Prelaj v. White, CIVIL NO. 3:20-CV-993
| Decision Date | 10 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 3:20-CV-993 |
| Parties | GJETO PRELAJ, Petitioner, v. D.K. WHITE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Mariani)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
This case presents a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Gjeto Prelaj, a federal inmate housed at the Low Security Correctional Institution (LSCI) Allenwood, who is serving an 54-month federal sentence for conspiracy to engage in access device fraud. According to this habeas corpus petition, in addition to this pending federal sentence, Prelaj is also the subject of an immigration detainer seeking to hold him pending removal from the United States once his term of incarceration is completed. (Doc. 1).
According to Prelaj, the Bureau of Prisons recently determined that it can safely house the petitioner at LSCI Allenwood and has declined to grant him an early release from custody due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. This agency decision, in turn, has inspired the instant federal habeas corpus petition. Prelaj has filed a pleading styled as an emergency petition for habeas corpus relief. (Id.) In this petition Prelaj alleges that he "is a non-violent, non-terrorist, non-sexual offender, who has a high risk of mortality via Coronavirus-Disease . . . due to pre-existing medical conditions" including diabetes, high cholesterol and obesity. (Id.) Based upon these averments, and relying upon the provisions of the recently enacted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Prelaj invites us to exercise our habeas corpus jurisdiction and afford him two types of extraordinary relief. First, he seeks an order lifting the immigration detainer that is lodged against him. In addition, Prelaj demands his immediate release from federal custody. While Prelaj makes these demands of the court, it appears uncontradicted that Prelaj has not fully exhausted his administrative avenues for relief within the Bureau of Prisons with respect to any of these claims. Thus, Prelaj comes before us as a habeas corpus petitioner who has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
This matter has been fully briefed by the parties. (Docs. 1, 5). Accordingly, this case is now ripe for resolution. Having reviewed this petition, and the government's response, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this petition be denied.
In our view, as discussed below, Prelaj's emergency petition faces a series of insurmountable legal obstacles that combine to defeat this request for release from custody.
At the outset, this petition suffers from a fundamental procedural flaw, since the petitioner has failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies within the federal prison system. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contains no express exhaustion requirement, "[o]rdinarily, federal prisoners are required to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241." Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, e.g., Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000); Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981). These exhaustion rules serve an important and salutary purpose. The Court of Appeals requires administrative exhaustion of a claim raised under § 2241 for three reasons: "(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy." Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761-62 (3d Cir. 1996); see alsoGambino, 134 F.3d at 171; Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988).
In order to facilitate this administrative exhaustion requirement, the Bureau of Prisons has established a clearly-defined procedure for addressing inmate grievances. See 28 C.F.R. § 542, et seq. Pursuant to this grievance process, an inmate must first attempt resolution of any issue on an informal level by presenting the matter to staff and allowing staff to attempt an informal resolution before an administrative remedy request is filed. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If an inmate is unable to resolve his concerns informally with the staff, the prisoner may file a formal written complaint at the institution level with the Warden within 20 calendar days of the event that forms the basis of the grievance. § 542.14(a). If the Regional Director denies the appeal and the inmate remains dissatisfied, the inmate can lodge a final appeal to the BOP's Central Office in Washington, D.C. within 20 days of the denial. § 542.15(a). If denied by the Central Office, the inmate may then file a civil action. §§ 542.10, 542.15.
This case presents the very paradigm of an unexhausted petition since there is no record of Prelaj ever attempting to raise these COVID-related release issues administratively with the Bureau of Prisons prior to filing this petition for writ of habeas corpus. This procedural default now has substantive consequences for the petitioner. With respect to unexhausted habeas claims like those presented here,"[c]ourts in the Middle District of Pennsylvania have consistently held that 'exhaustion of administrative remedies is not rendered futile simply because a prisoner anticipates he will be unsuccessful in his administrative appeals . . . . .'" Ross v. Martinez, No. 09-1770, 2009 WL 4573686, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009) (quoting Malvestuto v. Martinez, No. CIV.A. 1:09-CV-1339, 2009 WL 2876883, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2009)). Quite the contrary, rigorously applying these exhaustion requirements, courts have consistently rejected habeas petitions where the inmate-petitioners have failed to fully exhaust their administrative remedies. See, e.g., Johnson v. Williamson, 350 F. App'x 786 (3d Cir. 2009); Pinet v. Holt, 316 F. App'x 169 (3d Cir. 2009); Moscato, 98 F.3d 757.
As this court has previously explained when dismissing a federal prisoner's habeas petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies:
In order for a federal prisoner to exhaust his administrative remedies, he must comply with 28 C.F.R. § 542. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, et seq.; Lindsay v. Williamson, No. 1:CV-07-0808, 2007 WL 2155544, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2007). An inmate first must informally present his complaint to staff, and staff shall attempt to informally resolve any issue before an inmate files a request for administrative relief. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If unsuccessful at informal resolution, the inmate may raise his complaint with the warden of the institution where he is confined. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). If dissatisfied with the response, he may then appeal an adverse decision to the Regional Office and the Central Office of the BOP. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.15(a), 542.18. No administrative appeal is considered finally exhausted until a decision is reached on the merits by the BOP's Central Office. SeeSharpe v. Costello, No. 08-1811, 2008 WL 2736782, at *3 (3d Cir. July 15, 2008).
Miceli v. Martinez, No. 08-1380, 2008 WL 4279887, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2008).
This exhaustion rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings is also subject to a procedural default requirement. As the Third Circuit has explained:
[A] procedural default in the administrative process bars judicial review because 'the reasons for requiring that prisoners challenging disciplinary actions exhaust their administrative remedies are analogous to the reasons for requiring that they exhaust their judicial remedies before challenging their convictions; thus, the effect of a failure to exhaust in either context should be similar.' Sanchez [v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1986)]. We require exhaustion for three reasons: (1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy. Bradshaw [v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)]; see alsoSchlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 756-57, 95 S. Ct. 1300, 1312, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975) (); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (). Requiring petitioners to satisfy the procedural requirements of the administrative remedy process promotes each of these goals.
Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62. For these reasons, it is now well settled that: "a federal prisoner who challenges a [prison decision] within a federal institution, fails to exhaust his administrative remedies because of a procedural default, and subsequently finds closed all additional avenues of administrative remedy, cannot secure judicial review of his habeas claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice."
These basic legal tenets apply here and are fatal to this habeas corpus petition, which seeks judicial review of a prison placement decision under the CARES Act without full compliance by the petitioner with prison rules regarding appeals of such decisions. This court has specifically held that such claims must be administratively exhausted before they are presented in federal court. See e.g., Gottstein v. Finley, No. 3:20-CV-0935, 2020 WL 3078028, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 10, 2020); Cordaro v. Finley, No. 3:10-CR-75, 2020 WL 2084960, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2020). Therefore, with respect to his CARES Act custody complaints, the petitioner is an inmate who has failed to fully exhaust his remedies and...
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