Primghar State Bank v. Rerick. Cnty. Treasurer

• Decision Date: 25 October 1895
• Citation: 64 N.W. 801,96 Iowa 238
• Parties: PRIMGHAR STATE BANK v. RERICK. COUNTY TREASURER, ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

96 Iowa 238

64 N.W. 801

PRIMGHAR STATE BANK

v.RERICK. COUNTY TREASURER, ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 25, 1895.

Appeal from district court, O'Brien county; George W. Wakefield, Judge.

Action in equity to enjoin the collection of certain taxes, and to recover taxes paid. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants for costs. The plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Ernest C. Herrick, for appellant.

Boies & Roth and T. J. Conn, for appellees.

ROBINSON, J.

The facts shown by the pleadings are substantially as follows: The plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of this state, and is engaged in the banking business. The defendants are the county of O'Brien and its treasurer. The shares of the capital stock of the plaintiff were, during all of the year 1891, owned by private individuals, none being owned by the plaintiff. For the year stated, shares of the capital stock of the plaintiff were assessed in its name at the sum of $6,500. The assessment thus made was duly returned by the assessor, and entered upon the tax lists of the county. Taxes to the amount of $422.50 were levied on account of the shares so assessed, one-half of which have been paid under protest. The plaintiff asks to have the assessment declared void, and seeks to recover the amount it has paid, and to have the defendants enjoined from collecting the remainder. A temporary injunction to restrain the collection was duly issued. The ground of demurrer alleged is that the facts stated in the petition do not entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded.

Section 1 of chapter 39 of the Acts of the 23d General Assembly is as follows: “Section 1. All shares of the capital stock of banking associations organized under the general incorporation laws of the state, known as state or commercial banks, shall be assessed to such banks in the city or town wherein located, and not to the individual shareholders.” It seems to be conceded that the plaintiff is a banking association within the meaning of that section, and that the assessment in question was made according to its provisions. It is claimed by the appellant that the provision is void, because in violation of portions of the constitution of this state, which are as follows: Article 1, § 6: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Article 3, § 30: “The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in the following cases: For the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county or road purposes. * * * In all the cases above enumerated and in all the cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state.” It is not necessary to the validity of an act that it operate upon all persons in the state alike. It is sufficient if it be general and uniform in its operation upon all persons in like situation, and this is true whether individuals or corporations are affected. McAunich v. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa, 343;Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 116. Nor is an act which prescribes a fixed and specific rule for the assessment of the property of one class of corporations or persons, different from that applicable to other classes, a special act, within the meaning of the constitution. Therefore it has been held that an act which provided a specific rule for the assessment of express and telegraph companies operating and doing business within this state, different from that applicable to the assessment of other property, was not a special law. Express Co. v. Ellyson, 28 Iowa, 374. And the same rule has been applied to the assessment of railway property. Central Iowa Ry. Co. v. Board of Sup'rs, 67 Iowa, 199, 25 N. W. 128;Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155. See, also, Missouri Val. & B. Ry. & Bridge Co. v. Harrison Co., 74 Iowa, 287, 37 N. W. 372. We are of the opinion that the statute in question is general, not because it operates upon all persons within the state alike, but because it applies alike to all banking associations organized under the general incorporation laws of the state, known as “state or commercial banks.”

It is said that taxes must be uniform, and, speaking in a general sense, that is true; but the rule means that all individuals and all classes must be required to share uniformly with like individuals and like classes the burdens of taxation. It does not mean that taxes may be required of some which are not exacted of others, but that all persons subject to the same conditions must be uniformly taxed. Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa, 38. Absolute uniformity and equality of taxation in all cases, and with respect to all kinds of property, are not practicable. City of Dubuque v. Chicago, D. & M. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 196; Cooley, Tax'n, 164 et seq. It is claimed that the statute in question is unconstitutional because it applies a rule of taxation to the associations to which it refers different from that applied to national banking associations doing business within the state. Code, §§ 818, 819, provide that all shares of such bankingassociations shall be included in the valuation of the personal property of their owner, in the assessment of taxes in the township, incorporated town, or city, where the association is located and not elsewhere; that the shares shall be listed by the principal accounting officer of the association, and that the association shall be liable to pay the taxes thereon, and for that purpose shall retain so much of any dividend belonging to the shareholder as shall be necessary to pay the taxes levied upon his shares. These provisions make the association liable on the taxes levied upon the shares of a stockholder only to the amount of dividends which may be payable on account of the shares, and possibly for other property of the shareholders, if any, under the control of the association. Hershire v. Bank, 35 Iowa, 272. But the shares must be assessed as the property of their owner. An assessment of them to the association is void. Bank v. Hoffmann (Iowa) 61 N. W. 418....