Pridgeon v. State, 90-2083
| Decision Date | 12 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-2083,90-2083 |
| Citation | 605 So.2d 1004 |
| Parties | 17 Fla. L. Week. D2379 Paul Kenneth PRIDGEON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appellant Pridgeon has moved for rehearing of this court's affirmance of his conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, urging that the court has overlooked appellant's objections raised at trial. We grant the motion for rehearing, withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the following therefor.
Appellant Pridgeon was tried and convicted on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. One of the elements to be proved by the state in such a case is a prior felony conviction of the defendant. Thus, at trial the state introduced into evidence two certified copies of felony judgments and convictions bearing the name "Paul K. Pridgeon." After a state's witness identified appellant as the "Paul K. Pridgeon" named on exhibit # 2 (a certified copy of judgment and conviction), defense counsel asked for, and was granted an opportunity to "voir dire" the witness. Upon questioning, it became clear that the witness's testimony identifying appellant as the same "Paul K. Pridgeon" named on the document was merely hearsay testimony. 1 The following colloquy ensued:
Shortly thereafter, with respect to the introduction of state's exhibit # 1 (another certified copy of judgment and conviction), 2 defense counsel again established that the witness's testimony identifying appellant as the same "Paul K. Pridgeon" named on exhibit # 1 was hearsay testimony. 3 Thereupon, defense counsel objected:
We first note that the trial court correctly admitted the documents into evidence, albeit for the wrong reason. Even an authentic document will not be admitted if there is another exclusionary rule which is applicable. For example, when a document is hearsay, it is inadmissible even though it has been properly authenticated. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, Sec. 902.1 (1992). The certified copies of judgments and convictions were admissible under Section 921.241, Florida Statutes (1989), for the limited purpose of proving that the fingerprints appearing thereon were the fingerprints of the defendant against whom judgment of guilt was rendered. The introduction of such documents, however, is not sufficient to establish a basic element of the crime charged, that the defendant on trial is the same convicted felon named on the certified documents. To establish this essential element of the crime, the state must produce affirmative evidence that the defendant on trial and the person named on the certified document is one and the same person. See Sinkfield v. State, 592 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Killingsworth v. State, 584 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). One method of establishing this essential fact is through direct testimony.
Appellant's argument must fail because we are unable to discern the nature of appellant's objections at trial. It is axiomatic that in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a specific and timely objection to the perceived error must be made at trial. Jackson v. State, 451 So.2d 458 (Fla.1984); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332 (Fla.1982); Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla.1978); Sheffield v. State, 585 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In the present case, it is unclear whether appellant was objecting to the introduction of the documents into evidence, or to the hearsay testimony of the state's witness. 4 It seems apparent from the record that the trial judge considered the objections as addressing the admissibility of the documents themselves, as he responded to the objections by ruling the documents admissible. Thus, we must conclude that no specific hearsay objection to the officer's testimony was raised, and that such hearsay testimony constituted affirmative evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that appellant was indeed the person named on the certified copies of judgment and conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
1 The hearsay nature of Officer Bill Fortner's testimony is reflected by the following portion of the trial transcript:
Q. Officer Fortner, I show you state's exhibit number two for identification, which purports to be a judgment and sentence naming a Paul Kenneth Pridgeon, which bears the certification as being a true and correct copy of the records maintained by the clerk of this court, and ask you to examine that and tell me whether or not you're familiar with that judgment and sentence.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is the Paul Kenneth Pridgeon named in that judgment and sentence the same Paul K. Pridgeon that you previously identified?
A. Yes, sir, it is.
Q. And is the Paul Kenneth Pridgeon named in this judgment and sentence the defendant seated here--
A. Yes, sir.
Q. --in this courtroom?
A. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Blair: I offer this into evidence as state's exhibit two, Your Honor.
Mr. Peters: May I voir dire?
The Court: You may.
Q. Were you in court during these proceedings, Officer Fortner?
A. No, sir, I was not.
Q. Well, how are you aware of this?
A. Through general knowledge and my association with other law enforcement officers in...
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Louis v. State, 93-03037
...of the defendant. The certified copies of the predicate felonies conformed to section 921.241(2) and were admissible. Pridgeon v. State, 605 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Louis's fingerprint cards from the present cases were not part of a judgment. Although they contained certificates sim......