Private Industry Council of Kanawha County v. Gatson

• Decision Date: 20 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 23572,23572
• Citation: 483 S.E.2d 550,199 W.Va. 204
• Parties: PRIVATE INDUSTRY COUNCIL OF KANAWHA COUNTY, Petitioner Below, Petitioner, v. Cathy S. GATSON, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, Andrew N. Richardson, Commissioner, Bureau of Employment Programs, The Board of Review and Shelly Huffman, Respondents Below, Respondents.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Page 550

483 S.E.2d 550

199 W.Va. 204

PRIVATE INDUSTRY COUNCIL OF KANAWHA COUNTY, Petitioner Below, Petitioner, v. Cathy S. GATSON, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, Andrew N. Richardson, Commissioner, Bureau of Employment Programs, The Board of Review and Shelly Huffman Respondents Below, Respondents.

No. 23572.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 22, 1997.

Decided Feb. 20, 1997.

[199 W.Va. 205] Syllabus by the Court

1. " 'The findings of fact of the Board of Review of the West Virginia Department of Employment Security are entitled to substantial deference unless a reviewing court believes the findings are clearly wrong. If the question on review is one purely of law, no deference is given and the standard of judicial review by the court is de novo.' Syl. pt. 3, Adkins v. Gatson, 192 W.Va. 561, 453 S.E.2d 395 (1994)." Syl. Pt. 1, Raleigh County Bd. of Educ. v. Gatson, 196 W.Va. 137, 468 S.E.2d 923 (1996).

2. " 'Unemployment compensation statutes, being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed to achieve the benign purposes intended to the full extent thereof.' Syllabus point 6, Davis v. Hix, 140 W.Va. 398, 84 S.E.2d 404 (1954)." Syllabus, Mercer County Bd. of Educ. v. Gatson, 186 W.Va. 251, 412 S.E.2d 249 (1991).

3. " ' '[S]ubstantial unilateral changes in the terms of employment furnish 'good cause involving fault on the part of the employer' which justify employee termination of employment and preclude disqualification from the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits.' Syllabus Point 2, in part, Murray v. Rutledge, W.Va. , 327 S.E.2d 403 (1985).' Syllabus, Brewster v. Rutledge, 176 W.Va. 265, 342 S.E.2d 232 (1986)." Syl. Pt. 1, Wolford v. Gatson, 182 W.Va. 674, 391 S.E.2d 364 (1990).

Karen H. Miller, Todd A. Mount, Charleston, for Petitioner.

Jack W. DeBolt, Charleston, for Shelly Huffman.

PER CURIAM:

This is an unemployment compensation case that is before this Court upon a writ of certiorari from a final order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, entered on February 26, 1996. See W.Va.Code § 21A-7-27 (1970). The petitioner, Private Industry Council of Kanawha County, challenges a determination by the circuit court that the respondent, Shelly Huffman, is not disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. ¹ Petitioner contends on appeal that it was error for the circuit court to find that the respondent voluntarily left her employment with good cause involving fault on the part of the petitioner. We agree and reverse.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The respondent was employed by the petitioner from October 1, 1983 to February 28, 1993. The respondent's job position, at the time she terminated her employment, was that of executive director. The respondent held the position of executive director from May 22, 1986, to the date she left her employment. The record indicates that the petitioner provided the respondent with the use of a vehicle for business and personal matters throughout most of her tenure as executive director. ² On August 1, 1992, the petitioner informed the respondent that she could no longer use the vehicle for personal matters. The record indicates that the petitioner made the decision to terminate respondent's personal use of the vehicle after being informed by its insurance carrier that coverage was not provided for personal use by the respondent.

On February 28, 1993, the respondent quit her employment with the petitioner because of the new policy restricting her use of the vehicle for business purposes only. ³ Subsequent to resigning her position with the petitioner, respondent filed for unemployment compensation benefits. The Commissioner of the Bureau of Employment Programs, by decision dated January 29, 1993, found the respondent was eligible for benefits and was not disqualified from receiving benefits, because she "left work voluntarily with good cause involving fault on the part of the employer." The petitioner appealed the decision awarding unemployment benefits to the administrative law judge (ALJ). By order dated July 14, 1993, the ALJ reversed the Commissioner's decision after finding the respondent was "eligible for benefits but disqualified indefinitely as she left work voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of the employer."

