Pruitt v. Knight Pub. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 110,110
• Citation: 289 N.C. 254,221 S.E.2d 355
• Parties: Richard G. PRUITT v. KNIGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY, Employee-Defendant, Travelers Insurance Company, Carrier-Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 355

221 S.E.2d 355

289 N.C. 254

Richard G. PRUITT v. KNIGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY, Employee-Defendant, Travelers Insurance Company, Carrier-Defendant.

No. 110.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 29, 1976.

Spears, Spears, Barnes, Baker & Boles by Alexander H. Barnes, Durham, for defendants-appellants.

Palmer, Pittman & Campbell, P.A., by Bryan W. Pittman, Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellee.

HUSKINS, Justice:

We note at the outset that G.S. 97--33, pertaining to the prorating of permanent disability between injuries compensable under G.S. 97--31 and injuries sustained in military service or in another employment, is not applicable to this case. That statute is designed to prevent double recoveries. See Schrum v. Upholstering Co., 214 N.C. 353, 199 S.E. 385 (1938). Likewise, G.S. 97--34 and G.S. 97--35 are inapplicable here. Application of those statutes is restricted to those instances where the employee (1) receives an injury for which compensation is payable while he is still receiving or entitled to compensation for a previous injury in the same employment, or (2) receives a permanent injury specified in G.S. 97--31 after having sustained another permanent injury in the same employment. Here, plaintiff's earlier back injury arose out of a noncompensable automobile accident, separate and apart from any employment whatever. We therefore put aside all questions raised concerning these statutes.

This appeal presents two determinative questions:

1. Is plaintiff bound by the written agreement on I.C. Form 26 dated 6 June 1974, and approved by the Commission, wherein defendants agreed to pay and plaintiff agreed to accept compensation based on a 10 percent permanent partial disability of his back?

2. Where an employee is paid compensation for a period of temporary total disability caused by a compensable injury which materially aggravated a preexisting 25 percent permanent partial loss of use of the back so that the employee had a 35 percent permanent partial loss of use of the back at the end of the healing period, is the employee entitled to compensation under G.S. 97--31(23) for 10 percent or 35 percent permanent partial loss of use of the back?

The Court of Appeals did not decide the first question under the mistaken notion that all parties had stipulated before the hearing commissioner that '(t)he sole question for determination in this case is whether allocation of the disability to plaintiff's back as rated by Dr. Goldner should be prorated, or whether the defendants should bear the entire responsibility for the disability.' The quoted language follows the last stipulation to which the parties agreed but is not a part of it. It is the conclusion reached by Deputy Commissioner Denson as to the question involved in this case following the hearing conducted before her in Durham on 1 November 1974. The inadvertence is understandable in view of the proximity of the quoted language to the stipulations.

We now consider the questions in the order listed.

G.S. 97--82 provides that an employer and an injured employee may reach an agreement in regard to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, execute a memorandum of the agreement in the form prescribed by the Industrial Commission, and file it with the Commission for approval. 'If approved by the Commission, thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be enforceable by the court's decree as hereinafter specified.' In approving a settlement agreement the Industrial Commission acts in a judicial capacity and the settlement as approved becomes an award enforceable, if necessary, by a court decree. Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777 (1953). The wisdom of the statutory provision authorizing voluntary agreements in the manner prescribed by the Commission has been demonstrated by the fact that, through the years, more than 95 percent of all claims for compensation based on industrial injuries have been disposed of by agreements executed in conformity with the statute. See Smith v. Red Cross, 245 N.C. 116, 95 S.E.2d 559 (1956).

G.S. 97--17 provides:

'Nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to to prevent settlements made by and between the employee and employer so long as the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment are in accordance with the provisions of this Article. A copy of such settlement agreement shall be filed by employer with and approved by the Industrial Commission: Provided, however, that no party to any agreement for compensation approved by the Industrial Commission shall thereafter be heard to deny the truth of the matters therein set forth, unless it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Commission that there has been error due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake, in which event the Industrial Commission may set aside such agreement.'

In interpreting and applying G.S. 97--17 and G.S. 97--82, it has been uniformly held that an agreement for the payment of compensation, when approved by the Commission, is as binding on the parties as an order, decision or award of the Commission unappealed from, or an award of the Commission affirmed upon appeal. Tabron v. Farms, Inc., 269 N.C. 393, 152...