Prendiville v. Prendiville

• Decision Date: 16 July 1920
• Parties: DANIEL FRANCIS PRENDIVILLE, Appellant, v. ADELE PRENDIVILLE et al
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

223 S.W. 596

284 Mo. 116

DANIEL FRANCIS PRENDIVILLE, Appellant, v. ADELE PRENDIVILLE et al

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

July 16, 1920

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon Thomas C. Hennings Judge.

Affirmed.

Walter B. Douglas and Alfred J. Strobans for appellant.

(1) It being shown by the evidence that the defendant to whom the deed sought to be set aside was made was the manager of her mother's property and occupied a fiduciary relation with her mother, the burden was on the defendants "to show that absolute fairness, adequacy and equity characterized the transaction." 2 Pomeroy, Equity, secs. 955, 956; Kincer v. Kincer, 246 Mo. 427; Byrne v Byrne, 250 Mo. 632; Martin v. Baker, 135 Mo 495; Street v. Goss, 62 Mo. 228; Mowry v. Norman, 204 Mo. 175; Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 230. The deed being prepared by the direction of the managing defendant, being without consideration and being an unnatural disposition of the property, and being kept secret from the son, makes it imperative that fairness be shown. Meier v. Buchter, 197 Mo. 68; Dausman v. Rankin, 189 Mo. 707; Gibson v. Hammang, 63 Neb. 349; Huffman v. Huffman, 217 Mo. 235; Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 264. The alleged grantor had no independent advice; the matter being wholly in the hands of the managing defendant and her employee. 1 Bigelow on Fraud, 262; Armstrong v. Logan, 115 Mo. 465. (2) The court erred in holding that the plaintiff was estopped from questioning the validity of the deed. There was not sufficient plea of estoppel. Bliss on Code Pleading, sec. 364; Central Nat. Bk. v. Doran, 109 Mo. 81. There was no sufficient evidence in support of an estoppel. Taylor v. Williams, 45 Mo. 80; Wendover v. Baker, 121 Mo. 294; Kirk v. Middlebrook, 201 Mo. 245; Sitton v. Shipp, 65 Mo. 297; Railroad v. McCarty, 97 Mo. 214; McKee v. Higbee, 180 Mo. 299; Merrill v. Thompson, 252 Mo. 730; Hersman v. Hersman, 253 Mo. 86; Russell v. Sharp, 192 Mo. 287; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. sec. 808; Norris v. Letchworth, 140 Mo.App. 19. (3) The alleged oral agreement of plaintiff to waive his claim as heir to one-fourth of the real property conveyed by the deed procured by defendant Adele Prendiville, not being evidenced by a memorandum signed by plaintiff as required by statute, is void. R. S. 1909, sec. 2783; Harris Appeal, 3 Walker (Pa.) 24; Tapley v. Ogle, 162 Mo. 190; Wendover v. Baker, 121 Mo. 273; Hackett v. Watts, 138 Mo. 302; De Bardelaben v. Standemire, 82 Ala. 574. And a contract within the Statute of Frauds cannot be made the basis of estoppel. Smith v. Smith, 62 Mo.App. 596; Sursa v. Cash, 171, Mo.App. 396.

Muench, Walther & Muench for respondents.

(1) The deed here assailed expresses the intention of the grantor, formed many years before. The disposition thereby made is inherently natural, just and fair. While made to defendant Adele alone, she took title merely in trust to execute the intentions of the donor, and those intentions were faithfully and promptly carried out. Hence the ordinary rules with respect to conveyances to fiduciaries are inapplicable. Huffman v. Huffman, 217 Mo. 194; Hanfield v. Hennegar, 259 Mo. 50; Bennett v. Ward, 199 S.W. 947. (2) The transaction having resulted in the precise manner intended by the grantor in the deed, there is no ground for interference by the courts. Especially when no undue influence whatever is shown by the evidence, and the proof shows the grantor to have fully understood the transaction. Huffman v. Huffman, 217 Mo. 192. (3) The plea of estoppel by defendants was adequate, and set forth the substantial and ultimate facts out of which it grew. If plaintiff felt that the plea was too indefinite, a motion to make more definite would have reached the point. Absent this, he is bound by the result. Olden v. Hendrick, 100 Mo. 540; Bigelow on Estoppel, pp. 775 et seq. (4) (a) The plea is not in the nature of a cross-bill to specifically enforce an oral contract, as plaintiff seems still to imagine. It is a plain plea of "estoppel in pais," or equitable estoppel, and as such needs no support in writing. 16 Cyc. 757; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. secs. 385, 387; Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 345; Chouteau v. Goddin, 39 Mo. 250; Coke on Litt., 356; Doe d. Morris v. Rosser, 3 East, 15; Guffey v. O'Reiley, 88 Mo. 418; Hart v. Giles, 67 Mo. 175; Rice v. Bunce, 49 Mo. 231; Palmer v. Welch, 171 Mo.App. 580; Boeckler Co. v. Wahlbrink, 191 Mo.App. 335. (b) The evidence is ample, and overwhelming, to establish the estoppel pleaded. Plaintiff's bare denial of the facts supporting the plea is met by the positive evidence of two witnesses who have no material interest in the result of the case, as well as by convincing circumstances. The trial court had the best opportunity to observe these witnesses, and its finding of fact should be largely deferred to. Hummell v. Zinn, 184 S.W. 1154; Yaeger v. Yaegar, 185 S.W. 743; Thurmond v. Thurmond, 186 S.W. 1; Thiesen v. Thiesen, 167 Mo.App. 264; Griesedieck v. Griesdieck, 56 Mo.App. 98; Schierstein v. Schierstein, 68 Mo.App. 205; Wald v. Wald, 199 Mo.App. 347; Hull v. Hull, 168 Mo.App. 220; Creamer v. Bivert, 214 Mo. 479; Huffman v. Huffman, 217 Mo. 182; Daman v. Remme's Exr., 246 Mo. 240; Halsey v. Thrailkill, 237 Mo. 721; Walther v. Null, 233 Mo. 134.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, P. J.

