Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Inc. v. Baitinger, 83-1552
Decision Date | 26 June 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-1552,83-1552 |
Citation | 452 So.2d 140 |
Parties | The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC., Appellant, v. Herbert M. BAITINGER, Jr. and Jocelyn G. Baitinger, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Gail Baitinger Johnson, Deceased, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Wicker, Smith, Blomqvist, Tutan, O'Hara, McCoy, Graham & Lane and Shelley H. Leinicke, Miami, for appellant.
Lyons & Farrar and Marsha Lyons, Miami, for appellees.
Before NESBITT, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
Prudential Insurance Company of America (Prudential) appeals an order of the probate court requiring payment of $250,000 in insurance benefits to the personal representatives of Gail Johnson's estate. We affirm the order under review.
Gail Johnson died intestate on August 4, 1983, the apparent victim of a homicide. Shortly thereafter, her widower, Lee Johnson, was arrested and subsequently convicted and adjudicated guilty of the first degree murder of his wife. His appeal from that conviction is still pending.
At the time of her death, Gail Johnson was covered by life insurance policies issued by Prudential and two other insurance companies. The Prudential policy is in the amount of $250,000 and names Lee Johnson as the beneficiary. Following Johnson's conviction, the probate court ordered Prudential to pay the proceeds of the policy to the personal representatives of Gail Johnson's estate. Prudential appeals this order.
Under section 732.802(3), Florida Statutes (1983), a named beneficiary of a life insurance policy who unlawfully and intentionally kills the insured is not entitled to any benefits under the policy. In this regard, the statute essentially codifies the supreme court's holding in Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153 (Fla.1956). Although in the absence of a conviction of murder, the court may determine whether the killing was "unlawful and intentional" by the "greater weight of the evidence," § 732.802(5), the record in the present case does not indicate the court made any such determination. The court, therefore, must have relied upon the statutory provision in section 732.802(5) that:
A final judgment of conviction of murder in any degree is conclusive for purposes of this section.
Prudential contends that the court could not rely upon Lee Johnson's judgment of conviction because it was not "final" since an appeal thereof was pending. Prudential relies principally upon Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So.2d 304 (1947), wherein the supreme court held that, for purposes of conviction under Florida's habitual criminal statute, if an appeal has been taken, a judgment of conviction does not become final until it has been affirmed by the appellate court. We find, however, that Joyner is not controlling in the instant case.
Our primary concern in the realm of statutory interpretation is to vindicate the legislative intent. Moldofsky v. Stregack, 449 So.2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). In doing so, we must look at each separate and distinct legislative enactment independently. Therefore, the supreme court's interpretation of "final judgment of conviction" for purposes of the habitual criminal statute in Joyner is not necessarily controlling in other areas. See DePaulis v. Judges of District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 373 So.2d 663 (Fla.1979) ( ). See also Weathers v. State, 56 So.2d 536 (Fla.1952) ( ). (emphasis added).
In determining the legislative intent behind section 732.802, it is extremely helpful to compare the present statute with its predecessor. The prior statute stated that "[a] person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to take any part of his estate as a devisee." § 732.802, Fla.Stat. (1981). 1 That statute applied only to property that would pass by intestacy or through the decedent's will. Carter. In 1982, the legislature expanded the scope of the section to prevent a killer from receiving property passing outside the decedent's estate. See § 732.802(2) ( ); 2 § 732.802(3) ( ); 3 § 732.802(4) ( ). 4 Additionally, the former statute required a criminal conviction of murder as a prerequisite to a forfeiture of the killer's interest in the decedent's estate. See Peeples v. Corbett, 117 Fla. 213, 157 So. 510 (1934). See also Nable v. Estate of Godfrey, 403 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) ( ). The present statute, on the other hand, does not require a conviction of murder. In the absence of such a conviction, it specifically provides for a civil homicide proceeding where the standard of proof is "the greater weight of the evidence." § 732.802(5).
The foregoing clearly illustrates that the legislature intended to make it more difficult for a killer to receive any beneficial interest as a result of his wrongdoing. 5 See State v. Rodriquez, 365 So.2d 157 (Fla.1978) (). Accord State v. Gale Distributors, Inc., 349 So.2d 150 (Fla.1977). The legislature, thereby, was acting in accordance with the public policy expressed in Carter. 6 The change in the statutory language from "convicted of the murder" in the former statute, to "final judgment of conviction of murder" in the present statute was merely stylistic. See DePaulis (insertion of the word "judgment" was not intended to alter the policy, it was designed only to resolve a potential ambiguity in the word "conviction"; the committee intended the finality of conviction to be the adjudication of guilt); State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla.1981) (). We hold that the legislature intended that "final judgment of conviction" mean an adjudication of guilt by the trial court and that such would be conclusive for purposes of section 732.802. See DePaulis.
Lee Johnson was tried, convicted and adjudicated guilty of the first degree murder of his wife. This was conclusive for purposes of determining his interest in the insurance proceeds as the named beneficiary in the policy covering his wife's life. § 732.802(5). Pursuant to the statute, Lee Johnson was entitled to no benefits under the policy, and the policy became payable as though he had predeceased his wife. § 732.802(3). The proceeds, therefore, were payable to any alternative beneficiaries designated in the policy, Carter, or absent such designation, to the decedent's estate.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order requiring Prudential to pay the policy proceeds to the personal representatives of Gail Johnson's estate.
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