Price v. Gonzalez
| Decision Date | 11 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 76066-1-I,76066-1-I |
| Citation | 419 P.3d 858 |
| Parties | Anne M. PRICE, Appellant, v. Stacy GONZALEZ ; Jose Gonzalez and Sara Gonzalez, and the marital community composed thereof, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
John Jacob Van Velthuyzen, Holman Cahill, 5507 35th Ave. NE, Seattle, WA, 98105-2311, for Appellant.
Marilee C. Erickson, Reed McClure, 1215 4th Ave. Ste. 1700, Seattle, WA, 98161-1087, Respondents.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 Price sued the wrong defendant. The trial court dismissed, because the statute of limitations expired before the proper defendant received notice. Price argues that this was error, because her amendment to the complaint relates back to the original filing of the complaint. We affirm.
¶ 2 Stacy Gonzalez rear-ended Anne Price. Price's declaration describes the exchange of information that occurred immediately after:
In fact, Sara Gonzalez was Stacy's2 mother.
¶ 3 On November 13, 2015, the last day before the statute of limitations expired, Price filed a summons and complaint for personal injuries against Sara Gonzalez. Sara's answer stated that Price had sued the wrong defendant.
¶ 4 The trial court granted Price leave of court to amend her complaint. On January 27, 2016, over two months after the statute of limitations had expired, Price amended her complaint to name Stacy as a defendant, in addition to Sara and Jose Gonzalez.3 On February 4, 2016, within 90 days of the filing of the original complaint, Sara's attorney accepted service on behalf of both Sara and Stacy. On September 2, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss. They argued that the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, because Stacy, the proper defendant, did not receive notice within the statute of limitations period, as required by CR 15(c). The trial court granted this motion, because "defendant Stacy Gonzalez did not receive notice of the institution of the action mistakenly brought against her mother within the period of time provided by law for commencing the action against her which was three years from the date of the November 13, 2012 accident."
¶ 5 Price appeals.
¶ 6 Price makes two arguments. First, she argues that her amended complaint relates back to the original complaint under CR 15(c). Second, she alternatively argues that Washington courts should change their interpretation of CR 15(c) to conform to the federal rule that allows relation back of pleadings within 90 days of the expiration of the statute of limitations.
¶ 7 The trial court granted summary judgment to Gonzalez, because it found that Stacy did not receive notice of the institution of the action within the statute of limitations, as required by CR 15.4 This court reviews de novo a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment. Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wash.2d 909, 922, 296 P.3d 860 (2013). It performs the same inquiry as the trial court, and will affirm an order of summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. It reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id.
¶ 8 Price first argues that she satisfied the requirements of CR 15(c). Our Supreme Court has described the purpose CR 15(c) as follows:
Plaintiffs occasionally sue incorrect defendants by mistake and do not realize who the correct defendants are until after the statute of limitations period expires. We have a court rule that deals with that scenario: CR 15(c). If plaintiffs amend their complaint and meet the requirements of that rule, we treat their amended complaint as "relat[ing] back to the date of the original pleading," and thus timely.
Martin v. Dematic, 182 Wash.2d 281, 288, 340 P.3d 834 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting CR15(c) ).
¶ 9 CR 15(c) has two textual and one judicially created requirements, Id. at 288, 340 P.3d 834. The first and second (textual) requirements are:
[W]ithin the period provided by law for commencing the action against the original party, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the new party will not be prejudiced in maintaining her or his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the new party.
CR 15. Third, Washington courts have followed federal courts and added an "inexcusable neglect" prong, which disallows relation back if the error was due to inexcusable neglect. Martin, 182 Wash.2d at 289, 340 P.3d 834.
¶ 10 The party seeking for its amended complaint to relate back has the burden to prove these three conditions are satisfied. Id. at 288–89, 340 P.3d 834. But, CR 15(c) is to be liberally construed on the side of allowance of relation back of an amendment after the statute of limitations has run, particularly where the opposing party will be put to no disadvantage. Perrin v. Stensland, 158 Wash. App. 185, 194, 240 P.3d 1189 (2010).
A. Notice Within the Limitations Period
¶ 11 The first requirement of CR 15(c) is that the added defendant had notice of the action within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the original party. Martin, 182 Wash.2d at 288, 340 P.3d 834. Our Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean within the applicable statute of limitations. Id.
¶ 12 Price presents three alternative arguments to satisfy this prong. First, she argues that there is a question of material fact as to whether Stacy had actual notice of the action within the statute of limitations. Second, she argues that knowledge of the action should be imputed from Sara to Stacy due to a "community of interest." Third, she argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled under these facts, and, if so, Stacy would be deemed to have received notice within the appropriate limitation period.
¶ 13 Price first argues that there is a question of material fact regarding whether Stacy had actual notice of the complaint within the statute of limitations. Price did not serve Stacy within the statute of limitations period. However, she argues that Stacy's affidavit leaves open the question of whether Stacy received actual notice, on November 13, 2015, the date the statute of limitations expired. Price relies on the specific language of Stacy's affidavit: "Prior to November 13, 2015, I was not aware a lawsuit had been filed against my mother." (Emphasis added.) And, Stacy's declaration states that she did not know about the lawsuit before November 13, 2015. Price asserts that this alleged ambiguity leaves open the possibility that Stacy received notice of the lawsuit on November 13, 2015.
¶ 14 But, other portions of the declaration foreclose this interpretation, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Price. Stacy's declaration states that (Emphasis added.) Sara's declaration states that the first time she heard about the lawsuit was on a call from an attorney, and that that call occurred "[s]ubsequent to" November 13, 2015. (Emphasis added.) Thus, while Stacy did not know of the action before November 13, she also did not know of the action until after November 24. Actual notice has not been established.
¶ 15 Price alternatively argues that knowledge should be imputed to Stacy under a "community of interest" between Stacy and Sara. Price cites four cases where courts have imputed knowledge to misnamed parties when a community of interest exists between the named party and the new party. In Perrin, this court found a community of interest between a deceased defendant and the defendant's estate. 158 Wash. App. at 188, 196, 240 P.3d 1189. In LaRue v. Harris, 128 Wash. App. 460, 465, 115 P.3d 1077 (2005), the court imputed notice, based on a community of interest, to the insured decedent's estate from a properly served insurer. In both Schwartz v. Douglas, 98 Wash. App. 836, 840, 991 P.2d 665 (2000) and Craig v. Ludy, 95 Wash. App. 715, 717, 720, 976 P.2d 1248 (1999), this court found a community of interest between a deceased defendant and his insurer, when the original complaint named the deceased defendant, rather than his estate. These four cases all involve a legal alignment of interests...
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