Irvin, In re, 67845
| Decision Date | 16 July 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 67845,67845 |
| Citation | 171 Ga.App. 794,321 S.E.2d 119 |
| Parties | In re IRVIN. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Peter Zack Geer, Albany, for appellant.
J. Brown Moseley, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
On July 11, 1983, agents of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation intercepted a drug trafficking operation involving a single engine airplane which landed on a rural road in Baker County loaded with approximately 400 pounds of cocaine valued at $85.5 million. Four individuals were apprehended in connection with this event, indicted on July 18, 1983, and arraigned on August 5, 1983.
Following the arraignment hearing the district attorney presented evidence regarding the facilities of the Baker County jail and personnel of the Baker County sheriff's department. The sheriff of Baker County (respondent herein) testified that he did not have the proper personnel and facilities to securely maintain the custody of the four drug traffickers considering the size of the jail and having other prisoners. The superior court being concerned for the security of the defendants directed the housing and transfer of the defendants to the county jails of three nearby counties. The superior court judge stated: "... I am going to direct that [one defendant] be housed in the Calhoun County jail; that [defendant] Brown be housed in the Bainbridge, Decatur County jail; that [another defendant] be housed in the Grady County jail; and that [the remaining defendant] be housed in the Calhoun County jail.
"If you will please notify the sheriffs of those counties that they can come pick up those individuals, and the county commissioners need to be advised that the county will be billed for the expenses associated in connection with the housing of the defendants during whatever period of time it is necessary." These directions by the superior court instructed the respondent to transfer defendant Brown from the Baker County jail to the Decatur County jail in the same judicial circuit. Respondent failed to comply with the superior court's directions that he transfer defendant Brown. Thereafter, on August 10, 1983, defendant Brown was freed from the Baker County jail by force of arms by unknown individuals and remains at large.
Subsequently, a rule nisi issued and was served upon respondent sheriff directing him to appear to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court by reason of his failure to comply with the superior court's directions as to transferring the custody of the defendant Brown, and also ordering respondent to show cause why he should not be temporarily suspended as sheriff of Baker County. Following a hearing the superior court entered its order finding respondent in contempt of court, directing that respondent be incarcerated for a period of 20 days and pay a fine of $500. The order further stated that respondent be temporarily suspended as sheriff of Baker County until further order of the superior court. Respondent appeals. Held:
1. The superior court's direction to transfer the defendants was accomplished orally, and no written order was entered upon the record in the superior court directing respondent to accomplish this transfer. "What the judge orally declares is no judgment until it has been put in writing and entered as such." McRae v. Smith, 164 Ga. 23, 24(7), 137 S.E. 390. See also Tyree v. Jackson, 226 Ga. 690, 694 (2), 177 S.E.2d 160; Boynton v. Reeves, 226 Ga. 202, 203, 173 S.E.2d 702; Myers v. Wilson, 167 Ga.App. 340, 342(2), 306 S.E.2d 401.
The respondent sheriff argues that as the directions of the superior court were oral rather than written those directions were unenforceable, void and not a valid basis for an adjudication of contempt. This may be correct in regard to OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(3). However, the superior court is also authorized to inflict summary punishment for contempt under the circumstances stated in OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(2). OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(2) provides that the superior court may inflict summary punishment for contempt of court predicated upon "[m]isbehavior of any of the officers of the courts in their official transactions."
Sheriffs are certainly officers of the superior court. See in this regard OCGA § 15-13-1 et seq. and OCGA § 15-16-1 et seq. Several of the duties of the sheriff involve custody and supervision of persons in custody awaiting trial. It seems clear that conduct of a sheriff in connection with a lawful order to transfer a defendant from the jail in his county to another jail is within the realm of official transactions engaged in by that sheriff. It also would appear that failure of a sheriff to obey a lawful direction by the trial court to transfer a defendant to a jail in another county is misbehavior on the part of the sheriff.
If OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(2) is construed to apply only to the disobedience by an officer of the court to a written order this provision of our Code is rendered meaningless in that it would be entirely redundant because duplicitous of the provisions of OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(3). The statutes must be construed so as to render meaning to each and every part where this is reasonably practical. State of Ga. v. C.S.B., 250 Ga. 261, 263, 297 S.E.2d 260. Therefore, we hold that OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(2) is intended to impose upon officers of the courts engaged in their official transactions a higher duty to the court than is demanded of the broader group of individuals listed in OCGA § 15-1-4(a)(3) who are arguably subject to the contempt powers only for failure to comply with those commands of the court spread upon the record in written form. Surely the interrelationship between the court and its officers is of such a complex and on-going nature as to render impractical any requirement that the court must render into a writing spread upon the record of the court any direction to an officer as a prerequisite to compelling obedience to its commands.
Relying upon Howington v. Wilson, 213 Ga. 664, 100 S.E.2d 726, the respondent contends that the superior court was without authority to direct the transfer of the defendants to the jails of other counties for safekeeping. However, in Whiddon v. State, 160 Ga.App. 777, 784, 287 S.E.2d 114, this court held that if there is anything in Howington which conflicts with the earlier unanimous full bench decision of Revel v. State, 26 Ga. 275, 276 it must yield to Revel. In Revel v. State, supra, the Supreme Court held that where the superior court determines that the jail of the county in which a defendant is held is insecure it is competent for the superior court to order the defendant to be committed to the jail of any county for safekeeping. Although Howington involved a defendant awaiting trial and Revel involved a defendant who had been convicted, no distinction of this nature is acknowledged by Whiddon v. State, supra, nor do we find any logical basis for such a distinction as in either case the concern for preserving the secure custody of the defendant is the same.
2. We find no authority for that portion of the superior court's order temporarily suspending respondent from his position as sheriff of Baker County. This suspension is purportedly predicated upon the superior court's inherent powers as contemplated by OCGA §§ 15-6-8 and 15-6-9. However, the power to remove officers is executive in its nature and the courts have no inherent power to remove elected officers. Re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 596, 14 N.E.2d 465, 467, 118 A.L.R. 166. A sheriff is an elected county officer. Constitution of Georgia of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. 1, Par. III.
As the factual issues were not submitted to a jury, this is clearly not an application of the provisions of OCGA § 15-6-82 (). Nor may the suspension be viewed as further punishment for contempt. In re Pruitt, 249 Ga. 190, 288 S.E.2d 208.
3. Miller v....
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Irvin, In re
...of Appeals reversed that portion of the trial court's order indefinitely suspending petitioner as sheriff. See In Re: Irvin, Sheriff, 171 Ga.App. 794, 321 S.E.2d 119 (1984). We granted certiorari in this case to determine (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Howington v. W......
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Smith, In re, A93A0021
...the record of the court any direction to an officer as a prerequisite to compelling obedience to its commands. In re Irvin, 171 Ga.App. 794, 796(1), 321 S.E.2d 119 (1984), modified on other grounds 254 Ga. 251, 328 S.E.2d 215 Although it certainly would have been preferable for the order to......
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In re Beckstrom
...as a prerequisite to compelling obedience to its commands. In re Smith, 211 Ga.App. at 495(1), 439 S.E.2d 725. See In re Irvin, 171 Ga.App. 794, 796(1), 321 S.E.2d 119 (1984), reversed in part on other grounds by 254 Ga. 251, 328 S.E.2d 215 (1985). Accordingly, Beckstrom was properly found ......
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State v. Luster
...that appealed count. Brittain, supra. We do not construe statutes to render any provision meaningless, see generally In re Irvin, 171 Ga.App. 794, 796, 321 S.E.2d 119 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 254 Ga. 251, 328 S.E.2d 215 (1985), and thus we reject Luster's argument that a spee......