Priest v. Mack, 4-4763.

Decision Date01 November 1937
Docket NumberNo. 4-4763.,4-4763.
Citation109 S.W.2d 665
PartiesPRIEST et al. v. MACK, County Judge, et al.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Jackson Chancery Court; A. S. Irby, Chancellor.

Suit by Ras Priest and others against L. L. Mack, County Judge, and others. From an adverse decree, the plaintiffs appeal.

Decree affirmed.

Ras Priest, of Newport, for appellants.

BAKER, Justice.

The complaint was filed in the chancery court by the appellants against the county judge, county treasurer, and county board of election commissioners of Jackson county, Ark. The purpose of the suit was to enjoin the officers from operating under the county salary law, initiated in 1934, and to require or compel, by mandatory injunction, the election commissioners to certify the result of the election for or against Initiative Act No. 1, said to have been voted upon at the November election of 1936. The complaint was arranged in two counts.

In the first it was alleged that the initiative act, fixing the salaries of the county officers of Jackson county, was void, and, second, it was alleged that Initiative Act No. 1, said to have been voted upon and passed at the November election of 1936, was an act repealing the said void act. It was further alleged that the election commissioners had not certified the election returns in regard to the repealing act.

The plaintiffs, appellants here, sued in the aforesaid suit as resident taxpayers and qualified electors of the county, and they alleged that they had an actionable interest in the proper application and distribution of the tax money or funds of the county and that they were seeking an observance of all constitutional and legal provisions in regard thereto.

Among other things, it was alleged that the county treasurer had $457.73, money in the treasury belonging to Lee Reid as tax collector; that he had $672.38 in money and $538 in county warrants of Jackson county, belonging to W. H. Reid, circuit clerk, and $110.59 in money and $272.80 in county warrants, the property of Fred Ball, county and probate clerk; $316.22 in money, the property of A. W. Jackson, the county treasurer; that these funds, or several items, were in the hands or custody of the county treasurer, arising out of the initiative salary act and that the several sums had been deposited or paid over to the treasurer in accordance with the terms, conditions, and requirements of the said initiative act.

In the trial court the first count of the complaint was disposed of upon a general demurrer. The elaborate brief furnished us by appellants, printed in small type, with closely placed lines, is largely devoted to a discussion and argument that the electors of the counties may not proceed under Amendment No. 7 to the Constitution to initiate salary acts.

This case was argued orally, and it is conceded by appellants that, unless we are willing to reconsider and overrule the case of Dozier v. Ragsdale, 186 Ark. 654, 55 S. W.(2d) 779, the principal contention of this suit must fail.

The arguments presented are in a large measure the same as were presented in the Dozier v. Ragsdale Case, supra, and in Tindall v. Searan, 192 Ark. 173, 90 S.W. (2d) 476. Of course, there is considerable elaboration. There are dozens of citations, some of which appear to be applicable upon their face, but, after reading this most elaborate brief and having given full consideration to all these matters, we conclude it offers nothing that was not fully considered and disposed of in the cases just cited.

Let it suffice to say that the people of the state of Arkansas adopted Amendment No. 7. It became a part of the state's Constitution upon its adoption; it fits into that organic body, displacing whatever may be in conflict or repugnant to the provisions of the amendment; that it is self-executing. The purpose of the court in the case of Dozier v. Ragsdale, supra, in accordance with its long and well considered policies, was to make effective the will of the people as declared in the said amendment. This was done at that time, and no occasion has arisen since then to justify, in any measure, a reconsideration of what was said in that case. Because the opinion of this court is fully declared in that announcement, it would be a labor without justification to attempt a repetition at this time. There has been brought us in this case, as presented here, several questions which have been argued with great vigor and supported by numerous citations of authorities. Some of these are to the effect that the initiative act of Jackson county has provisions in violation of section 11, article 16, of the Constitution of 1874, or for a diversion of funds. For instance, officers are required to collect the original fees and turn them into the treasury, and, if any portion of the said fees shall remain, after payment of the salaries of county officers, such funds shall then become county general funds and be so held by the county treasurer.

It is also urged that where salaries of county officers are paid in part by the state that such officers are required to turn these into the county treasurer and to surrender any claim thereto. We appreciate the significance of this argument, but at this time all these questions are moot propositions, unnecessary to be considered, or to be passed upon by us. Let us suggest that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Phillips v. Rothrock
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 8 Noviembre 1937
    ...191 Ark. 787, 88 S.W.2d 68; Clay County v. Ruff, 192 Ark. 150, 90 S.W. 2d 474; Beene v. Hutto, 192 Ark. 848, 96 S.W.2d 485; Priest v. Mack (Ark.) 109 S.W.2d 665. The chief insistence of appellant is that there was no legal authorization for the submission of the salary act to the electors, ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT