Pressley v. State

• Decision Date: 05 January 1983
• Docket Number: No. 30,30
• Citation: 454 A.2d 347,295 Md. 143
• Parties: David PRESSLEY v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 143

295 Md. 143

454 A.2d 347

David PRESSLEY v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 30.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 5, 1983.

Gary S. Offutt, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Maureen O'Ferrall Gardner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.

SMITH, Judge.

We granted a writ of certiorari in this case limited solely to the question of whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it need not find beyond a reasonable doubt every link in a chain of circumstantial evidence. Given our oft stated rule that jury instructions must be viewed as a whole and considering this instruction with the other instructions given in this case, we find no reversible error. Hence, we shall affirm.

David Pressley was convicted of storehouse breaking by a Baltimore City jury. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unreported opinion.

The facts which we shall state are gleaned from the agreed statement of facts filed by the parties pursuant to Maryland Rule 828g. There was a breaking into and removal of property from a basement office. The occupant of the office testified to the differences he observed between conditions at the office on the day the depredations were discovered and the day before. The point of entry appeared to be a broken window one floor above that office on the opposite side of the building. There was evidence presented to the effect that a rock was found on the window sill of that window and another rock on the floor inside the window. Fingerprints were found on the broken glass from the window. These prints were identified as belonging to Pressley.

Instructions to the jury included:

"Now, you should not assume that the defendant, Mr. Pressley, is guilty merely because he has been prosecuted, and because charges have been preferred against him. The burden of proof is on the State to prove every element of the charge against the defendant, and he is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That presumption attends him throughout the trial until or unless overcome by proof establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty.

"Now while the burden is upon the State of establishing every fact material of [sic] the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, that does not mean that the State must prove the defendant is guilty to an absolute or mathematical certainty. It means such evidence as you would act upon in matters involving affairs in your own life, or business, or with regard to your own property. If the evidence is such as you would act upon it in a very important matter in your own lives, then it is sufficient to convict in a criminal case. Evidence is sufficient to remove a reasonable doubt when it convinces the judgment of an ordinarily prudent person of the truth of a proposition with such force that he would act upon that conviction without hesitation in his own important affairs.

"Now, the weight of the evidence is not measured by the number of witnesses or by any particular circumstances--he didn't have a parade of witnesses here as we do in many other cases. That doesn't necessarily mean proof has to be established by the number of witnesses. It depends on credibility, probability, and believability of all the witnesses.

* * *

"... [J]ust keep in mind that it is your job to determine what the facts are as they relate to the evidence adduced from the witness stand, and any exhibits that have been admitted into evidence.

* * *

"As I have already stated, in order to find the defendant guilty of this third count, you must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. Now guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may be based on direct evidence. For instance, somebody saw him in there, or somebody saw him come out, or it may be based on circumstantial evidence. So I want to define circumstantial evidence for you.

"Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts of [sic] circumstances which may in fact be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a verdict of guilty. The law makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct, because in either case you, as jurors, must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant.

"The defendant is entitled to every inference in his favor which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Where there are two inferences that may be drawn from the same set of facts, one consistent with guilt, and one consistent with innocence, the defendant is entitled to the one, for instance, which is consistent with his innocence. Circumstantial evidence need not be such that no possible verdict other than guilt can stand. It is not necessary that the circumstantial evidence exclude every possibility of the defendant's innocence or produce absolute certainty in the minds of the jurors of his guilt. Is [sic] not required to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in a chain of circumstances necessary to establish defendant's guilt.

"Now, while the evidence must form a basis for the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not necessary that each circumstance, standing alone be sufficient to establish guilt, but all the circumstances are to be considered together.

"I instruct you as follows. A latent fingerprint found at the scene of the crime shown to be that of an accused tends to show that he was at the scene of a crime, the attendant circumstances with respect to the print may show that he was at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. If they do so show, beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, it is a rational inference consistent with the rules of law both as to fingerprints, and as I instructed you, circumstantial evidence that the accused was the criminal agent or one [sic] the criminal agents.

"Now, I instruct you that fingerprint evidence, to be legally sufficient, must be coupled with evidence of other circumstances tending to reasonably to exclude the hypothesis that the prints were impressed at a time other than when the crime was committed. If, however, you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant's fingerprints were at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed, then you must find the defendant not guilty. That is, if you have a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to show that it was the defendant's fingerprints that were found at the scene at time the crime was committed. The defendant has no burden whatsoever to show the prints were not his."

Pressley takes issue with the italicized portion of the instructions. His counsel objected to the trial judge (Watts, J.), stating in relevant part:

"I think it should be clear that the burden is upon the State to prove each and every element ... including any--the evidence which comprises the element beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't want the jury to get the impression that with respect to circumstantial evidence, that they don't have to find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

Judge Watts replied:

"I think I clearly covered that. What I was trying to say was, he doesn't have to prove somebody saw him go in or saw him come out. All they have are the fingerprints. That's what I meant. That's why I will leave it alone."

Pressley argues to us that this instruction "flies in the face of the truism that 'a chain is only as strong as its weakest link' "; that "the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime in order to convict"; that here it "relied upon proof of a chain of seven facts"; that "[e]ach of these facts had to be proven in order for the chain of proof to link [Pressley] to the crime with which he was charged"; that "failure to prove any one of the 'links' in this chain of circumstantial evidence would break the connection between [Pressley] and the crime of which he was accused completely"; and that, since the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, "it necessarily follows that the failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one of the facts necessary to link [Pressley] to the crime raises a reasonable doubt as to whether he was the person who committed the offense, and hence would require that he be acquitted."

The Court of Special Appeals relied upon its opinion in Metz v. State, 9 Md.App. 15, 262 A.2d 331 (1970). In that case Judge Orth quoted for the court from Nichols v. State, 5 Md.App. 340, 247 A.2d 722 (1968), cert. denied, 253 Md. 735 (1969), which he also wrote for that court. Both opinions quoted and relied upon 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 980 at 477 (12th ed. 1955) for the proposition:

"[C]ircumstantial evidence need not be such that no possible theory other than guilt can stand.... It is not necessary that the circumstantial evidence exclude every possibility of the defendant's innocence, or produce an absolute certainty in the minds of the jurors. The rule does not require the jury to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of each link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to establish the defendant's guilt."

Citing 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence § 17 at 23 and 25 (5th ed. 1956), it was stated in both Nichols and Metz relative to circumstantial evidence, after the reference to Wharton: "While it must afford the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not necessary that each circumstance, standing alone, be sufficient to establish guilt, but the circumstances are to be considered collectively." 5...