Spencer v. Hunt

• Decision Date: 24 March 1933
• Citation: 147 So. 282,109 Fla. 248
• Parties: SPENCER, Sheriff v. HUNT.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

147 So. 282

109 Fla. 248

SPENCER, Sheriff v. HUNT.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

March 24, 1933

Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceeding by M. T. Hunt against W. C. Spencer, as Sheriff of Hillsborough County. To review an order or judgment discharging the petitioner the Sheriff brings error.

Reversed and petitioner remanded to custody.

COUNSEL McKay, Withers & Ramsey, of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.

R. J Duff and L. D. McGregor, both of Tampa, for defendant in error.

OPINION

ELLIS Justice.

In October, 1932, an information was filed in the criminal court of record for Hillsborough county, which charged M. T. Hunt with the offense of unlawfully practicing 'dentistry and dental surgery' within the meaning of the provisions of chapter 14708 Laws of Florida 1931, in that he was not a duly licensed or registered dentist or dental surgeon on May 14 1931, on which date the above-named statute became a law.

The information charged that Hunt at no time prior to the filing of the information had been either duly licensed or registered to practice dentistry or dental surgery in Florida, nor was he a commissioned officer of the United States Army, Navy, or Marine Hospital, nor did his work consist of laboratory work on inert matter only, nor had a certificate or license ever been issued to him to practice that profession.

Hunt was held for trial under that information and on January 11, 1933, secured a writ of habeas corpus from the circuit court for Hillsborough county and obtained his discharge in that proceeding from the custody of the sheriff.

The view of the Honorable F. M. Robles, Circuit Judge, as expressed in the order discharging the petitioner, was that the act referred to above was in violation of the Constitution.

The sheriff of the county by petition before the court obtained an order granting a writ of error. Section 5444, Comp. Gen. Laws, 1927.

The act was attacked by the petitioner in the circuit court upon seven grounds each resting upon some provision of the Constitution. In cases of this nature where the court of original jurisdiction declares an act of the Legislature to be in conflict with the Constitution, the presumption does not obtain in the appellate court as in other cases on writ of error from this court that the judgment of the trial court is accurate. Obviously no such presumption can exist because the question of the validity of the act is presented directly for determination by this court and the presumption obtains in favor of the constitutionality of the act, which may not be held had unless the court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of its invalidity. See State v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; Hayes v. Walker, 54 Fla. 163, 44 So. 747.

It must be assumed that the Legislature intended a valid enactment. See Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 794, 19 Ann. Cas. 235; State v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138.

One who assails as act of the Legislature as unconstitutional has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that such act is in conflict with some designated provision of the state or federal Constitution. See Board of Com'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist. v. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line, 80 Fla. 252, 86 So. 199; Neisel v. Moran, 80 Fla. 98, 85 So. 346.

The statute should be so construed, if fairly possible, as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score. Burr v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 77 Fla. 259, 81 So. 464.

Therefore Hunt, who was successful in obtaining his discharge from custody upon the theory that the act, the provisions of which he was charged with violating, was unconstitutional, must as the question is transferred to this court still carry the burden of showing the act to be invalid. Although the judgment of the court below would stand if no writ of error had been taken, nevertheless the burden still rests upon the person attacking the act to show its invalidity, now that a writ of error was taken, because the question whether the court erred in holding the act invalid is the equivalent, now since the case is here, of whether the act is invalid.

The first attack made upon the act is that it violates section 16, article 3, of the Constitution, in that the title to the act is 'misleading and does not embrace the provisions in the body of the act.' The title of the act is as follows: 'An Act to Regulate the Practice of Dentistry, Dental Surgery and Dental Hygiene in the State of Florida, and to Provide Penalties for the Violation of Any of the Provisions of This Act.'

It is contended that the title does not indicate that a board of dental examiners is to be created thereby, nor to indicate that the board of examiners existing under the Act of 1925, c. 10109 (repealed by the 1931 act), was to continue in office until January 1, 1932, and that thereafter the Governor should appoint the members of the board, nor that fees were to be collected from applicants for examinations, licenses, and registrations of persons engaged in the practice of dentistry, nor does the title indicate that large sums of money were to be collected by the board and by it expended in such manner as to the board seemed proper.

