Primerica Financial Services, Inc. v. Mitchell, 98-8157-Civ.

• Decision Date: 13 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-8157-Civ.,98-8157-Civ.
• Citation: 48 F.Supp.2d 1363
• Parties: PRIMERICA FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. William F. MITCHELL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

48 F.Supp.2d 1363

PRIMERICA FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. William F. MITCHELL, Defendant.

No. 98-8157-Civ.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

January 13, 1999.

Richard Martens, John Boykin, and Charles Pickett, Jr., West Palm Beach, Florida, for Primerica Financial Services, Inc.

Peter Schneider, Atlanta, Georgia, for Primerica Financial Services, Inc.

Brian Spector, Miami, Florida, for William F. Mitchell.

ORDER AFFIRMING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SEITZ, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Barry L. Garber, United States Magistrate Judge, on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [DE 6]. The Court has considered the above referenced Report and Recommendation, the objection thereto, and the pertinent portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised.

THE COURT hereby finds that the Report and Recommendation is well-reasoned and thorough. Defendant objects, however, asserting that there was no jurisdictional basis for the Report and Recommendation because there was no pending Motion to Dismiss at the time of the referral to Judge Garber. The Court disagrees and finds that the Motion to Dismiss was pending and ripe for review. A brief procedural history of pertinent pleadings and motions illuminates this issue.

This matter was filed on March 12, 1998, and the Motion to Dismiss was filed on April 22, 1998. On August 25, 1998, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and a Motion for Leave to Supplement its Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. On September 10, 1998, Defendant responded to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Supplement by arguing that a supplement was an impermissible "surreply" to the Motion to Dismiss. The implication of Defendant's argument contained in his Response to the Motion for Leave to Supplement was that he intended the Motion to Dismiss be heard as to the Amended Complaint. Defendant did not explicitly withdraw his Motion to Dismiss or alert the Court that he was not renewing his Motion to Dismiss with respect to the Amended Complaint. Defendant waited three (3) months to Answer or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint even though he contends that his Motion to Dismiss was moot upon the filing of that Amended Complaint.

On November 30, 1998, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Supplement its Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and referred the Motion to Dismiss to Judge Garber. Immediately after the Court's referral of the pending motion to Magistrate Judge Garber, the matter was transferred to this Court. Two weeks later, Judge Garber rendered his Report and Recommendation that the motion be denied.

The transfer of this matter has caused some procedural confusion for the parties and this Court. However, Defendant's failure to answer the Amended Complaint for three months and his failure to explicitly notify the Court that he believed his Motion to Dismiss to be moot prior to or at the time of the referral to Judge Garber negates the credibility of his current objection to the Report and Recommendation.

Accordingly, having reviewed, de novo, the Report and Recommendation, dated December 17, 1998, pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise duly advised, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Garber to deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be AFFIRMED. It is further

ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GARBER, United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before this Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to an Order of Reference issued by United States District Judge Wilkie D. Ferguson. No hearing was held on this Matter.

BACKGROUND

This case involves allegations by Primerica Financial Services ("PFS") and affiliated companies against Defendant William Mitchell, a former agent of PFS, regarding his activities while working for PFS's competitor, World Marketing Alliance, Inc. ("WMA"), which is not a party to this action. Plaintiffs allege that Mitchell and co-conspirators have engaged in illegal conduct including unfair competition, tortious interference, and a civil conspiracy. Defendant filed this Motion in April 1998. Plaintiffs filed an initial opposition in June 1998 and then filed an amended complaint in August 1998. Accordingly, when considering this Motion, the Court will look to the operative Amended Complaint in making its determination.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law. Burger King Corp. v. Holder, 844 F.Supp. 1528, 1529 (S.D.Fla.1993) citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). The Court, however, must confine its analysis to the allegations as stated in the Complaint. Id. It must accept those allegations as true and resolve all factual issues in favor of the non-moving party. Id.; Quinones v. Durkis, 638 F.Supp. 856, 858 (S.D.Fla.1986). The threshold of sufficiency that a complaint must meet is "exceedingly low." Florida College of Osteopathic Medicine, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 982 F.Supp. 862, 864 (M.D.Fla.1997) (citing Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir.1985)). Accordingly, a claim may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only if it is clear that no relief can be granted under any facts consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 72, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).

In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The Court must take "the material allegations of the complaint and its incorporated exhibits as true, and liberally construe the complaint in favor of the Plaintiff." Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Servs., Inc., 840 F.2d 797, 798 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted), aff'd, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). The law in this Circuit is well-settled that "the `accepted rule' for appraising the sufficiency of a complaint is `that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.'" S.E.C. v. ESM Group, Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)) cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055, 108 S.Ct. 2822, 100 L.Ed.2d 923 (1988). The moving party bears a heavy burden. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 953 (11th Cir.1986).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiffs Have Stated A Claim For Tortious Interference (Counts I & II).

Counts I and II of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint allege tortious interference with the PFS Sales Force and with the PFS Companies' customers. In Florida, the elements of a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship are the following:

1. Existence of a business relationship under which plaintiff has legal rights;

2. Knowledge of the relationship by defendant;

3. An intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship by the defendant; and

4. Damage to the plaintiff as the result of the breach of the business relationship.

Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So.2d 812, 814 (Fla.1994). Prior to Plaintiffs' amending their Complaint Defendant asserted that Plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action because they were seeking to recover damages on behalf of their independent contractors who had, among other things, allegedly lost commissions as the result of Defendant's activities. Defendant argues that such claims brought on behalf of the sales force are not permissible under Florida law.¹ In addition, Defendant has moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) for a more definite statement of Plaintiffs' allegations which it contends are disguised defamation claims that may be barred by the statute of limitations. The Court will address both of these arguments.

First, Plaintiffs have now filed an Amended Complaint that only seeks to recover damages allegedly suffered by the named Plaintiffs. Specifically, in Count I, Plaintiffs allege that they have a business relationship with their sales force of which Defendant was aware (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 66, 73); that Defendant intentionally and without privilege induced members of Plaintiffs' sales force to discontinue or not enter into a business relationship with Plaintiffs (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 67, 69-71); and, that as a result, Plaintiffs have suffered financial injury. (Amended Complaint ¶ 72). Similarly, in Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs make comparable allegations regarding their alleged business relationships with their customers. (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 80-92). Defendant suggests that because there are no allegations that Defendant made statements or sent literature directly to Plaintiffs' customers, Plaintiffs have failed to plead Count II adequately. The law in this Circuit is well-settled that "the `accepted rule' for appraising the sufficiency of a complaint is `that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.'" S.E.C., 835 F.2d at 272 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957)). Given that it does not appear beyond doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts entitling them to relief, the Court finds that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, Plaintiffs have adequately stated claims for tortious interference in Counts I and II of their Amended Complaint. Accordingly, those counts should not be dismissed on those grounds.

Second, Defendant makes a somewhat complex and clever argument in support of its motion for a more definite...