Prentice v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

• Decision Date: 17 March 2022
• Docket Number: SC20-291
• Citation: 338 So.3d 831
• Parties: Linda PRENTICE, etc., Petitioner, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

338 So.3d 831

Linda PRENTICE, etc., Petitioner,

v.R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Respondent.

No. SC20-291

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 17, 2022

Celene H. Humphries, Thomas J. Seider, and Shea T. Moxon of Brannock Humphries & Berman, Tampa, Florida; Gregory D. Prysock, Katherine M. Massa, and Antonio Luciano of Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, and Keith R. Mitnik of Morgan & Morgan, P.A., Orlando, Florida, for Petitioner

Marie A. Borland and Troy A. Fuhrman of Hill Ward Henderson, Tampa, Florida; and Jason T. Burnette, Brian Charles Lea, Stephanie E. Parker, John Walker, and Emily Baker of Jones Day, Atlanta, Georgia, Charles R.A. Morse of Jones Day, New York, New York, and Michael A. Carvin of Jones Day, Washington, District of Columbia, for Respondent

Christine R. Davis and Joseph H. Lang, Jr. of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and William W. Large of Florida Justice Reform Institute, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Reform Institute

Geoffrey J. Michael of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; and Jesse Panuccio of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Philip Morris USA Inc.

MUÑIZ, J.

As we will soon explain, this is an " Engle progeny" case, where an injured smoker sues a tobacco company for fraudulent concealment, conspiracy, and other tortious conduct. Today we resolve a district court conflict over what proof is required to prevail on the reliance element of those fraudulent concealment and conspiracy claims—a disagreement that has led to divergent jury instructions in Engle progeny cases.¹ We hold that an Engle progeny plaintiff must prove reliance on a statement that was made by an Engle defendant (for a concealment claim) or co-conspirator (for a conspiracy claim) and that concealed or omitted material information about the health effects or addictiveness of smoking cigarettes.

I.

John Price got chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

after smoking multiple packs of R.J. Reynolds cigarettes a day for most of his adult life. Price sued RJR and asserted claims for strict liability, negligence, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to fraudulently conceal. After Price's death from COPD, Linda Prentice maintained the lawsuit as a wrongful death action.

Price and Prentice's lawsuit traces to 1994, when injured smokers filed a class action seeking damages from RJR, the other major domestic tobacco companies, and affiliated organizations for smoking-related illnesses. Our Court prospectively decertified the class in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle III) , 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). At the time of our decision in Engle III , the Engle trial court had completed Phases I and II of the case's three planned phases. The reader can disregard Phase II, which has no relevance to our decision today.

We held in Engle III that, notwithstanding our decision to decertify the class, individual class members like Price could choose to bring individual actions in which certain factual findings from Phase I of Engle would be given "res judicata effect." Engle III , 945 So. 2d at 1277. Those findings have come to be known as the "approved Phase I findings." The individual class member lawsuits, of which there have been thousands, are usually referred to as " Engle progeny" cases.

The point of an Engle progeny case is to litigate the plaintiff-specific reliance, causation, and damages issues that were left unaddressed by the Phase I jury. That jury "did not determine whether the defendants were liable to anyone." Id. at 1263. Instead, the Phase I findings related "exclusively to the defendants’ conduct and the general health effects of smoking." Id. at 1256 ; see also id. at 1276-77 (listing the approved Phase I findings).

An Engle progeny plaintiff must first prove membership in the Engle class—a class consisting of Florida residents who developed a qualifying smoking-related illness by November 21, 1996, and whose illness was caused by an addiction to cigarettes containing nicotine. Upon successfully proving class membership, the plaintiff is entitled to use the approved Phase I findings to establish the conduct elements of her Engle claims. See Engle III ; Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas , 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (clarifying how the approved Phase I findings were to be used in Engle progeny cases).