It is not denied that the arts of dentistry, dental surgery, and dental hygiene may be comprehended under the one word 'dentistry,' and that the practice of that art or any phase of it is not a business which the state in the exercise of its police power may regulate by suitable legislation to the end that the health of the public may not be jeopardized by incompetent persons uninstructed in the science of the structure, function, and therapeutics of the mouth and contained organs, teeth, and dental alveoli and the surgical and prosthetic treatment of them, who may without any restrictions of law as to character and learning upon the subject through their ignorance and lack of character spread suffering and disease among the people in an effort to exploit those who may need treatment.

The practice of dentistry is not an absolute, unqualified, or vested right, but is subordinate to the police power of the state. In the proper exercise of the police power the Legislature may control and reasonably regulate the practice of dentistry. Such regulations must be reasonable and bear some relation to the service to be rendered by the practitioner, as well as to the end to be attained. The statute therefore, in so far as its purpose is to regulate the practice of dentistry, is not contrary to public policy nor is it without the domain of the exercise of the police power. See Noble v. State, 68 Fla. 1, 66 So. 153.

The point to be determined under this attack therefor is whether the obligations itemized in the brief and set forth above relate to matters so irrelevant and unrelated to the subject of the act as expressed in the title as to violate the constitutional provision requiring the subject of the act to be briefly expressed in the title. Section 16, art. 3, Constitution.

The 'subject' of an act is the matter to which it relates; the 'object' is its general purpose. Although the two terms are held to be equivalent by some authorities, the better view is that the word 'subject' is a broader term than the word 'object,' as one subject may contain many objects. See Ex parte Hernan, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 343, 77 S.W. 225.

The Constitution uses the word 'subject,' which is required to be briefly expressed in the title of an act. The act under consideration has several objects. To avoid prolixity only a few need be mentioned. One is to define the term 'practicing dentistry,' another to continue the old board of examiners and to create a new board by appointment of the Governor after January 1, 1932, another is to provide the means by which the board may function and defray its necessary expenses to fully accomplish the purpose of the act, and one to define the powers of the board and to regulate the procedure for procuring certificates by applicants for the privilege to practice.

Whether such objects are so unrelated to the subject of the act as to be subject to the criticism that they are not germane, have no appropriate place in an act dealing with the matter of regulating the practice of dentistry, so that the subject as expressed in the title may be said to be misleading and a cloak for legislating upon dissimilar matters, is the question. See State v. Bryan, supra; Schiller v. State, 49 Fla. 25, 38 So. 706; Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533; Florida E. C. R. Co. v. Hazel, 43 Fla. 263, 31 So. 272, 99 Am. St. Rep. 114; Ex parte Pricha, 70 Fla. 265, 70 So. 406; In re De Woody, 94 Fla. 96, 113 So. 677.

Only the subject, and not matters properly connected therewith, is required by the Constitution to be expressed in the title to the act. See Hayes v. Walker, 54 Fla. 163, 44 So. 747; Thompson v. State, 66 Fla. 206, 63 So. 423; Butler v. Perry, 67 Fla. 405, 66 So. 150; Ex parte Gilletti, 70 Fla. 442, 70 So. 446.

When the title of the act expresses its subject with such sufficient certainty as to give reasonable notice of matters dealt with by the act and of its scope, and reasonably leads to inquiry as to its contents though not an index to the act as to all its related provisions, it is sufficient. See Lainhart v. Catts, 73 Fla. 735, 75 So. 47.

There must be a plain violation of the requirements of the constitutional section and article referred to before the court will nullify statutes as not being within the subject embraced in the title and of 'matter properly connected therewith.' Rushton v. State ex rel. Collins, 75 Fla. 422, 78 So. 345, 348; Smith v. Chase, 91 Fla 1044, 109 So. 94; ...