The respondent thereafter appealed the decision of the ALJ to the Board of Review. By order dated December 2, 1993, the Board of Review reversed the decision of the ALJ after concluding: "Claimant is eligible for benefits and not disqualified. Claimant left work voluntarily with good cause involving fault on the part of the employer." The petitioner thereafter sought review of the Board of Review's decision before the circuit court. By order entered February 26, 1996, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review. This petition for certiorari followed. We now reverse.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review of a decision from the Board of Review is set out in syllabus point 1 of Raleigh County Bd. of Educ. v. Gatson, 196 W.Va. 137, 468 S.E.2d 923 (1996):

" 'The findings of fact of the Board of Review of the West Virginia Department of Employment Security are entitled to substantial deference unless a reviewing court believes the findings are clearly wrong. If the question on review is one purely of law, no deference is given and the standard of judicial review by the court is de novo.' Syl. pt. 3, Adkins v. Gatson, 192 W.Va. 561, 453 S.E.2d 395 (1994)."

See also Syllabus, Belt v. Rutledge, 175 W.Va. 28, 330 S.E.2d 837 (1985); Syllabus, Oyler v. Cole, 171 W.Va. 402, 299 S.E.2d 13 (1982); Syl. pt. 1, Kisamore v. Rutledge, 166 W.Va. 675, 276 S.E.2d 821 (1981). ⁴ We pointed out in the single syllabus of Mercer County Bd. of Educ. v. Gatson, 186 W.Va. 251, 412 S.E.2d 249 (1991) that " '[u]nemployment compensation statutes, being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed to achieve the benign purposes intended to the full extent thereof.' Syllabus point 6, Davis v. Hix, 140 W.Va. 398, 84 S.E.2d 404 (1954)." To this end our decisions have been constant that "unemployment compensation statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant[.]" Davenport v. Gatson, 192 W.Va 117, 119, 451 S.E.2d 57, 59 (1994). See also, Courtney v. Rutledge, 177 W.Va. 232, 351 S.E.2d 419 (1986); London v. Board of Review of Dept. of Employment, 161 W.Va. 575, 244 S.E.2d 331 (1978). However, "[t]his 'liberality' rule is not to be utilized when its application would require us to ignore the plain language of the statute." Adkins, 192 W.Va. at 565, 453 S.E.2d at 399. (Citation omitted).

This Court has recognized that West Virginia's statutory eligibility and disqualification provisions concerning the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits constitute a two-step process. Hill v. Board of Review, 166 W.Va. 648, 276 S.E.2d 805 (1981). The first step involves determining whether an individual is eligible to receive such benefits, and the second step is to consider whether the individual is disqualified. Lough v. Cole, 172 W.Va. 730, 310 S.E.2d 491 (1983). In the instant case the respondent has been determined to be eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits at every level of the proceedings, and the petitioner does not contest that determination. Therefore, the sole issue before this Court concerns disqualification of the respondent under W.Va.Code § 21A-6-3(1) (1990), which provides:

Upon the determination of the facts by the commissioner, an individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

(1) For the week in which he left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of the employer and until the individual returns to covered employment and has been employed in covered employment at least thirty working days. (Emphasis added).

III. DISCUSSION

The Board of Review's determination that the respondent was not disqualified from receiving benefits was grounded on the following factual findings: (1) the petitioner discontinued personal use of the car by the respondent; (2) the value of the car to the respondent was $492.00 per month; and (3) a disagreement between the petitioner and respondent regarding her duties. Based upon these factual findings the Board of Review reached the legal conclusion "that a substantial unilateral change in the terms and conditions of" respondent's employment occurred, which "constitute[d] good cause involving fault on the part of the employer for an individual to quit her employment." A review of cases in which this Court has identified a substantial unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment are helpful to properly analyze this case. In syllabus point 1 of Wolford v. Gatson, 182 W.Va. 674, 391 S.E.2d 364 (1990) we held:

" ' '[S]ubstantial unilateral changes in the terms of employment furnish 'good cause involving fault on the part of the employer' which justify employee termination of employment and preclude disqualification from the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits.' Syllabus Point 2, in part, Murray v. Rutledge, W.Va. , 327 S.E.2d 403 (1985).' Syllabus, Brewster v. Rutledge, 176 W.Va. 265, 342 S.E.2d 232 (1986)."

In Wolford the claimant's terms of employment were unilaterally changed when her hours were cut approximately 25% and her regular duties were changed to include cleaning the employer's home as part of her regular employment. We found these changes were substantial enough to constitute good cause involving fault of the employer.

In Brewster the claimant's hourly rate of pay was unilaterally reduced from $3.35 per hour to $2.25 per hour and his job duties were changed to include janitorial work. The claimant told his employer he would not agree to perform the additional janitorial work and quit. We concluded that these substantial unilateral changes constituted good cause.

In Murray we held that changing a claimant's...