Price v. Craig

• Decision Date: 17 October 1932
• Docket Number: 30113
• Citation: 164 Miss. 42,143 So. 694
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: PRICE v. CRAIG

143 So. 694

164 Miss. 42

PRICE v. CRAIG

No. 30113

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 17, 1932

Division A

1 CONTRACTS.

Contract whereby husband and wife agreed to will or convey property to parties who agreed to provide for them during life held not against public policy.

2 DOWER.

Contract by husband and wife to will or convey property in consideration of defendant's providing for them during life, vested in defendant rights which could not be defeated by husband's subsequent marriage, after first wife's death, to one having notice of contract and of facts sufficient to put her on inquiry.

3 WILLS.

On execution of contract whereby husband and wife agreed to will or convey property to another who agreed to provide for them during life, husband and wife except as to life interest became trustees of legal title, and the other party became equitable owner, except as to life estate.

4. DOWER.

Widow's statutory rights to share in husband's estate do not attach to property to which husband holds only legal title.

5. HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Husband's disposition of property made long prior to contemplation of marriage, and while another marriage relation existed, could not be in fraud of rights of second wife.

6. WILLS.

Husband's will giving property to one who provided for him pursuant to contract was not abrogation of contract which would enable widow to renounce will (Code 1930, sections 3561, 3562).

HON. R. E. JACKSON, Chancellor.

APPEAL from Chancery Court of Le Flore County.--HON. R. E. JACKSON, Chancellor.

Suit by Mrs. M. E. Price against Mrs. Annie Louise Craig, in which defendant filed a cross-bill. From the decree dismissing the original bill and granting the relief prayed for in the cross-bill, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Colson & Guy, of Greenwood, for appellant.

If the will of the husband or wife shall not make any provision for the other, the survivor of them shall have the right to share in the estate of the deceased husband or wife, as in case of unsatisfactory provision in the will of the husband or wife, for the other of them; and in such case a renunciation of the will shall not be necessary, but the rights of the survivor shall be as if the will had contained a provision that was unsatisfactory, and it had been renounced.

Section 3562, Code of 1930.

When a husband makes his last will and testament, and does not make satisfactory provision therein for his wife, she may at any time within six months after the probate of the will, file in the office where probated a renunciation.

Sec. 3561, Code of 1930.

Mrs. T. P. Price, immediately upon the death of her husband became the owner of one-half interest in all real property including his homestead and all personal property other than the property exempted from execution, by operation of law.

Cain v. Barnwell, 87 So. 481, 484.

Since the contract has been performed such right as appellee may have must necessarily accrue to her by virtue of its performance.

Bradley v. Howell, 134 So. 843; Knight v. Knight, 97 So. 481.

It is true that a person may by contract bind himself to will his property to a certain person or for certain purposes, but it is also equally true that if the agreement to will is performed by making a will, then the will takes the place of the contract, and no greater force and effect can be given the contract than can be given the will.

Where a contract did not convey to any of the parties thereto any interest in the property of the others to vest immediately or in the future, but the object sought to be accomplished by it was to cause whatever property each of the parties thereto, on his death to vest when that event should occur, in the surviving party or parties, such instrument was testamentary in character and could have no operation as a deed.

Thomas v. Byrd, 73 So. 725.

The husband was not disabled from making the will, but the operation and effect of his will would under the statute be subject to the consent of the widow so far as her distribution share was concerned.

Fleming v. Fleming, 180 N.W. 206.

If it was within the parties contemplation and the contract embraced the taking of the deceased's entire estate to the exclusion of any future wife or child, then we have no hesitation in saying that the contract was void as against public policy.

Owens v. McNally, 33 L.R.A. 369.

The complainant, widow of T. P. Price, deceased, is entitled to the share in her deceased husband's estate granted her by statute, and the quit claim deed conveying her interest without consideration and under a misapprehension of her right, is void or voidable, and ought to be cancelled.

A. & V. Railroad Co. v. James, 73 Miss. 110, 19 So. 105; Hoy v. Hoy, 48 So. 903.

The widow is not deprived of her statutory rights in the property of her deceased husband.

