Pringle v. Wolfe
| Decision Date | 28 June 1996 |
| Citation | 668 N.E.2d 1376,646 N.Y.S.2d 82,88 N.Y.2d 426 |
| Parties | , 668 N.E.2d 1376 Michael PRINGLE, Respondent, v. Terrance M. WOLFE, as Town Justice of the Town of Walworth, et al., Defendants, and Patricia B. Adduci, as Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of New York, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
In an effort to reduce the incidence of drunk driving on New York's roadways, the State Legislature enacted the prompt suspension law (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e][7], which under certain circumstances mandates the suspension of a driver's license to operate a motor vehicle pending prosecution for driving while intoxicated. We hold that the prompt suspension law accords with due process requirements.
To supplement the government's arsenal in its war against drunk driving, the Legislature enacted Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(2)(e)(7), commonly known as the prompt suspension law (L.1994, ch. 312). 1 Designed to provide "an efficient and effective means of balancing the need to maintain safe highways for the public and the rights of the criminal defendant" (Mem. of Div. of Budget, Bill Jacket, L.1994, ch. 312), the prompt suspension law requires the suspension, pending prosecution, of the license of a driver charged with driving while intoxicated. Specifically, the law mandates that before the conclusion of all proceedings necessary for arraignment, the Judge must suspend the driver's license of a person charged with driving while intoxicated upon determining that the accusatory instrument is sufficient on its face and finding reasonable cause to believe that the driver operated a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of .10 of 1% as evidenced by the results of a chemical test (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e][7][a], [b]. 2
Michael Pringle was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated per se and driving while intoxicated (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2], [3] ). Before Pringle was arraigned on these charges, he instituted this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the prompt suspension law (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e][7] is unconstitutional, and an order enjoining its enforcement against him. Supreme Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the suspension of Pringle's license pending prosecution and thereafter granted Pringle's motion for summary judgment declaring that the prompt suspension law provides insufficient procedural protection in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Federal and State Constitutions. The Commissioner appeals to this Court as of right (CPLR 5601[b][2] and we now reverse.
It is well established that a driver's license is a substantial property interest that may not be deprived without due process of law (see, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 90). The issue on appeal, then, is what process is due to protect against the risk of its erroneous deprivation (id., at 539-540, 91 S.Ct. at 1589-90; see, Curiale v. Ardra Ins. Co., 88 N.Y.2d 268, 274-275, 644 N.Y.S.2d 663, 667 N.E.2d 313). To determine whether the temporary license deprivation worked by the prompt suspension law accords with due process requirements, we employ the balancing test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 and elucidated in subsequent cases upholding the procedural adequacy of driver's license suspension schemes (see, Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112, 103 S.Ct. 3513, 77 L.Ed.2d 1267; Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321; Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172). We also bear in mind that the prompt suspension law, a legislative enactment, is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, which will only be rebutted by a showing of the statute's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt (see, City of New York v. State of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 479, 485, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154, 562 N.E.2d 118). The due process inquiry consists of a balancing of the following interests:
"First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail" (Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903, supra ).
To determine the impact of the prompt suspension law on the private interest at stake--which can be generally defined as the substantial interest in retaining one's license to drive pending criminal prosecution--we consider the availability and timing of a judicial hearing, the duration of the suspension, and the availability of hardship relief (see, Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11-12, 99 S.Ct. at 2617-18, supra ). As the following analysis demonstrates, the severity of the prompt suspension law is tempered by the driver's right to a presuspension judicial hearing, its temporary duration, and the availability of a conditional license and hardship relief.
Under the prompt suspension law, the court must hold a suspension hearing before the conclusion of the proceedings required for arraignment and before the driver's license may be suspended (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e][7][b]. At the suspension hearing, the court must first determine whether the accusatory instrument is sufficient on its face and next whether there exists reasonable cause to believe that the driver operated a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol level in excess of .10 of 1% as shown by a chemical test (id.). The court may not order suspension of the license unless it has in its possession the results of the chemical test, and, as the Commissioner concedes, these results must be presented to the court in certified, documented form (see, CPLR 4518[c] ). If the Judge affirms the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument and finds reasonable cause to believe the driver operated a motor vehicle with the proscribed blood alcohol level as evidenced by the documented results of a reliable chemical test, a prima facie showing for license suspension has been established.
Once the prima facie showing is made, the statute provides that the driver "shall be entitled to an opportunity to make a statement regarding these two issues and to present evidence to rebut the court's findings" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e][7][b]. In interpreting this language, Supreme Court concluded that the statute requires that the court order the license suspension once a prima facie showing is made but before the driver is given an opportunity to present evidence--in effect denying the driver a right to be heard--which formed the basis of Supreme Court's ruling of unconstitutionality. Because it is meaningless to allow the driver to "rebut the court's findings" after the suspension is ordered, we reject Supreme Court's myopic reading of the statutory language and hold that the driver is entitled to present evidence to rebut the court's tentative findings before the court may order the license suspension.
Pringle further contends that the statute provides inadequate notice of the license suspension proceeding. We disagree. First, the statute provides clear notice that the license suspension hearing will be held before the conclusion of all proceedings required for the arraignment (see, People v. Demperio, 86 N.Y.2d 549, 552, 634 N.Y.S.2d 672, 658 N.E.2d 718; see also, Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381, 386, 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 [ ]. In addition, at the time of arrest, the driver is notified of the specific criminal charges and of the time and place of arraignment, eliminating any possibility that the suspension will be ordered in the driver's absence. Finally, the statute expressly provides that the driver is "entitled to an opportunity * * * to present evidence tending to rebut the court's findings," which we construe as requiring an adequate opportunity to prepare for the license suspension hearing (see, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 143, 149, 459 N.Y.S.2d 743, 446 N.E.2d 428; McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 150). Thus, it would be incumbent on the court to grant a driver's reasonable request for a short adjournment if necessary to marshal evidence to rebut the prima facie showing of "reasonable cause."
Aside from the availability of a presuspension hearing, the impact of the license suspension is tempered by its limited duration and the availability of relief from its terms. As a general rule, the prompt suspension law mandates the suspension of full driving privileges only until the disposition of the criminal proceeding. Although subject to procedural variations throughout the State, its duration is always constrained by the speedy trial limits of CPL 30.30. After a mandatory suspension period of 30 days, moreover, the driver is entitled to apply to the Commissioner for a "conditional" license (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2][e][7][d]. The conditional license, as prescribed by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1196, permits the operation of a motor vehicle to and from a place of employment,...
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