Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe

• Decision Date: 07 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81SC263,81SC263
• Parties: PRESTIGE HOMES, INC., Employer; Aetna Insurance Company, Insurors; and the Industrial Commission of Colorado, Petitioners, v. Guy Y. LEGOUFFE, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 850

658 P.2d 850

PRESTIGE HOMES, INC., Employer; Aetna Insurance Company,

Insurors; and the Industrial Commission of

Colorado, Petitioners, v. Guy Y. LEGOUFFE, Respondent.

No. 81SC263.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Feb. 7, 1983.

Tilly & Graves, John W. Grund, Denver, for petitioners, Prestige Homes, Inc. and Aetna Ins. Co.

Morrato, Bieging, Burrus & Colantuno, P.C., James J. Morrato, Englewood, for respondent.

LOHR, Justice.

This case arises from a workmen's compensation claim filed by the respondent, Guy Y. Legouffe, for a permanent disability suffered as a result of a heart attack allegedly precipitated by an industrial accident. The Industrial Commission (commission) denied benefits, affirming a referee's finding that Legouffe had not established a causal connection between the accident and the injury. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the commission for further proceedings to determine the amount of benefits due the respondent. Legouffe v. Prestige Homes, Inc., 634 P.2d 1010 (Colo.App.1981). We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' judgment and now reverse that judgment and direct that the case be remanded to the commission for further proceedings.

The industrial accident giving rise to the present controversy occurred on September 8, 1976, while Legouffe was carrying out his regular duties as a construction superintendent for the petitioner, Prestige Homes, Inc. At that time, Legouffe was thirty-three years old and had been working for the company for approximately five years. His duties included field supervision of construction of single family residences as well as some manual labor as a carpenter.

On the day of the accident, Legouffe proceeded to connect an air compressor unit on the back of his pickup truck to a temporary electric supply at the job site. After plugging one end of a cable into the electric supply, Legouffe connected the other end to the air compressor and suddenly received a shock of 220 volts. The claimant testified that he felt the shock enter one hand and travel through his arm and chest and out the other arm. He fell to the ground and experienced chest pain and difficulty in breathing. A co-worker took him to the hospital where the attending physician, Dr. Lissauer, diagnosed the problem as myocardial infarction (heart attack). Tests performed on November 10, 1976, revealed that Legouffe suffers from coronary artery disease and a ventricular aneurysm, which significantly impair his circulation and the proper functioning of his heart.

The employer filed an accident report and the insurance carrier filed a general admission of liability with the workmen's compensation section of the State Department of Labor and Employment. Thereafter, Dr. Lissauer filed a supplemental medical report stating his opinion that Legouffe is permanently disabled due to heart disease, and Legouffe filed a claim for workmen's compensation benefits for a permanent disability. The insurance carrier requested that the claimant undergo an additional medical examination by Dr. Mutz, who subsequently filed reports in which he concluded that neither the claimant's heart attack nor his heart disease was causally related to the electric shock. The insurance carrier then filed a denial of liability and requested reimbursement for payments already made to Legouffe pursuant to the earlier general admission of liability. Evidentiary hearings on the issues of causation and extent of disability were held before a Department of Labor and Employment referee. ¹

The expert testimony at the hearings on the issue of causation was in conflict. Dr. Lissauer testified for the claimant. The doctor stated his opinion that the electric shock was the precipitating cause of the heart attack, but that an after-the-fact attempt to ascertain the specific manner in which the shock caused the heart attack would be conjectural. The doctor testified that the cause of the claimant's left ventricular aneurysm was definitely the heart attack, but that he could not express an opinion as to whether the coronary artery disease was preexisting because the testing method used for diagnosing the disease does not give any indication of the cause. Dr. Lissauer did agree, however, that such disease is usually a long-standing condition.

Dr. Mutz testified for the employer and gave his opinion that the claimant had serious preexisting coronary artery disease, that he was predisposed to having myocardial infarction, and that there was no causal connection between the electric shock and the heart attack. ² The doctor based his opinion on the facts that coronary artery disease is a long-term degenerative condition which is often asymptomatic until the time of infarction, and that a shock of 220 volts is not severe enough to cause a heart attack of the type experienced by the respondent. ³ One indication of the lack of severity of the shock, he testified, is that the claimant did not suffer any external burns on his body.