Mayfield v. Cook, 77 So. 713; Fleming v. Fleming, 180 N.W. 206; Owens v. McNally, 45 P. 710, 33 L.R.A. 369; Thomas v. Byrd, 112 Miss. 612, 73 So. 725.

Notice of the contract, however, could go no further than notice that Mr. Price was to will the property to Mrs. Craig, and of course in so willing it the will would be subject to the infirmities imposed by law on his power to will. The contract was performed by Mr. Price by making the will, and by doing so he fully performed his contract with Mrs. Craig. Whether the appellant had knowledge or notice of the will would not deprive her of her statutory rights.

All of the property could have been conveyed by Mr. Price to another at any time prior to his death, and in doing so such conveyance would have been a mere breach of his contract, and the damage to the Craigs would have been the amount of money they had put out under the terms of the contract, and no more. Mr. Price had full power and dominion over the property and retained the entire interest in the property until his death.

Pollard & Hamner and R. V. Pollard, Jr., all of Greenwood, for appellee.

The contract between the Prices and the Craigs, and the will executed pursuant to said contract, created vested irrevocable property rights in appellee, of which she cannot be deprived and upon execution of the contract the Prices became trustees of the legal title.

Anding v. Davis, 38 Miss. 574; Robertson v. Robertson, 94 Miss. 645, 47 So. 675; Howe v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30; Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60; Burdine v. Burdine, 98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992; Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kans. 269, 178 P. 421; Deseumer v. Rondel, 76 N.J.Eq. 394, 74 A. 703; Rosetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210; Emery v. Darling, 50 Ohio St. 160, 33 N.E. 715.

Appellant's subsequent marriage to Price with notice, actual as well as constructive, of appellant's right under the contracts and will, did not confer upon appellant such rights as would defeat or impair the rights vested in appellee by the contract and will.

Dillon v. Gray, 87 Kans. 129, 123 P. 878; Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kans. 269, 178 P. 421; Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52; Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S.W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 395; Burdine v. Burdine, 98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992.

The property was no more part of his "estate" than if he had executed and delivered to Mrs. Craig a deed conveying the whole of said property to her, subject to a life interest in himself. After the execution of his contract, he had no right to convey the property to another.

Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 60; Deseumer v. Rondel, 76 N.J.Eq. 394, 74 A. 703.

OPINION

Cook, J.

Mrs. M. E. Price, the appellant herein and complainant in the court below, filed a bill of complaint in the chancery court of Le Flore county, against Mrs. Annie Louise Craig, the sole legatee and devisee under the last will and testament of the appellant's husband, T. P. Price, deceased, seeking to cancel a quitclaim deed executed by her conveying to Mrs. Craig all her right, title, and interest in and to the estate of her deceased husband, and to recover from the said Mrs. Craig one-half of her husband's estate. Mrs. Craig filed an answer to the bill of complaint and made it a cross-bill, praying that her title to the property involved be confirmed. The appellant answered the cross-bill and included therein a general and a special demurrer, both of which were overruled. On the final hearing of the case, a decree was entered dismissing the original bill and granting the relief prayed for in the cross-bill, and from this decree, this appeal was prosecuted.

The bill of complaint alleged that the appellant, complainant herein, is the widow of T. P. Price, deceased, and that at his death he was the owner and in possession of certain valuable real estate located in Greenwood, Le Flore county, Mississippi, occupied by him and the appellant as a homestead, and also certain personal property consisting of household goods, money in bank, etc.; that the said T. P. Price had been married previous to his marriage to the appellant, and that his first wife died intestate in the year 1929; that the said T. P. Price and his first wife during their lifetime entered into a contract, dated August 6, 1927, and duly recorded in the deed records of Le Flore county, whereby they undertook, for a consideration named therein, to contract to vest in the appellee, Mrs. Craig, at the death of the longest liver of them, the title to the real property then owned by them, and particularly described in said contract, and also the title to all other property, real and personal, whereof the longest liver of them should die seized and possessed; and that this contract was performed by T. P. Price, prior to his death, by the execution of a will in which the appellee was the sole beneficiary.

The bill further alleged that this will was placed in the hands of the appellee, but had not...