Pratt v. Weiss
| Decision Date | 16 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. SC12–1783.,SC12–1783. |
| Parties | Ancel PRATT, Jr., Petitioner, v. Michael C. WEISS, D.O., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Linda Anderson Alley of Sheldon J. Schlesinger, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, and Philip Mead Burlington and Andrew A. Harris of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
James C. Sawran, Andrea Candace Marcus, and Kimberly J. Kanoff of McIntosh, Sawran & Cartaya, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Respondent Florida Medical Center.
Petitioner Ancel Pratt, Jr., seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Pratt v. Weiss, 92 So.3d 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), on the basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of this Court and other district courts on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
At issue in this negligence case is whether a settlement offer complied with the requirements delineated by the Florida Statutes and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure so as to justify an award of attorney's fees and costs. Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2014),1 provides, in relevant part:
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 articulates the procedures that implement section 768.79. See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So.2d 276, 278 (Fla.2003). The rule provides, in relevant part:
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 (emphasis supplied).2
The Fourth District in the decision below provided a brief summation of the facts of the case:
A proposal for settlement was served upon Pratt which stated, in part:
Pratt did not accept the offer. A jury returned a verdict adverse to Pratt with respect to the claims, and the trial court entered final judgment in favor of FMC Hospital and FMC Medical.
FMC Hospital and FMC Medical subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442. Pratt opposed the motion, asserting that the entities were joint offerors, and the proposal was invalid because it failed to apportion the amount offered, as required by the statute and the rule. FMC Hospital and FMC Medical responded that there was only a single offeror—Florida Medical Center—and, therefore, apportionment of the amount offered was not required. The trial court agreed with FMC Hospital and FMC Medical and entered a judgment that awarded their attorney's fees and costs.
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed. Pratt, 92 So.3d at 852. The district court held that because the offer was made on behalf of the single hospital entity that was allegedly responsible for the injury to Pratt, the settlement proposal complied with section 768.79 and rule 1.442. Id. at 854–55. We granted review based upon conflict with cases that hold apportionment of a settlement amount is required where an offer of judgment is made by or to multiple parties. See, e.g., Hilyer Sod, 849 So.2d at 278–79 ; Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So.2d 1037, 1040 (Fla.2005).
The eligibility to receive attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442 is reviewed de novo. See Frosti v. Creel, 979 So.2d 912, 915 (Fla.2008). This Court has held that subdivision (c)(3) of rule 1.442, which requires a joint proposal to state the amount and terms attributable to each offeror or offeree, must be strictly construed because it, as well as the offer of judgment statute, is in derogation of the common law rule that each party is responsible for its own fees. See Hilyer Sod, 849 So.2d at 278 ; see also Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger Anesthesia Prof. Ass'n, 539 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Fla.1989) ().4 Thus, to be valid, an offer of judgment presented by multiple offerors must apportion the amount that is attributable to each offeror. Hilyer Sod, 849 So.2d at 278–79.
The purpose of the apportionment requirement in the rule is to allow each offeree to evaluate the terms and the amount of the offer as it pertains to him or her. See id. at 278 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Materiale, 787 So.2d 173, 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ). On more than one occasion, the Fourth District has referred to the requirement as a “bright line rule,” to be applied without exception. See Cano v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 8 So.3d 408, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ; Graham v. Yeskel, 928 So.2d 371, 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Strict application of the requirement has resulted in the invalidation of offers of judgment where two plaintiffs presented an unapportioned settlement offer to one defendant, see Hilyer Sod, 849 So.2d at 277 ; where one plaintiff presented an unapportioned settlement offer to two defendants, even though one defendant was alleged to be only vicariously liable, see Lamb, 906 So.2d at 1040 ;5 and where one defendant presented an offer to two plaintiffs that was conditioned upon the acceptance of both plaintiffs, see Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So.3d 646, 647–48 (Fla.2010). We held that the proposal in Gorka was invalid because the conditional nature of the offer divested each plaintiff of independent control over the decision to settle. Id. at 649.
We conclude that the plain language of the settlement offer in this case demonstrates it was a joint proposal. Although the offer was titled “Defendant, Florida Medical Center's, Proposal for Settlement/Offer of Judgment,” the text of the proposal unambiguously refers to the defendant offerors in the plural. Thus, under the clear wording of the proposal, two offerors—FMC Hospital and FMC...
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