Price v. Springfield Real-Estate Ass'n

• Decision Date: 16 June 1890
• Citation: 14 S.W. 57,101 Mo. 107
• Parties: PRICE v. SPRINGFIELD REAL-ESTATE ASS'N.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

14 S.W. 57

101 Mo. 107

PRICE v. SPRINGFIELD REAL-ESTATE ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

June 16, 1890.

ADMINISTRATORS — SALES BY ORDER OF COURT.

1. Where defendant in ejectment produces in support of his title an order of the county court for the sale of lands belonging to the estate of an intestate, an order approving the sale, and a deed in pursuance thereof, it will be presumed that all the necessary proceedings antecedent to such sale were had.

2. Where the administrator purchased at such sale, and the law as it then stood allowed a purchase by him only on his paying at least three-fourths of the appraised value of the land, it will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that he paid the necessary sum.

3. Where the administrator was one of the justices of the court that approved the sale, but the other two had no interest in it, and the law then in force (St. Mo. 1835, p. 159, § 39) prohibited a justice from sitting to determine any cause in which he is interested, it will be presumed that he did not participate in such approval.

4. The law in force when the sale was made required the sale to be made during a term of the court. The deed recited that the sale was made on a day when it was shown that the court was not in session. Held that, as this recital was not required to be made, it will not be allowed to rebut the presumption that the sale was regular.

Appeal from circuit court, Greene county.

Boyd & Delaney, for appellant. B. U. Massey, C. W. Thrasher, and Adiel Sherwood, for respondent.

BLACK, J.

This is an action of ejectment for 30 acres of land near Springfield, in Greene county. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment in favor of the defendant. It is admitted that Daniel B. Miller died seised of the land in 1839 or 1840. In 1869 and 1870 the heirs of Miller made deeds of quitclaims to John C. Price, and the plaintiff claims under the last will of Price. The defendant, for a record title, put in evidence a deed from Joshua Davis, clerk of the county court of Greene county, to Joseph Weaver, dated 4th May, 1843, from which it appears Weaver, as administrator of the Miller estate, sold 80 acres of land, of which the land in suit is a part, and he became the purchaser at his own sale; a sheriff's deed dated the 14th September, 1855, made by virtue of proceedings duly had in the partition of the real estate of Joseph Weaver, conveying to Joseph Farrier the 30 acres in question; also other deeds showing a chain of title from Farrier to the defendant. This suit was commenced on the 13th April, 1886; and a further defense is the statute of limitations. There is no evidence, showing, or tending to show, that plaintiff, her testator, or the Miller heirs ever had actual possession of the 30 acres, or any part of it. On the other hand, it is shown that Farrier began cutting fire-wood from the land in 1864. Like acts of ownership have been continued by him, and those claiming from and under him, down to the commencement of this suit, though it does not appear that the land has ever been cleared or cultivated. Defendant, and those under whom it claims, have paid all of the taxes assessed against the property from 1841 to 1883. It is unnecessary to set out with more detail the evidence on the issue of adverse possession, for the instructions given are so inconsistent that it is impossible to tell on what theory the court decided the case, it having been tried by the court without a jury. If the administrator's deed is a valid conveyance, and must be so declared, as a matter of law, on this record, then the judgment must be affirmed, without any regard to the instructions. The deed from the county clerk to Weaver is, as has been said, dated the 4th May, 1843. It recites a public sale made by Weaver, as administrator of the estate of Daniel B. Miller, on the 11th September, 1841, pursuant to an order of the county court made on the 6th August, 1841, and that Weaver, being the highest bidder, became the purchaser of the 80 acres, at the price of $280. The defendant also put in evidence three orders of the county court to the following effect: One made on August 6, 1841, directing the administrator to sell the 80 acres of land to the highest bidder at the court-house door on a credit of nine months, to pay the debts of the Miller estate; one dated the 3d November, 1841, showing that Weaver, as administrator, exhibited the sale-bill for the 80 acres of land sold according to the previous order of the court, and directing that he be charged with the sum of $280, the amount for which the land was sold; and one dated the 31st May, 1843, approving the sale, and directing the clerk to execute a deed to Weaver. There is no affirmative proof that these are all of the orders made by the court in the matter of this sale, and it was admitted on the trial that all of the papers filed in the matter of the Miller estate had been lost or destroyed.

1. The plaintiff insists that, in order to sustain the administrator's sale, it devolved upon the defendant to show that the administrator filed a petition for the sale of the real estate, to produce an order of the court directing notice to be given to all parties in interest of the filing of such a petition, and to show that the administrator caused the property to be appraised. These objections are all based upon the proposition that the county courts are courts of special and limited jurisdiction, and that all these matters must be shown in support of the administrator's deed. Early cases are cited giving some support to the proposition, but the doctrine has long since been exploded. Formerly county courts had, and probate courts now have, exclusive original jurisdiction in matters concerning the administration of estates of deceased persons. It is now well-settled law that the orders and judgments of these courts are entitled to the same favorable presumptions and intendments that are accorded to the judgments of circuit courts. The proceedings of our probate and county courts are no more open...