Pruitt v. First Nat. Bank of Habersham County

• Decision Date: 25 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 53698,53698,2
• Citation: 235 S.E.2d 617,142 Ga.App. 100
• Parties: Benjamin PRUITT, Jr. v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF HABERSHAM COUNTY
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 617

235 S.E.2d 617

142 Ga.App. 100

Benjamin PRUITT, Jr. v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF HABERSHAM COUNTY.

No. 53698.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

April 25, 1977.

Adams & Clifton, Alton M. Adams, Toccoa, for appellant.

Griggs & Butterworth, James N. Butterworth, Winslow H. Verdery, Cornelia, for appellee.

BANKE, Judge.

The appellee petitioned for confirmation of a sale under power of property owned by the appellant subject to a security deed in the appellee's favor. The appellant contended that the property brought a price far below its true market value. The trial judge entered an order confirming the sale, from which judgment the appellant appeals.

The appellant contends that the trial judge erred in entering judgment against him without first finding the facts specially and in failing to state separately his conclusions of law as required by CPA § 52(a), Code Ann. § 81A-152(a) (Ga.L.1970, pp. 170, 171). The judge's order consisted of only one sentence of substance. The sentence was written in the lengthy style which is sometimes characteristic of legal writing. It recited that each statutory element for confirmation of a sale under power was met, that the judge was satisfied the property brought its true market value, and that the sale was confirmed. Findings of fact were not stated separately from conclusions of law. There was no specific finding of fact made as to the market value of the land an issue which was hotly contested at the trial. We hold that the trial judge did not meet the requirements of CPA § 52(a) for findings of fact and conclusions of law.

1. Findings of fact and conclusions of law required by CPA § 52(a) are mandatory. Doyal Development Co. v. Blair, 234 Ga. 261, 215 S.E.2d 471 (1975). One reason for the requirement is to enable an appellate court adequately to review the judgment rendered. Brown v. Brown, 237 Ga. 201, 227 S.E.2d 360 (1976). When a trial judge enters an order with merely a dry recitation that certain legal requirements have been met, adequate appellate review of the trial judge's decision making process is effectively prevented. In National Lead Co. v. Western Lead Products Co., 291 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1961), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which is identical in all relevant particulars to CPA § 52(a), was held to require more than a paraphrase of statutory requirements and an ultimate conclusion. Likewise, in the case sub judice, a paraphrase of the statutory requirements for confirmation of a sale under power and an ultimate conclusion will not suffice as findings of fact and conclusions of law.

2. Possibly the most important reason for the requirements of CPA § 52(a) is to evoke care on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining the facts. See C. Wright and A. Miller, 9 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2571, p. 680 (1971). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized this function, stating that judges "will give more careful consideration to the problem if they are required to state not only the end result of their inquiry, but the process by which they reached it," United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199, 84 S.Ct. 639, 643, 11 L.Ed.2d 629 (1964).

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Frank, stated: "It is sometimes said that the requirement that the trial judge file findings of fact is for the convenience of the upper courts. While it does serve that end, it has a far more important purpose that of evoking care on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining the facts. For, as every judge knows, to set down in precise words the facts as he finds them is the best way to avoid carelessness in the discharge of that duty: Often a strong impression that, on the basis of the evidence, the facts are thus-and-so gives way when it comes to...