general city laws are those which relate to all the cities of one or more classes; special city laws are those which relate to a single city, or to less than all the cities of a class.’

If the Rapid Transit Act under discussion in the Admiral Realty Co. Case related to the ‘property, affairs or government of a city,’ and was a special law, it came within those provisions of the Constitution which required its submission to the mayor of the city of New York for his approval. This court, as above stated, decided that the Rapid Transit Act, dealing with railroads, whether of one or more cities-it made no difference-was not a law relating to the ‘property, affairs or government of cities.’ You see how slowly we must go in jumping at conclusions as to what the people of this state meant by the ‘affairs of a city’-much less, very much less, than most people consider the word ‘affairs' to mean.

Since 1894 the words ‘property, affairs or government of cities' have become words of art, and were so used in the recent Home Rule Amendment, now known as article 12 of the Constitution. Whatever other reasons there may have been for deciding the Admiral Realty Co. Case, the fact remains that this court gave to these words, ‘property, affairs or government of cities,’ a special limited meaning, and we would be unfair to the people of this state if we now changed their meaning. When the people put these words in article 12 of the Constitution, they put them there with a Court of Appeals' definition, not that of Webster's Dictionary.

The same thing holds true regarding the Public Service Commission Law (Consol. Laws, c. 48). McAneny v. Board of Estimate and Apportionment of City of New York, 232 N. Y. 377, 393, 134 N. E. 187, 193. The law applied in effect to the city of New York; it controlled the transit in that city, an affair, apparently, of the city of New York. Yet this court said: ‘Rapid transit for the city of New York has, for many years, been a matter of public interest, affecting not only the people of that city, but of the whole state. It has been generally regarded as a state affair. The history of legislation on the subject shows it.’

The fact that that law was also considered a general, instead of a local, law under the Constitution of 1894, was another point in the case, but in no way affected or weakened the statement which I have just quoted. It is too late for us at this time to say that this court, or our former associates, were not obliged to pass upon all the questions involved in these cases which I have cited. Whether necessary or unnecessary, the fact is they did pass upon them, and the Legislature and the people, in adopting the Constitution, were justified in using words in the sense in which they had been judicially explained and limited.

Apparently nothing so nearly affects the property or government of a city as its jurisdiction. To change the boundaries of the city of New York, either by contraction or expansion, touches it in its government and in its property, using the word ‘property’ in its widest sense as associated with jurisdiction. Yet we held in City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N. Y. 429, 165 N. E. 836, that a change in boundary by the Legislature was not a law coming within the home rule provisions. The degree of the change, or its importance, could not and did not affect the principle. It either was or was not a law touching the property and government of the city, and we held that it was not. Such was also the ruling of this court regarding chapter 548 of the Laws of 1912, providing for the creation of Bronx county. People ex rel. Unger v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616. See, also, People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 149 N. Y. 367, 44 N. E. 146,32 L. R. A. 344;Browne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96, 149 N. E. 211.

The Tenement House Act (Laws 1901, c. 334, as amended by Laws 1902, c....