Priestley v. State
| Decision Date | 01 November 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 3688,3688 |
| Citation | 446 P.2d 405 |
| Parties | David PRIESTLEY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
David H. Carmichael, of Kline & Tilker, Cheyenne, for appellant.
James E. Barrett, Atty. Gen., Lynn R. Garrett, Deputy Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.
Before HARNSBERGER, C. J., and GRAY, McINTYRE and PARKER, JJ.
David Priestly was charged, tried and convicted of grand larceny. His appeal raises (1) the question of whether the accused was afforded protection in compliance with the standards set up in Miranda v. State of Arisona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974; and (2) whether the trial court should have independently determined the admissibility of a statement attributed to defendant.
A short time after Priestley had been in the City Cafe, in Cheyenne, the owner discovered approximately $400 was missing from the cafe. From a picture shown to him by the police, the owner identified Priestley as the man who had been in his cafe just prior to the time when the money was missed.
At that point, counsel for appellant claims, Priestley became a prime suspect and the police were ready to arrest him on sight. Soon a patrolman, who was one of the officers investigating the theft, saw a man resembling the suspect walking along a street in Cheyenne. The testimony of the patrolman concerning his first contact with this man, who in fact Priestley, is important in determining whether defendant was coerced into a statement. We therefore set out in full the pertinent testimony of the patrolman on his meeting with defendant.
'Q. What did you do if anything? A. I made a U-turn and approached the subject by car and motioned for him to come over to the car and asked him for his name and he did not reply, and I asked him for his military identification.
'Q. Were you inside or outside your car at this time? A. I was inside.
'Q. Go ahead, what happened then? A. I asked him for military identification, and he produced a note book with his name in it, while I was looking at this, he opened up the police car door and asked me to take him to the City Cafe.
'Q. And did he tell his name prior to that? A. No, he never did tell me his name.
'Q. What else did he say? MR.: I will object to the question as being incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and further that a proper foundation has not been laid for this line of questioning. May we approach the bench, Your Honor. (WHEREUPON A DISCUSSION WAS HAD AT THE BENCH) THE COURT: The objection will be sustained.
'Q. Referring you, now, back to your previous testimony of being on the south side and seeing an individual and approaching the individual, who was the person that you approached, do you know? A. It was David Priestley.
'Q. And where did you see, where did you approach him? A. Near the intersection of 9th Street and Central.
'Q. Would that-- A. He was just going up the viaduct, traveling north.
'Q. What did you do subsequently when you approached him? A. I motioned for the gentleman to come over to the police car. He was standing outside of the police car and I asked him what his name was and he did not reply, and I asked him for military identification card and he shrugged his shoulders and handed me a notebook.
'Q. Had Mr. Priestley said anything to you? A. No, he had Not.
'Q. Then, what did you do? A. As I was looking at the notebook he opened up the police car and started getting in and asked me to take him to the City Cafe.
'Q. What occurred then? A. He asked me to take him to the City Cafe, he stated he had taken a large sum of money and at that time I placed him under arrest.
'Q. What else happened at that time?
MR. CARMICHAEL: Your Honor, I will object, again, I will object to these answers that was given as unresponsive and I would like to renew my prior objection again as to any improper foundation that hasn't been laid for this line of inquiring. THE COURT: Objection is overruled. 'Q. All right, what did you do then? A. I placed the subject under arrest, frisked him and advised him of his rights.
'Q. What did you do? A. I advised him that he had the right to remain silent, and anything that he did say could be used against him in Court and that he had the right to an attorney to represent him before being questioned and that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him and I asked him if he understood what I just had stated.
'Q. What if anything did the defendant do then? A. He stated, 'Take me up to the City Cafe'.
The only other testimony relating to the initial meeting between the patrolman and defendant was the testimony of Priestley himself. The pertinent part of his testimony was as follows:
Regardless of whether the testimony of the patrolman or the testimony of the defendant is considered, there would be no basis for saying there was improper custodial interrogation at the time Priestley was picked up. No improper interrogation at a later time is claimed.
If we accept as true the testimony of the patrolman-which would be according to the general appellate rule-the story we get is that there was no interrogation at all. The patrolman merely asked for military identification. Then, while the patrolman was looking at the notebook handed him, Priestley opened up the car door and asked the officer to take him to the City Cafe, stating he had taken a large sum of money.
According to the officer's story, there were no further questions. Instead, the defendant was arrested, warned of his constitutional rights, and taken to the City Cafe.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the Miranda decision, has expressly approved the admission of statements such as the one whith the patrolman attributed to Priestley. At 86 S.Ct. 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the court stated:
If we accept the officer's version of what transpired, Priestley's statement was clearly a volunteered statement of the kind referred to in the foregoing quotation. Thus, as stated in the Miranda opinion, such a statement is not barred by the Fifth Amendment and its admissibility is not affected by the holding in that case.
Even if we were to accept Priestley's version of what transpired when he was picked up, we arrive at the same result. According to his story, the officer merely asked for identification. It was afterwards when, according to Priestley, the officer told defendant to get into the car. There of course could be no custody until Priestley did get in. From that point on the only question asked was by Priestley. He asked the officer what the officer wanted with him. It was the officer and not Priestley who made the statement, the officer saying, 'You know, taking this man's money at the City Cafe.'
Priestley admits he was warned of his constitutional rights when he got to the City Cafe. He did not testify to any interrogation following his entrance into the patrolman's car until after he had been properly warned of his rights at...
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