Price v. State
| Decision Date | 05 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-19-00011-CR,06-19-00011-CR |
| Parties | DEON MICHAEL PRICE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Williamson County, Texas
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
After a traffic stop in Williamson County,1 Deon Michael Price was taken into custody and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). The trial court denied his pretrial motion to suppress statements made and evidence gathered during the police encounter. The jury found Price guilty as charged. According to the jury's recommendation, the trial court assessed a $2,000.00 fine against Price, but he was not assessed a period of confinement.
On appeal, Price argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because he was interrogated after invoking his right to counsel, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the police violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by detaining and arresting him without cause, (3) the evidence supporting the verdict is legally insufficient, and (4) the trial court erred by failing to give his requested jury instructions. On cross appeal, the State contends that Price's sentence is void and illegal because it falls below the statutory minimum of seventy-two hours' confinement.
Because the sentence imposed was not within the statutory punishment range, we reverse and remand the case for a new punishment hearing. We otherwise affirm the trial court's judgment on guilt/innocence because (1) Price's gun-related statements were admissible, (2) error about Price's detention and arrest was not preserved, (3) legally sufficient evidence supports the jury'sverdict, and (4) failure to instruct the jury as to voluntariness was harmless error and the facts did not require an instruction on exclusion of improperly obtained evidence.
One night in November 2017, Price, his girlfriend (Kayla Longoria) and his friend (Skylar Hadmire) had been at Las Esquina Cantina in Round Rock, Texas, for about forty-five minutes when Price returned from the restroom and saw that Longoria was involved in a "big scuffle." Price collected Longoria and Hadmire, and the three of them left the Cantina and drove toward Price's house. During the scuffle, a Cantina employee had called 9-1-1 and reported that several patrons were trying to start a fight and that three of the people involved had just left the Cantina in a red Dodge Charger.
In response to the 9-1-1 call, Officer Rigo Valles was dispatched to the Cantina. Upon his arrival, he saw a red Dodge Charger leaving the area. Valles learned that Price, Longoria, and Hadmire were involved in an altercation with "the manager, his girlfriend and a friend of theirs or two" where a woman had been slapped and Cantina property was damaged. Neither the slapped patron nor the Cantina decided to press charges.
Officer Josh Mackey, also responding to the 9-1-1 call, saw a red or orange-looking Dodge Charger leaving the downtown area. Mackey notified Officer Christian Wilson and then decided to investigate whether the vehicle's occupants were involved in the Cantina altercation. Mackey activated his patrol car's overhead lights and followed Price's car until it pulled into the driveway of the home where Price and his father lived. Wilson's patrol car pulled in behind Mackey's car.
Longoria exited the car's passenger door as Wilson approached the driver-side door and spoke with Price. Wilson testified that he could smell the odor of alcohol and marihuana coming from the vehicle. Wilson also testified that Price's speech was slurred and that he was "very belligerent and agitated" and wanted to know why "the police were stopping him." Price claimed that, because he and his family had prior "bad experiences" with police officers, he was nervous, anxious, upset, and scared during the stop.2 Even so, Wilson believed Price's argumentative demeanor was another sign of intoxication. As Wilson tried to de-escalate the situation, Price claimed that Longoria had been "jumped" at the Cantina and repeatedly told the officers to look at her eye.
As the stop unfolded, another officer on the scene thought he saw a weapon or magazine, "or something to that effect," in the car and drew his gun. In response to the officer's draw, Wilson also drew his gun. Wilson then ordered Price to "place his hands on his face" so they could determine whether there were any weapons in the car. Price "yelled out" that he had a gun with him, and Wilson asked if it was in the car or in his pants. Price conveyed that the gun was "in the car or under the seat."
The officers then told Price that they would take him out of the car, and they instructed him on how they wanted to do so. Wilson testified that Price was removed and handcuffed for safety reasons and that Price "mostly" complied with their instructions, as the officers did not have to put him forcefully on the ground. Once on the ground, Price said he wanted a lawyer, repeatedly saidthat his gun was in the car, and denied any wrongdoing. Those events were recorded on an officers' body camera and dash cameras, and the footage was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.3
Wilson decided to move Price to his patrol car for safety reasons. When Wilson placed Price in his patrol car, he smelled the scent of alcohol and marihuana on Price's person.
Hadmire was also removed from the car and placed into a different patrol car. The officers then searched the car so they could find and secure any weapons. Ultimately, the officers found a gun in the car, marihuana in the console,4 and a pink drink in the driver's side cupholder that smelled of alcohol.
After the scene was secured, Wilson read Price his Miranda5 rights, and Price told Wilson that he would talk with him. Price then told Wilson that he had gone to a few bars and had a few drinks that night and that his mind was all "jumbled up." Price also questioned Wilson about the offense with which he was being charged. Wilson responded that he was not being charged with anything yet. Even so, because of Price's belligerent behavior, his slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol, Wilson and the other officers decided to conduct field sobriety tests on Price. They determined, however, that it would be safer to perform the tests at the police station.
At the police station, an officer read Price his Miranda rights again, and Officer Miles Tucker then administered the field sobriety tests. Tucker testified that Price's eyes were watery,glazed, and bloodshot pink; his speech was slurred; and his eyelids drooped. While performing the field sobriety tests, Price also exhibited several positive indicators of intoxication. For those reasons, Price was arrested and charged with DWI. When Price refused to provide a blood sample, Tucker obtained a warrant for his blood. The sample showed that Price's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was 0.142 grams per one hundred milliliters of blood, well over the state-mandated maximum-allowable BAC.
Before trial, Price moved to suppress his statements to the police and other evidence gained from the stop. Price argued that the officers lacked the requisite cause to detain and arrest him. He also argued that his confession to having had a few drinks that night and his statements about the gun were involuntary and the result of improper custodial interrogation after he had requested an attorney. The trial court held that Price's statements related to the gun were admissible but granted the motion on the remainder of Price's statements, including his confession. A jury ultimately found Price guilty of DWI, and in accordance with the jury's recommendation, the court assessed Price a $2,000.00 fine with no jail time.
In his first point of error, Price contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the statements that he made after he invoked his right to counsel.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that turn on credibility and demeanor while reviewing de novo other application-of-law-to-fact issues. SeeJohnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). "Appellate courts . . . should afford the same amount of deference to trial courts' rulings on 'application of law to fact questions,' also known as 'mixed questions of law and fact,' if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor." Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). "[A]ppellate courts may review de novo 'mixed questions of law and fact' not falling within this category." Id. We must affirm the decision if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record. Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
If a suspect requests counsel at any time during a custodial interview, "he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994). "This secondary Miranda right to counsel is 'designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.'" Jernigan v. State, No. 06-10-00221-CR, 2011 WL 4954168, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 19, 2011, pet. ref'd) () (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 458). "[A] suspect who has invoked the right to counsel cannot be questioned regarding any offense unless an attorney is actually present." Id. (quoting Davis, ...
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