The referee issued an order denying the claim for compensation, finding that a causal connection between the electric shock and Legouffe's heart attack had not been shown. Upon the claimant's petition for review, the referee issued a supplemental order, which summarized the evidence and concluded that the claim should be denied. The commission reviewed the record and adopted and affirmed the referee's findings, conclusions and decision.

On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the commission's final order and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of benefits to which the claimant is entitled. The court first addressed the issue of whether Legouffe was required to prove that "unusual exertion" caused his heart attack as suggested by section 8-41-108(2.5), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Supp.), and concluded that such proof is not required in cases where a preexisting heart disease is aggravated by job-related trauma. The court then held that the proper standard of proof on the issue of causation is whether such causal connection is established with reasonable probability rather than reasonable medical certainty, noting that the referee's findings indicate confusion over the proper standard to apply. Finally, the court took judicial notice of certain scientific propositions found in medical treatises and concluded that Dr. Mutz' testimony was based upon an erroneous assumption of scientific fact and therefore could not serve as a basis for the referee's conclusion that no causal connection had been shown. We first address the judicial notice issue and conclude that the court of appeals' judgment should be reversed because of its erroneous application of the judicial notice rule, C.R.E. 201. We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the referee's findings indicate confusion in the application of the "unusual exertion" requirement and in the standard of proof the claimant was required to satisfy, and accordingly remand the case for further findings applying appropriate standards.

I.

In reversing the commission's order denying benefits to the claimant, the court of appeals disregarded the referee's factual finding, based on Dr. Mutz' testimony, that the heart attack was not caused by the electric shock. It did so on the ground that the finding was based upon an assumption contrary to certain propositions of scientific fact of which the court took judicial notice pursuant to Colorado Rule of Evidence 201. We conclude that the court of appeals erred in applying the judicial notice rule to disregard the referee's factual finding; therefore, reversal of that court's judgment is required.

Facts subject to the judicial notice rule are those "not subject to reasonable dispute" and must be either "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" or "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." C.R.E. 201(b). Appellate courts, as well as trial courts, may make use of this rule. C.R.E. 201(f). The rule is a codification of existing case law, Larsen v. Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163 (Colo.App.1981), and has traditionally been used cautiously in keeping with its purpose to bypass the usual fact finding process only when the facts are of such common knowledge that they cannot reasonably be disputed. See Anderson v. Lett, 150 Colo. 478, 374 P.2d 355 (1962) (conclusions reached by application of mathematical principles cannot be judicially noticed unless such conclusions are irrefutable); Winterberg v. Thomas, 126 Colo. 60, 246 P.2d 1058 (1952) (unquestioned laws of mathematics are judicially noticeable); Sierra Mining Co. v. Lucero, 118 Colo. 180, 194 P.2d 302 (1948) (calendar days and dates are subject to judicial notice); People ex rel. Flanders v. Neary, 113 Colo. 12, 154 P.2d 48 (1944) (the fact that a term of public office was due to expire in a short time was judicially noticed); see also Federal Rules of Evidence, Note to Subdivision (b) of Rule 201, Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules.

The court of appeals relied on medical treatises not offered or admitted into evidence, and not cited by either Dr. Lissauer or Dr. Mutz, for its finding that an electric shock caused by contact with a 220 volt power line can cause serious injury without leaving a visible burn mark. The court in effect assumed the role of an expert medical witness by discrediting the opinion of Dr. Mutz based on independent research and interpretation of medical texts which properly should be interpreted only by experts in the appropriate field. See Sayers v. Gardner, 380 F.2d 940 (6th Cir.1967); Ross v. Gardner, 365 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.1966). To accept the court's substitution of its own fact findings for those of the referee in this instance would expand the judicial notice rule far beyond its intended scope. The court compared the type of facts judicially noticed here...