Pruitt, In re, 38162
| Decision Date | 02 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 38162,38162 |
| Citation | 288 S.E.2d 208,249 Ga. 190 |
| Parties | In re Glyndon C. PRUITT. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert E. Andrews, Gainesville, for Glyndon C. Pruitt.
Jeff C. Wayne, Bruce L. Udoff, Dist. Attys., Charles Henry Frier, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gainesville.
Omar W. Franklin, Jr., General Counsel State Bar, Victor Alexander, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel State Bar, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Kathryn Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen. amicus curiae.
This case involves a contempt citation against an attorney who failed to appear in court when scheduled. A hearing on the question was conducted and the trial judge found Pruitt to be in willful contempt.
Appellant Glyndon C. Pruitt is a resident of Gwinnett County and practices law both in Gwinnett and Hall Counties. On the mornings of May 12 and May 13, 1981, the trial judge found that appellant was not present when Judge Palmour called the criminal calendar in the Superior Court of Hall County, although appellant was attorney of record for two of the defendants on the calendar. At 2:30 p. m. on May 13, 1981, Judge Palmour called one of those two cases for trial. Appellant was handling a non-jury case in Gwinnett County at this time, but another lawyer, Mr. Don Peevy, announced that he was answering for appellant and that he would strike a jury then if the court insisted, but he would prefer to wait and let appellant handle the entire case. Court was then recessed until appellant could arrive, some forty-five minutes later.
Judge Palmour issued an order directed to appellant requiring him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. This proceeding was referred to the Chief Judge of the Northeastern Judicial Circuit, who assigned Judge Scoggin to hear and adjudicate the matter. Appellant filed his traverse to the citation, urging in his defense that he did appear for calendar call on May 12, 1981, that the district attorney approved in advance his absence from the May 13 calendar call, and that on the afternoon of May 13, 1981, his absence was not willful or intentional, but was caused by conflicts in court schedules and that he had arranged for Mr. Peevy to appear as necessary in his behalf until he could arrive.
On August 14, 1981, the contempt proceeding came to trial. Both sides presented oral and documentary evidence surrounding the events of May 12 and May 13. Additionally, Judge Palmour testified as to seven prior instances, from November, 1978 through November, 1980, in which appellant had failed to appear in court before him when scheduled to do so. Appellant presented evidence and testimony offering explanations to justify his conduct on these prior occasions, and he pointed out that none of these prior episodes had resulted in a contempt citation or other punishment from the court. On September 1, 1981, Judge Scoggin adjudicated appellant to be in contempt and as punishment, ordered that appellant's name be stricken for one year from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice in the Superior Courts of the Northeastern Judicial Circuit and suspended appellant from practicing law in that circuit for a period of one year. On September 3, 1981, appellant filed his notice of appeal. He also filed his motion for supersedeas, which was granted on the same day.
(1) The evidence supports the trial judge's finding of contempt. While the charges against appellant were disputed by him, there was ample evidence on which the trial judge could base his decision. The trial judge's finding of contempt was not clearly erroneous and must be upheld.
(2) Appellant's second enumeration of error is that the punishment imposed on him by the trial court for contempt--suspension from the practice of law for one year in the Northeastern Judicial Circuit of Georgia--is not a punishment authorized by the laws of the State of Georgia. We agree.
The order of the trial court reads, in relevant part, as follows:
The basis of the punishment imposed in this case is subject to only one interpretation--it is punishment for contempt. While the trial court characterizes this punishment as an "alternative remedy, stemming from inherent judicial authority," it is clear from the context in which it was imposed that it was a punishment for contempt. This lawyer was cited for contempt. He was called before the trial judge to answer this charge of contempt. In its order, the trial court states that the most important power of the Court is the power to punish for contempt. The trial court found Pruitt to be in willful contempt. At no point during the proceedings was Pruitt advised that the purpose of this hearing was other than an adjudication of the current contempt charge against him. The punishment imposed by the trial court can only be characterized as punishment for contempt.
Viewed as a punishment for contempt, this suspension was not authorized under Georgia law. The trial court is correct when it notes that the power to punish for contempt is an inherent power of the superior courts in Georgia. Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168, 36 S.E. 630 (1900). Since the writings of Blackstone, it has been recognized that the power to punish for contempt is necessarily inherent in all common law courts of record. 1 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 282-288. The rationale which supports the contempt power is that a court may be unable to preserve order in judicial proceedings or to bring about the administration of justice without the power to punish those who refuse to obey its rulings and orders. Bradley, supra, at 170, 36 S.E. 630.
While it is clear that our courts have the inherent power to punish...
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