Pridgen v. Sweat

• Decision Date: 30 June 1936
• Citation: 125 Fla. 598,170 So. 653
• Parties: PRIDGEN v. SWEAT, Sheriff.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

170 So. 653

125 Fla. 598

PRIDGEN v. SWEAT, Sheriff.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

June 30, 1936

On Rehearing Oct. 12, 1936.

Original proceeding by O. G. Pridgen for a writ of habeas corpus against Rex Sweat, as Sheriff of Duval County.

Writ quashed, and petitioner remanded to custody.

On Rehearing.

COUNSEL Whitaker Brothers, of Tampa, and James H Bunch, of Jacksonville, for petitioner.

Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., and W. B Dickenson, of Tampa, for respondent.

OPINION

BROWN, Justice.

This is a habeas corpus proceeding which involves the constitutionality of section 10, chapter 14708, Laws of Florida 1931.

The petition for the writ of habeas corpus alleges that the petitioner was detained and incarcerated by the respondent sheriff of Duval county under and by virtue of an information filed in the criminal court of record of said county, and the capias issued thereunder, which information charged the petitioner with unlawfully practicing dentistry in said county without first having secured a certificate from the Florida State Board of Dental Examiners, as required by law. It is further alleged that the information is based upon section 10 of said chapter 14708, which section is alleged to be invalid, unconstitutional, and void for various reasons. The petition was addressed to this court and, raising as it does a question of public interest, this court issued the writ as prayed for. The sheriff's return merely states that he is holding the petitioner in custody upon the capias and information described in the petition.

Chapter 14708, Laws 1931, is entitled 'An Act to Regulate the Practice of Dentistry, Dental Surgery and Dental Hygiene in the State of Florida, and to Provide Penalties for the Violation of Any of the Provisions of This Act.' The act provides for a State Board of Dental Examiners, consisting of five members, to be appointed by the Governor. Section 9 provides that every person who desires to practice dentistry or dental surgery, or any branch thereof, within the state of Florida, shall file with the secretary-treasurer of said board a written application upon a form prescribed by the board and furnish satisfactory proof that he is at least twenty-one years of age and of good moral character. The application must be sworn to and accompanied by the applicant's diploma or certificate of graduation from 'an accredited dental college as defined by the National Association of Dental Examiners.'

Section 10 of this act, here assailed, reads as follows:

'When such application and accompanying proof are found satisfactory, the Board shall notify the applicant to appear before it for examination at a time and place to be fixed by the Board. Examination shall be both written and clinical, and shall be practical and theoretical, and shall be of such a character as to test the qualifications of the applicant to practice dentistry or dental surgery, and shall include such subjects as are taught in accredited dental schools, and any other subjects which in the discretion of the Board are necessary. All examination papers shall be filed with the Secretary-Treasurer of the Board and kept for reference and inspection for a period of not less than two years. Should the applicant pass a satisfactory examination he or she shall be granted a certificate by the Board, signed by the Chairman and the Secretary-Treasurer of the Board and bearing the seal of the said Board, which certificate, when duly recorded, shall be conclusive evidence of his or her right to practice dentistry or dental surgery in this State.'

The act contains thirty-four sections, one of which makes it a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment to practice dentistry or dental surgery in this state without first having obtained and had recorded a certificate from said board.

The language of section 10, against which counsel for petitioner leveled their heaviest artillery, is that contained in the second sentence of said section and particularly the clause reading as follows: 'and shall include such subjects as are taught in accredited dental schools, and any other subjects which in the discretion of the Board are necessary.'

Petitioner does not allege that the board had required him to take an examination which was in any respect unreasonable, arbitrary, or improper, or had refused him an examination under the act. So we have here presented the bald question whether, on its face, section 10 is unconstitutional and void, either as a whole, or in some part thereof so vital to the remainder that the whole must fall.

The requirement that the examination 'shall include such subjects as are taught in accredited dental schools' should be construed in connection with that provision of section 9 of the act which requires that the applicant for examination shall file 'his diploma or certificate of graduation from an accredited dental college as defined by the National Association of Dental Examiners.' This section 9 was held valid, as against the contention that it violated constitutional provisions concerning the division of powers and delegation of legislative authority, in the case of Spencer v. Hunt, 109 Fla. 248, 147 So. 282. This general question was ably discussed in the opinion written for the court by Mr. Justice Ellis in the cited case. Sections 9 and 10 taken together sufficiently define what is meant by the term 'accredited dental schools.'

Counsel for petitioner cite, among others, the case of Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S.Ct. 231, 233, 32 L.Ed. 623. In that case it was held that a state statute requiring every practitioner of medicine to obtain a certificate from the State Board of Health that he is a graduate of a reputable medical college is not unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the opinion in that case it was said:

'The power of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end it has been the practice of different states, from time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely; their possession being generally ascertained upon an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an institution, established for instruction on the subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal. The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the judgment of the state as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity can be raised because of their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and application, that they can operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation.'

Applying this doctrine, the requirement of section 10 that the examination 'shall be of such a character as to test the qualifications of the applicant to practice dentistry or dental surgery, and shall include such subjects as are taught in accredited dental schools,' is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, if fairly and justly administered by the board in keeping with the plain language of the statute. The presumption is that public officers will do their duty, and there being no showing here of any discrimination or wrongful conduct on the part of the board, such presumption, in the absence of such showing, would obtain. It might have been a desirable safeguard against possible discrimination if the statute had required the board of dental examiners to adopt a general rule or regulation specifying the subjects upon which all applicants would be examined, for in such case the reasonableness and validity of such a general rule could easily be reviewed by the courts. But in view of what was said in the above-cited case of Dent v. West Virginia and also in the opinion of this court in Spencer v. Hunt, supra, we are by no means convinced that the clauses of the statute above referred to amount to a delegation of legislative power, or that it is so vague and indefinite in its meaning as to deny to an applicant for examination due process of law or the equal protection of the laws (Const.U.S. Amend....