This is a suit in equity instituted by plaintiff against his three sisters, to set aside a deed made by their mother to the defendant, Adele Prendiville.

In the petition plaintiff alleges that the deed was the result of undue influence, and that at the time the deed was executed the grantor therein did not have sufficient mental capacity to comprehend the nature of her act. The answers deny that the deed was the result of undue influence or that the grantor therein was without sufficient mental capacity to make the deed, and then sets up a plea of estoppel, which in substance alleges that the plaintiff and two of the defendants owned as tenants in common the remaining interests in certain land left by their father, subject to a life estate in their mother; that after their mother's death the plaintiff and two of the defendants agreed to a partition of the said real estate; that plaintiff was given the more valuable portion of said real estate and on that act promised that he would not institute a suit against the defendants to set aside the deed which is now in question.

The trial court found the issues in favor of the defendants on the theory that the plaintiff had become estopped by his conduct. Plaintiff thereupon duly perfected an appeal to this court.

There appears to be but little dispute between the two statements of facts found in the briefs. The statement found in respondent's brief is more concise and for that reason we quote largely from the statement of facts made by respondents as follows:

"Undisputed facts are that prior to his death (March 3, 1905), Maurice Prendiville, father of these litigants, had made disposition of his estate so that he and his wife, Bridget Prendiville, retained joint life-estates in one tract of land on Bacon Street, containing a front of 110 feet, and improved by two double houses and one single building, and another tract of 75 feet front on St. Ferdinand Avenue, improved by a row of four houses with flats above and below, while title by the entirety to the old family homestead on Prairie Avenue, also occupying a front of 75 feet, was vested in himself and wife.

"That when his father died, plaintiff, Frank Prendiville, was a member of the household, and so remained for a period of two or three years thereafter; that he scarcely spoke to his mother while such member of the family -- she having refused to pay him $ 2,000 out of her life insurance -- and that after his marriage, and for a period of almost eight years, he never again saw his mother. That, after the burial of the mother, Frank rode back to her late home with his two sisters, Martha and Adele, and then and there began negotiations for the division of the Bacon Street and St. Ferdinand Avenue property, which negotiations ended with the exchange of deeds about November 24, 1915.

"It likewise appears without contradiction that some years after the death of Maurice Prendiville, his widow removed the old homestead building on Prairie Avenue, and being then the owner in fee of the land, as survivor, erected thereon another row of small tenements of three rooms each, being numbered from 2419 to 2425a North Prairie Avenue, and that, on the day when Mrs. Prendiville suffered a stroke of paralysis, Dr. Klein, after seeing the patient, advised that the daughters have any disposition she desired to make attended to without delay, and her daughter, defendant Adele, thereupon went to the office of the North St. Louis Savings Trust Company and there consulted with two parties connected with that institution concerning the execution of deeds whereby the Prairie Avenue property should be conveyed to her three daughters, in the proportion of two houses to Mrs. Morley, and one each to Martha and Adele; that, upon being informed that such division was impracticable without a survey defining the division line, the notary, Moresi, was then directed by her to make one deed, conveying all the property to her, she thereafter to make the division; that the notary drew such a deed, and that afternoon took it to Mrs. Pendiville's residence for signature, where her mark was affixed and the acknowledgment taken, in the presence of the notary, defendant Adele, defendant Martha and Mr. Daniel Murphy, the latter two of whom signed the deed as witnesses.

"As to matters not admitted, or as to which the evidence conflicts, the following appears:

"To sustain his charges of undue influence and mental incapacity plaintiff merely adduced evidence...