Price v. Springfield Real Estate Ass'n

• Decision Date: 16 June 1890
• Parties: Price, Appellant, v. The Springfield Real-Estate Association
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

14 S.W. 57

101 Mo. 107

Price, Appellant, v. The Springfield Real-Estate Association

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 16, 1890

Appeal from Greene Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. D. Hubbard, Judge.

Affirmed.

Boyd & Delaney for appellant.

(1) The deed of Joshua Davis to Joseph Weaver did not pass the legal title; the legal title still remained vested in the heirs of D. B. Miller, deceased. First. It does not appear that a petition for sale of the land was filed nor that the pretended sale was approved at the next term of the county court nor any order of the county court directing notice to be given to all persons in interest. Teverbaugh v Hawkins, 82 Mo. 180; Pattee v. Mowry, 59 Mo 161; 7 South. Law Rev. 651. Second. The county court of Greene county under the Acts of 1835 was a court of limited jurisdiction, and every jurisdictional fact must appear affirmatively. Strouse v. Drennan, 41 Mo. 289; Mitchell v. Bliss, 47 Mo. 353; State v Towl, 48 Mo. 148; Castleman v. Relfe, 50 Mo. 583; Gibson v. Vaughn, 61 Mo. 418. (2) The record shows that Joseph Weaver was one of the judges of the county court, and being such he was incompetent to act as administrator. Coffin v. Cattle, 9 Pick. 483; State v. Castleman, 23 Ala. 85; Ins. Co. v. Price, 1 Hop. Ch. 1; Freeman on Judgments, [3 Ed.] sec. 144. (3) The sale was void because made on a day on which neither the circuit court nor county court of Greene county was in session. (4) The order of sale, the sale by Weaver, the report and approval thereof did not vest in the purchaser and those claiming under him an equity sufficient to defeat the claim of heirs or their grantees; the defendants are only entitled to the return of the purchase money. Valle v. Fleming's Heirs, 29 Mo. 152; Evans v. Snyder, 64 Mo. 516; Sims v. Gray, 66 Mo. 614; Snider v. Coleman, 72 Mo. 568; Schafer v. Causey, 76 Mo. 365; Henry v. McKerlie, 78 Mo. 416. (5) The judgment of the lower court should be reversed on the defense of the ten years' statute of limitations. (6) The act of February 27, 1874, does not defeat plaintiff's right of recovery. It has no application to the case at bar; if it did it would be unconstitutional.

B. N. Massey and C. W. Thrasher for respondent.

(1) The records and deeds offered in evidence show that the legal title to the land in controversy was well vested in respondent at the commencement of this suit, and the deed from Joshua Davis, clerk, to Joseph Weaver, not being void, cannot be successfully attacked in this collateral proceeding, the judgments and orders of the county court within its jurisdiction being entitled to the same presumptions as the judgments of the circuit courts of this state. Brooks v. Duckworth, 59 Mo. 49; Johnson v. Beasley, 65 Mo. 250; Sims v. Gray, 66 Mo. 613; Henry v. McKerlie, 78 Mo. 416; State v. Evans, 83 Mo. 319; State v. Young, 84 Mo. 90; Nave v. Todd, 83 Mo. 601; Camden v. Plain, 91 Mo. 117; Rowden v. Brown, 91 Mo. 429; McNitt v. Turner, 16 Wall. 353; Exendine v. Morris, 76 Mo. 416; Overton v. Johnson, 17 Mo. 442. (2) Even without the deed from Joshua Davis, clerk, to Joseph Weaver, administrator of estate of Daniel B. Miller, deceased, the records and other deeds put in evidence by respondent, together with evidence of possession and occupation of, and exercising acts of ownership over, the land in controversy, by respondent and those under whom respondent claims, and the record of the county court of said Greene county, approving the sale and charging said administrator, Weaver, with two hundred and eighty dollars, the purchase money for said land, are sufficient to constitute an equity in respondent, which will defeat the recovery of appellant in this suit. Grayson v. Weddle, 63 Mo. 523; Long v. Mining & Smelting Co., 68 Mo. 422; Gilbert v. Cooksey, 69 Mo. 42; Henry v. McKerlie, 78 Mo. 416, and cases there cited. (3) Upon the evidence in this case, the general statutes of limitations are a complete bar to this suit. Draper v. Shoot, 25 Mo. 197; Fugate v. Pierce, 49 Mo. 441; Musick v. Barney, 49 Mo. 558; Turner v. Hill, 60 Mo. 271; Key v. Jennings, 66 Mo. 356, 367; Leeper v. Baker, 68 Mo. 400, 407; Gaines v. Saunders, 87 Mo. 557; Hickman v. Link, 97 Mo. 482; Crispen v. Hannovan, 50 Mo. 536; Jackson v. McGruder, 51 Mo. 55; Long v. Higginbotham, 56 Mo. 245. (4) Under the evidence shown by the record in this cause, the special statute of limitations contained in section 3225, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1879, is a complete bar to this suit. Mansfield v. Pollock, 74 Mo. 185; Rollins v. McIntire, 87 Mo. 496; Fairbanks v. Long, 91 Mo. 628; Tyler on Ejectment, 928, 929, and cases cited. Similar special statutes of three years' limitation, concerning suits for land held under tax deed, have been declared valid and constitutional in this and other states. Hill v. Atterbury, 88 Mo. 114; Mason v. Crowder, 85 Mo. 526; Edgerton v. Bird, 6 Wis. 527; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Lindsay v. Fay, 25 Wis. 460; Ocanto County v. Jeward, 46 Wis. 326; McMillan v. Wehle, 55 Wis. 685. (5) The court below committed no error of which appellant can complain, in giving and refusing declarations of law on the trial of this cause. (6) On the evidence in this case, the judgment of the court below was manifestly for the right party, and should be affirmed. Hedecker v. Ganzhorn, 50 Mo. 154; Jackson v. Magruder, 51 Mo. 55; Lewis v. Curry, 74 Mo. 49; Fitzgerald v. Barker, 96 Mo. 661; Anderson v. Shockley, 82 Mo. 250; Hoskinson v. Adkins, 78 Mo. 537; State ex rel. v. Edwards, 75 Mo. 473.

Adiel Sherwood also for respondent.

1 The plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of that of his adversary. This is fundamental. Foster v. Evans, 51 Mo. 390; Large v. Fisher, 49 Mo. 307; Robbins v. Eckler, 36 Mo. 494; Buxton v. Carter, 11 Mo. 481; Apel v. Kelsey, 47 Ark. 413; 2 Greenleaf Ev., sec. 331; Dawson v. Parham, 47 Ark. 215. (2) The plaintiff has no standing in court on account of any irregularities, imperfections or defects, or failure to comply with the law, in the proceedings which resulted in the deed made to Joseph Weaver, by Davis, clerk of the county court, because: First. The deed made to Weaver, administrator, for the land bought by him at his own sale was voidable only, and not void. Unless timely action in such cases be taken by heirs or devisees they are estopped and the title becomes absolute. The remedy is by bill in equity. Curran v. Kuby, 37 Minn. 330; Montgomery v. Johnson, 31 Ark. 74; Harrington v. Brown, 5 Pick. 519; Gilbert's Appeal, 78 Pa. St. 266; Musselman v. Eshleman, 10 Pa. St. 394. Second. The omission to give notice of application to sell, or to have an appraisal, or to advertise, are not errors which go to the jurisdiction. They are cured by the confirmation, and no defects can be shown collaterally. And directing a deed is sufficient confirmation. The presumption is that the application for the administrator's sale was made in accordance with the statute, and that the order directing the sale was valid and this although the record is silent as to notice. Sims v. Gay, 109 Ind. 501; Livingston v. Cochran, 33 Ark. 294; Apel v. Kelsey, 47 Ark. 413; Bell v. Green, 38 Ark. 78. Third. An administrator's sale under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be impeached collaterally by showing that there were no debts against the estate. The legal presumption is that the personalty has been exhausted, and the court's judgment is not subject to collateral attack. Curran v. Kuby, 37 Minn. 330; Camden v. Plain, 91 Mo. 117; McNair v. Hunt, 5 Mo. 301. Fourth. The approval of the sale by the court passes an equity to the legal title and the heirs cannot maintain ejectment. The purchaser has perfect title by paying the purchase money and complying with the terms of sale. A subsequent approval is valid. Henry v. McKerlie, 78 Mo. 416; Snider v. Coleman, 72 Mo. 568; Long v. Joplin, etc., Co., 68 Mo. 422; Grayson v. Weddle, 63 Mo. 523. Fifth. The deed passed the title to Weaver and that title has since passed to bona fide purchasers without notice, and whatever defects, if any there were in the deed, are now cured and all questions as to the title forever set at rest. Somes v. Brewer, 2 Pick. 183; Jackson v. Henry, 10 John. 184; Blood v. Hayman, 13 Met. 231; Robbins v. Bates, 4 Cush. 104. (3) Where there is conflicting evidence the facts will be taken as found. The judgment is conclusive if there is any legal evidence to support it. Huckshorn v. Hartwig, 81 Mo. 648; Hamilton v. Berry, 74 Mo. 176; Dalton v. Bank, 54 Mo. 105; Scruggs v. Scruggs, 41 Mo. 243; Wall v. Shindler, 47 Mo. 282; Hamilton v. Boggess, 63 Mo. 233; Ramsey v. Henderson, 91 Mo. 560; Waddell v. Williams, 50 Mo. 216; Allen v. Jones, 50 Mo. 206; Carmichael v. Cox, 85 Ind. 151; Schad v. Sharp, 95 Mo. 573; Ogleboy v. Corby, 96 Mo. 285; Caruth v. Richeson, 96 Mo. 186; McCallister v. Sigler, 116 Ind. 476; Cole v. Parker, 70 Mo. 372. (4) Where rejected evidence would not change the result, or where erroneous instructions work no prejudice, the judgment being for the right party, will be affirmed. Especially, is this true where the case is tried by the court sitting as a jury. Every presumption is in the court's favor. Mason v. Mason, 102 Ind. 38; Edwards v. Parker, 28 Kan. 700; Railroad v. Grimes, 38 Kan. 241; Dalby v. Snuffer, 57 Mo. 294; Dorr v. School District, 40 Ark. 243; Fairbanks v. Long, 91 Mo. 628; Whitaker v. Voorhees, 38 Kan. 71; Felix v. Scharnweber, 119 Ill. 446. (5) The defense of the statute of limitations is well taken. Any deed, however defective it may be, and even void, which contains a correct description of the property and purports to convey it, gives the grantee "color of title." Bracken v. Jones, 63 Texas, 184; Jackson v. Wheat, 18 Johns. 44; Jackson v. Newton, ...