Pruitt v. Neal
| Decision Date | 02 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–1880.,13–1880. |
| Citation | 788 F.3d 248 |
| Parties | Tommy R. PRUITT, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Ron NEAL, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, Respondent–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Marie F. Donnelly, Evanston, IL, Laurence E. Komp, Manchester, MO, for Petitioner–Appellant.
James Blaine Martin, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Respondent–Appellee.
Before BAUER, WILLIAMS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
Tommy R. Pruitt appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A jury in Indiana state court convicted Pruitt of murdering a deputy sheriff and he was sentenced to death. His petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raises four claims: (1) he is intellectually disabled and therefore categorically and constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty; (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to present evidence to support his claim of intellectual disability; (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present at the penalty phase mitigating evidence regarding his schizophrenia
and its effects; and (4) the prosecutor violated Pruitt's right to due process by reciting a poem about the death of a police officer and comparing Pruitt to notorious murderers in the closing argument of the penalty phase of trial, and appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this as an error on appeal. With regard to the second ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim ((3) above), Pruitt challenges only counsel's presentation of evidence at the penalty phase of trial; he is not asserting ineffectiveness in failing to seek a determination of guilty but mentally ill or in otherwise presenting mental health evidence at the guilt phase of trial.
We conclude that Pruitt has established that he is intellectually disabled and categorically ineligible for the death penalty and that trial counsel were ineffective in their investigation and presentation of evidence that Pruitt suffered from schizophrenia
. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
These facts are taken from the Indiana Supreme Court decision affirming Pruitt's conviction and sentence. Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90 (Ind.2005) (Pruitt I ), cert. denied, Pruitt v. Indiana, 548 U.S. 910, 126 S.Ct. 2936, 165 L.Ed.2d 962 (2006).
On June 14, 2001, Morgan County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Starnes stopped Pruitt's vehicle. Starnes obtained Pruitt's driver's license and registration, called that information in, and was told that a recent robbery report suggested Pruitt might be in possession of stolen weapons. When Starnes approached Pruitt's vehicle a second time, Pruitt emerged with a handgun, and the two exchanged gunfire. Starnes was struck by five shots. He was taken to the hospital and underwent surgery. He later developed an infection and died.
The state ultimately charged Pruitt with murder, attempted murder (Pruitt also shot Ryan Starnes, Deputy Starnes's son, who was accompanying his father as part of a college internship), and related offenses. The state sought the death penalty because Starnes was a law enforcement officer killed in the line of duty.
The trial court appointed attorneys William Van Der Pol, Jr. and Douglas Garner to represent Pruitt. Before trial Pruitt sought a determination of intellectual disability in a death sentence case, requesting that the court order an evaluation and dismiss the death penalty. The court ordered an evaluation of Pruitt and appointed forensic psychologist Dr. George W. Schmedlen, Ph.D., J.D., for that purpose.
The trial court conducted a week-long evidentiary hearing at which Pruitt presented two expert witnesses, clinical neuropsychologist Dr. Bryan A. Hudson, and clinical neuro-psychologist and professor of psychology Dr. Charles J. Golden, Ph.D., as well as non-expert testimony and other evidence in an effort to establish his intellectual disability. Pruitt's experts testified that Pruitt is intellectually disabled based on his IQ test scores and their assessment of his adaptive functioning. However, Dr. Schmedlen and the state's expert, psychologist Dr. Martin G. Groff, Ph.D., testified that Pruitt was not intellectually disabled. The trial court found that Pruitt “does not have significantly subaverage intellectual functioning,” Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d at 103, noting that at most, “Pruitt's functioning would be considered border-line—not [intellectually disabled],” id. at 104. The trial court also found “that the defense has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Pruitt has substantial impairment of adaptive behavior.” Id. at 108. The trial court was “particularly impressed with Mr. Pruitt's ability to function as a carpenter, obtain a commercial driver's license, perform duties of an over the road truck driver and fill out applications for employment.” Id. at 108–09. Therefore, the court denied Pruitt's motion to dismiss the death penalty.
At the guilt phase of the trial, the jury convicted Pruitt of murder, attempted murder, and related offenses. At the penalty phase, the defense presented evidence of Pruitt's background and intellectual disability. Drs. Hudson and Golden again testified that Pruitt is intellectually disabled, and Dr. Golden also testified about Pruitt's mental illness. The jury found that Deputy Starnes was a law enforcement officer acting in the course of his duty at the time he was murdered and that this aggravating circumstance outweighed any and all mitigating circumstances, and recommended a sentence of death. In imposing sentence for the convictions other than murder, the trial judge considered the “possible mitigating factors as presented in the[ ] proceedings” and found that none of them “constitute a mitigating circumstance.” Trial Tr. 6455. The judge also concluded that “Pruitt does not have a mental condition which would justify his actions or in any way mitigate for purposes of sentencing” and that the “aggravating factors outweigh any possible mitigating factors.” Id. at 6455–56. The judge sentenced Pruitt to a total of 115 years on the other offenses. In imposing sentence for murder, the judge found that the jury determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance that Starnes was a law enforcement officer acting in the course of his duty, that this aggravating circumstance outweighed any and all mitigating circumstances, and that a sentence of death should be imposed. The judge accordingly sentenced Pruitt to death.
Pruitt appealed his murder conviction and sentence directly to the Indiana Supreme Court; the court affirmed. Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d 90. Although that court concluded that the trial court's standard for assessing adaptive behavior was too restrictive and that the record did not support the trial court's conclusion with respect to adaptive behavior, id. at 109–110, it decided that the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion with respect to the intellectual functioning. The court explained:
While some of Pruitt's scores suggest significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, others do not. In addition to this data, the trial court found that Pruitt was able to fill out applications for employment and to have the capacity, if not the will at all times, to support himself. In light of the inconsistent IQ scores and the other evidence cited by the trial court, the trial court's finding that Pruitt did not meet the statutory test is consistent with this record.
Id. at 106. The Indiana Supreme Court therefore upheld the trial court's conclusion that Pruitt was not intellectually disabled. Id. at 106, 110. Justice Rucker dissented, concluding that Pruitt had shown that he is intellectually disabled and therefore a death sentence was unconstitutional and statutorily impermissible. Id. at 123–26.
Next, Pruitt petitioned for post-conviction relief. At the hearing on his petition, he presented testimony from newly retained experts as well as from psychologist Dr. Dennis Olvera, Ph.D., who had been retained by trial counsel to conduct IQ testing of Pruitt but had not testified at trial. Pruitt also presented evidence from his trial attorneys and appellate attorney, family, and educators. The post-conviction court denied Pruitt's petition and motion to correct errors, finding as to the intellectual disability claim that Pruitt's “additional evidence ... presented at the post-conviction hearing was largely cumulative of the evidence developed before and [during] trial and is entirely unpersuasive.” PCR App. 688.
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899 (Ind.2009) (Pruitt II ), reh'g denied, 907 N.E.2d 973 (Ind.2009). The court found that “Pruitt has offered no evidence undermining the correctness of the trial court's and this Court's findings that he is not [intellectually disabled]” and therefore concluded that his death sentence was not unconstitutional under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Pruitt II, 903 N.E.2d at 938 (quotation omitted). Justice Rucker again dissented on the basis of Pruitt's intellectual disability. Id. at 940.
Pruitt petitioned for writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The district court heard oral argument and then denied the petition. Pruitt v. Wilson, No. 3:09cv380RLM, 2012 WL 4513961 (N.D.Ind. Oct. 2, 2012). Pruitt moved the court to alter or amend its decision; the motion was denied. The district court granted Pruitt a certificate of appealability.
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