In this case, the jury first found that Price was a member of the Engle class. The jury then found in Prentice's favor on her claims for strict liability, negligence, and concealment conspiracy, but not for fraudulent concealment. The jury awarded Prentice $6.4 million in compensatory damages and apportioned 60% of the fault for Price's death to Price and 40% to RJR. But because the jury found in Prentice's favor on concealment conspiracy (an intentional tort), the judgment was not reduced to reflect Price's comparative fault. See Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 232 So. 3d 294, 305 (Fla. 2017). RJR appealed.

The First District's decision in the appeal focused on RJR's challenge to the jury instruction on Prentice's concealment conspiracy claim. By way of background, the approved Phase I findings pertinent to that claim were (1) "that the [ Engle ] defendants concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both;" and (2) "that the defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment." Engle III , 945 So. 2d at 1257 n.4.

In addition to the approved Phase I findings, Prentice presented evidence that the

major tobacco companies in the United States, including RJR, made fraudulent statements about the hazards of smoking as early as December 4, 1953. Over a fifty-year period, the tobacco companies concealed information about the addictive nature of nicotine and the harmful effects of smoking while engaging in marketing efforts to encourage people to smoke.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Prentice , 290 So. 3d 963, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

Although the approved Phase I findings sufficed to establish the conduct elements of her concealment claims, it remained for Prentice to prove the other elements of the claims, including the reliance element. As to the reliance element of her conspiracy claim, RJR had sought an instruction telling the jury that it must determine "whether Mr. Price reasonably relied to his detriment on a statement that concealed or omitted material information regarding the health effects of smoking cigarettes or their addictive nature, and that was made in furtherance of" the Engle defendants’ conspiracy. Id.

The trial court refused. It instead instructed the jury to determine "whether the conspiracy to withhold health information or information regarding addiction and any acts proven in furtherance of that conspiracy were relied upon by John Price to his detriment." Id. at 966. RJR argued that the trial court's refusal to give RJR's requested special instruction on reliance was both erroneous and prejudicial.

The First District agreed with RJR, principally on the authority of the decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Whitmire , 260 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). The holding in Whitmire was that, to prevail on fraudulent concealment, Engle progeny plaintiffs "must prove detrimental reliance on fraudulent statements." Id. at 537. The Whitmire court started from the premise that the Engle defendants owed smokers no free-standing disclosure obligation and that the defendants’ disclosure obligation would therefore have to be triggered by the defendants’ statements. The court further reasoned that, absent a plaintiff's reliance on those statements, there could be no liability for fraud. Applying the Whitmire court's holding, the First District here concluded that the disputed jury instruction in Prentice's case was prejudicial error because neither it nor any other instruction informed the jury of the need to find that Price had relied on a statement. To remedy the error, the district court vacated the entire judgment.

The First District's decision on the reliance issue conflicts with decisions of other district courts. Specifically, although all Florida courts agree that fraudulent concealment and concealment conspiracy claims include a reliance element, the Second, Third, and Fourth Districts have held that an Engle progeny plaintiff need not prove reliance on a statement. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Duignan , 243 So. 3d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ; Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Chadwell , 306 So. 3d 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) ; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Burgess , 294 So. 3d 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

We have now exercised our discretionary jurisdiction to review the First District's decision and to resolve the conflict. Each of the parties has asked us to address issues outside the conflict question, but we decline to do so. We will not address Prentice's fallback argument that the First District erred by vacating the entire judgment, not just the verdict on the concealment conspiracy count. Nor will we take up RJR's renewed challenge to this Court's decisions, in Engle III and later in Douglas , to give "res judicata effect" to the approved Phase I findings. We apply those decisions in our opinion today, but we neither endorse them nor question their correctness.

II.

The parties have framed their dispute in clear terms. RJR says that an Engle progeny plaintiff must prove reliance on a statement. Prentice says that the plaintiff's burden is to prove reliance on silence. In our view, RJR is right. We hold that, to prevail on fraudulent concealment and concealment conspiracy claims, an Engle progeny plaintiff must prove reliance on a statement that was made by an Engle ...